Eric McDowell v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 29, 2024
• Docket: 5:23-cv-02406
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 ERIC MCDOWELL et al., Case № 5:23-cv-02406-ODW (ASx)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 14 MOTION TO DISMISS [6] PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P. et 15 al.,

16 Defendants.

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiffs Eric McDowell, Noel Perez, and Aaron Stubbs bring this putative 20 class action for alleged California labor violations against Defendant Penske Truck 21 Leasing Co., L.P. (“Penske”). (Notice of Removal (“NOR”) Ex. A (“Compl.”), ECF 22 Nos. 1, 1-1.) Penske now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) to dismiss counts one, five, six, and seven of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 24 (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 6.) Penske also moves to partially 25 dismiss Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action to the extent that it is based on the violations 26 27 28 1 asserted in counts five, six, and seven. (Id.) For the following reasons, the Court 2 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Penske’s Motion.1 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 The following facts are taken from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ashcroft v. 5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that well-pleaded factual allegations are 6 accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss). 7 All three named Plaintiffs are employed by Penske, where they currently work 8 as technicians. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 15.) Plaintiffs allege that they consistently work 9 over eight hours per day and are not properly compensated for the work they do in 10 excess of eight hours. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 12, 16.) Furthermore, Penske no longer compensates 11 employees for the time that it takes to ready their workstations and change into their 12 required protective work uniforms. (Id. ¶ 24.) Penske halted that practice on 13 October 24, 2022. (Id.) 14 On March 22, 2023, Penske representatives and Western Region Automotive 15 Local Union (“Union”) representatives held a meeting to discuss why employees were 16 no longer compensated for the time spent changing into their uniforms at work. (Id. 17 ¶ 25.) Penske and Union representatives acknowledged that, before October 24, 2022, 18 Penske used to compensate employees for this time. (Id.) Penske representatives 19 further advised that this compensation stopped due to an update in their payroll 20 software, and assured the Union representatives that the issue would be addressed and 21 resolved. (Id.) However, despite these representations, the issue remains unresolved, 22 and Penske employees are still not paid for this time. (Id.) 23 On October 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this class action in San Bernardino County 24 Superior Court, asserting claims for: (1) unfair business practices, (2) failure to pay 25 minimum wages, (3) failure to pay overtime compensation, (4) failure to maintain 26 required records, (5) failure to provide itemized wage statements, (6) failure to timely 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 pay wages, (7) failure to pay all wages owed upon separation, and (8) Private Attorney 2 General Act (“PAGA”) violations. (Id. ¶¶ 38–91.) On November 27, 2023, Penske 3 removed the action to this Court. (See NOR, ECF No. 1.) 4 Penske now moves to dismiss the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action 5 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Mot. 2.) Penske also moves for partial dismissal of 6 Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action to the extent that it is based on violations asserted in 7 counts five, six, and seven. (Id.) 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 10 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 11 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 12 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 13 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 14 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 15 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual 17 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 18 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 20 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 21 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the 22 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . ‘as 23 true and . . . in the light most favorable’” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 24 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 25 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory 26 allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. 27 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 28 1 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 2 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 4 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court 5 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 6 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 7 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly 8 denied . . . if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City and County of San 9 Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Penske moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first, fifth, sixth, and seventh cause of 12 action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Mot. 6.) Penske also moves for partial dismissal of 13 Plaintiffs’ eighth claim under PAGA to the extent that it is based on the violations 14 asserted in claims five, six, and seven. Id. The Court will address each cause of 15 action in turn. 16 A. Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practices 17 Plaintiffs bring their first cause of action alleging violations of California’s 18 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), which prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or 19 fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Under the 20 UCL, a plaintiff may obtain restitution or injunctive relief for certain prohibited 21 business practices. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 22 1144 (2009). Because “[a] UCL action is equitable in nature,” money damages are 23 not available. Korea Supply, 29 Cal. 4th at 1144; see also Kaldenbach v. Mut. of 24 Omaha Life Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 847 (2009). 25 Accordingly, “the traditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal 26 courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party 27 requests restitution under the UCL.” Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 28 (9th Cir. 2020). UCL “plaintiffs are required, at a minimum, to plead that they lack an 1 adequate remedy at law.” Anderson v. Apple Inc., 500 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1009 2 (N.D. Cal. 2020). In other words, UCL plaintiffs must “allege some facts suggesting 3 that damages are insufficient to make them whole.” Franckowiak v. Scenario 4 Cockram USA, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-8569-JFW (PVCx), 2020 WL 9071697, at *2 5 (CD. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020). 6 Here, Plaintiffs fail to include in their Complaint an allegation that they lack an 7 adequate remedy at law. (See generally Compl.) District courts have consistently 8 dismissed UCL claims based entirely on Labor Code wage-and-hour violations that do 9 not allege the lack of an adequate legal remedy. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Wal-Mart 10 Assocs., No. 2:20-cv-1926-DSF (JCx), 2020 WL 6526372, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 11 2020) (“[I]n order to assert a claim for equitable restitution under the UCL in federal 12 court, the complaint must allege that the plaintiff lacks an adequate legal remedy.”); 13 Franckowiak, 2020 WL 9071697, at *3 (holding plaintiffs must successfully allege 14 that their legal remedies are inadequate to be able to proceed with their UCL claim). 15 Therefore, because Plaintiffs fail to plead the lack of an adequate legal remedy, 16 the Court GRANTS Penske’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action 17 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 18 B. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action: Itemized Wage Statements 19 Plaintiffs bring their fifth cause of action under California Labor Code 20 section 226(a), alleging that Penske failed to provide itemized wage statements. To be 21 actionable, California Labor Code section 226(e)(1) requires that an employer’s 22 failure to comply with section 226(a)2 be “knowing and intentional.” Cal. Lab. Code 23 § 226(e)(1). “Section 226(e)(3) explains that a ‘knowing and intentional failure’ does 24 not include an isolated and unintentional payroll error due to a clerical or inadvertent 25 mistake.” Novoa v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 26 2015). A plaintiff must therefore demonstrate that the defendant was “aware of the 27 2 Cal. Labor Code section 226(a) requires California employers to provide each employee with an 28 itemized wage statement containing certain specified information about employee’s hours, wages, and accruals. 1 factual predicate underlying the violation[s].” Id. at 1028. A plaintiff does not, 2 however, need to show that the employer knew its conduct was unlawful; it is enough 3 that the employer only had knowledge of the conduct itself. See Garnett v. ADT LLC, 4 139 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 5 Here, Plaintiffs adequately plead that Penske was aware of the conduct 6 underlying the alleged violation. Penske’s representatives acknowledged, during the 7 March 2023 meeting with the Union, that they had compensated employees for the 8 time spent changing into their uniforms up until October 24, 2022. (Compl. ¶ 24.) 9 This acknowledgment, as well as representations that the ongoing issue with the 10 payroll system would be resolved, indicates Penske’s awareness of the facts 11 underlying the claim. See Garnett, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (holding that a relevant 12 factor in determining whether the “knowing and intentional” element is satisfied is 13 whether the employer had, prior to the alleged violation, adopted a set of policies, 14 procedures and practices that did comply with section 226). 15 As plaintiffs sufficiently allege a violation of California Labor Code 16 section 226(a), the Court DENIES Penske’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth cause 17 of action. 18 C. Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of Action: Failure to Timely Pay Wages 19 Plaintiffs bring their sixth cause of action under California Labor Code 20 section 204, which requires employers to pay wages to employees twice monthly on 21 designated paydays. Cal. Lab. Code § 204. However, the California Labor Code does 22 not provide aggrieved employees with a private right of action against employers who 23 violate section 204. Young v. ABM Sec. Servs., 905 F.2d 1541, at *5 (9th Cir. 1990) 24 (“Cal. Labor Code § 210 authorizes the Labor Commissioner to fine employees who 25 violate § 204 and deposit the money in the state treasury. The statute does not grant 26 employees a private right of action against employers who violate section 204.”); see 27 also Johnson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 809 F.Supp.2d 1114, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2011), 28 aff’d, 546 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2013) (“There is nothing in section 204 or 210 that 1 indicates, in clear understandable, unmistakable terms, that a private right of action 2 exists for violations of section 204.”) 3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a legal action against Penske for 4 violations of California Labor Code section 204 because no private right of action 5 exists under the statute. Id. Plaintiffs do not contest this issue. (See generally Opp’n, 6 ECF No. 9.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Penske’s Motion to Dismiss as to 7 Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action. As amendment would be futile, this cause of action is 8 dismissed WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 9 D. Plaintiffs’ Seventh Cause of Action: Failure to Pay Wages Upon Separation 10 Plaintiffs bring their seventh cause of action under California Labor Code 11 sections 201 and 202, which provide for waiting time penalties to employees who did 12 not receive all wages earned either (i) at the time they were discharged, or (ii) at the 13 time they resigned. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202. Thus, a plaintiff can pursue a claim 14 for a violation of either section 201 or 202 only if they suffered the corresponding 15 types of injury. McGhee v. Tesoro Ref. and Mktg. Co. LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 16 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2020). In other words, a named plaintiff may pursue a claim on 17 behalf of a class only for statutory injuries that he himself suffered. Id. 18 Here, McDowell, Perez, and Stubbs are all currently employed by Penske. (See 19 Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 15.) As none of the named plaintiffs resigned or were discharged 20 from Penske at the time that they filed this action, they lack standing for their claims 21 under both section 201 and 202. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Penske’s Motion to 22 Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 23 E. Plaintiffs’ Eighth Cause of Action: Private Attorney General Act 24 Finally, Penske moves for partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action 25 under PAGA to the extent that it is based on violations asserted in counts five, six, and 26 seven. (Mot. 6.) PAGA is a statutory mechanism whereby an aggrieved employee 27 may bring a civil action to recover civil penalties for violations of certain provisions 28 of the Labor Code. Arias v. Superior Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980–81 (2009); see also 1 Thomas v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 2 (“PAGA . . . permits individuals to bring private actions against an employer for civil 3 penalties under specified sections of the Labor Code.”) Because a PAGA claim is 4 based on violations of discrete provisions of the Labor Code, courts regularly order 5 partial dismissal of PAGA claims when certain predicate Labor Code violations are 6 implausible, ill-pled, or otherwise not viable. See, e.g., Bato v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 7 Holdings, No. 2:09-cv-04671-MMM (Ex), 2010 WL 11459908, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 8 Feb. 8, 2010). Thus, when a plaintiff fails to plead a violation of the California Labor 9 Code, they also fail to plead a PAGA claim based on that same violation. Id. 10 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Penske’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ 11 eighth cause of action—the PAGA violation—to the extent that it is based on the now- 12 dismissed sixth and seventh causes of actions. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Vv. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES 3 || IN PART Penske’s Motion. (ECF No.6.) Specifically, the Court DISMISSES 4] Plaintiffs’ first, sixth, and seventh cause of action, and it DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ 5 || eighth cause of action to the extent that it is based on the sixth and seventh causes of 6 || action. Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action survives Penske’s Motion. 7 The Court provides Plaintiffs with leave to amend the first cause of action to 8 | remedy the deficiencies detailed above. If Plaintiffs elect to amend, the First 9 || Amended Complaint is due no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this 10 || Order, in which case Defendant should answer or otherwise respond within fourteen 11 | (14) days of Plaintiffs’ filing of the First Amended Complaint. If Plaintiffs do not 12 | timely amend, the dismissal of the first cause of action shall be deemed a dismissal 13 || with prejudice as of the lapse of the deadline to amend, and Penske shall answer the 14 || Complaint, as modified herein, within fourteen (14) days of the lapsed deadline. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 March 29, 2024 he 19 aye ue

21 OTIS D. W HT, I 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28