MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 23 2015, 9:13 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eric Lynn, April 23, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1410-CR-710 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Anne Flannelly, State of Indiana, Magistrate Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 49G17-1406-CM-32741
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary [1] On June 22, 2014, Appellant-Defendant Eric Lynn and his long-time girlfriend,
Melissa Linhart, engaged in a physical altercation. After law enforcement
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 1 of 16 officers were called to the scene, Linhart escorted the officers into the home she
shared with Lynn. Lynn became belligerent after the officers asked Lynn for
identification. During his interaction with the officers, Lynn charged at one of
the officers, braced himself, and locked his legs and arms in an attempt to
prevent the other officer from taking him to the ground. Lynn continued to
struggle even after being brought to the ground by the officers.
[2] Lynn was subsequently charged with Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement. Lynn challenged the admission of the evidence relating to his
arrest, claiming that the officers, who did not have a warrant, illegally entered
his home. The trial court denied Lynn’s challenge to the admission of the
evidence, finding that Linhart, a co-inhabitant of the home, had consented to
the officers’ entry into the home. Following a bench trial, the trial court found
Lynn guilty of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
[3] On appeal, Lynn contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the challenged evidence. Lynn also contends that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the challenged evidence and that the evidence is
sufficient to sustain Lynn’s conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [4] On June 22, 2014, Officers Jason Thalheimer and John Walters (collectively,
“the Officers”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department were
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 2 of 16 dispatched to a reported domestic disturbance at Woodland Drive in
Indianapolis. Upon arriving at the scene, the Officers encountered Linhart.
Linhart, who was standing in front of the home in question, appeared upset.
Linhart had a cut on the corner of her mouth and seemed as if she had been
crying. Linhart informed the Officers that she lived in the home with Lynn,
with whom she had been in a relationship for eleven years.
[5] Linhart was initially reluctant to tell the Officers what happened, but eventually
told the Officers that she had been in a physical fight with Lynn. After the
Officers asked Linhart where Lynn was, she directed the Officers to the home.
Linhart then walked the Officers up to the front door, opened the door, pointed
to Lynn who was lying inside on the floor, and escorted them into the home.
[6] When the Officers entered the home, Lynn was lying on the floor watching
television. Lynn’s parents, Estel and Brenda Lynn, were sitting on the couch.
Officer Walters asked Lynn for identification. Lynn became belligerent. It was
apparent to Officer Walters that Lynn had been drinking.
[7] Estel, who also appeared to be intoxicated “jumped up off the couch” and
began to yell at the Officers. Tr. p. 39. Estel staggered over to Officer Walters
and slapped Officer Walters on the back twice. Officer Walters then pushed
Estel away. Estel, who again exhibited signs of extreme intoxication, lost his
balance and “fell down to his butt.” Tr. p. 40. After observing the interaction
between Officer Walters and his father, Lynn “became very upset” and
positioned himself in a manner which suggested that he was going to engage
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 3 of 16 the Officers in a physical altercation. Tr. p. 40. The Officers repeatedly
instructed Lynn to sit down.
[8] Officer Walters told Lynn that he was under arrest for the battery of Linhart
and instructed Lynn to place his hands behind his back. Lynn initially
complied. However, after Officer Walters got one handcuff on Lynn, Estel got
up and said “you’re not going to f[******] arrest my son.” Tr. p. 42. Estel then
made a motion as if he was going to charge Officer Walters. Officer
Thalheimer interceded, got between Officer Walters and Estel, and pushed
Estel down onto the nearby couch. Lynn attempted to “jump up” and charge
Officer Thalheimer.
[9] After Lynn attempted to charge Officer Thalheimer, Officer Walters, who still
had one handcuff on Lynn, attempted to force Lynn to the ground. Lynn, who
was determined to aid his father, braced himself and locked his legs and arms in
an attempt to prevent Officer Walters from taking him to the ground. Officer
Walters eventually managed to use his body weight to force Lynn to the
ground. Lynn continued to struggle even after Officer Walters managed to
force Lynn to the ground. After “some struggle,” Officer Walters was able to
bring Lynn under control. Tr. p. 43.
[10] On June 23, 2014, the State charged Lynn with Class A misdemeanor domestic
battery, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Prior to trial, Lynn filed a motion
seeking to suppress all evidence relating to his arrest. In support of this motion,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 4 of 16 Lynn claimed that the challenged evidence should be suppressed because the
police entry into his home was unlawful. Also prior to trial, the State moved to
dismiss the battery charges.
[11] The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on September 9, 2014,
immediately prior to trial. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Lynn’s
motion to suppress. The trial court then conducted a bench trial, after which it
found Lynn guilty of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial
court sentenced Lynn to one year, with credit for time served and the remainder
suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision [12] Lynn contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain
evidence at trial. He also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
I. Admission of Evidence [13] Lynn contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
relating to his alleged act of resisting law enforcement following the warrantless
entry into his home by the Officers. In raising the contention, Lynn argues that
admission of the challenged evidence was improper under both the Fourth
Amendment to the United State Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the
Indiana Constitution because it occurred immediately following the Officers’
unlawful warrantless entry into his home. The State, for its part, argues that the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 5 of 16 evidence was admissible because Linhart, Lynn’s co-habitant in the home,
consented to the Officers’ entry into the home.
A. Standard of Review [14] Our standard of review for rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially
the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by
an objection at trial. Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we
consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Collins v.
State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We also consider
uncontroverted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Id.
[15] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Bradshaw
v. State, 759 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). Accordingly, we will
reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when the trial
court abused its discretion. Id. (citing Bradshaw, 759 N.E.2d at 273). An abuse
of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (citing Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d
1093, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
B. Analysis 1. The Fourth Amendment
[16] On appeal, Lynn claims that the warrantless entry into his home by the Officers
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “The Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 6 of 16 fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens
possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Trotter v. State, 933
N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted). “The Fourth
Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home,
whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.” Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). The prohibition does not apply, however, to
situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the
individual whose property is searched or from a third party who possesses
common authority over the premises. Id. Stated differently, a valid consent to
entry into a premises by an individual having common authority over or a
sufficient relationship to the premises creates an exception to the warrant
requirement. See Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 676 (Ind. 2005).
[17] In the instant matter, the record demonstrates that Linhart, who was involved
in a long-term romantic relationship with Lynn, resided in the home with Lynn.
Linhart’s status as a co-inhabitant of the home is sufficient to give her the
authority to give the necessary consent to allow the Officers to enter the home.
See U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (providing that the authority
which justifies the third-party consent rests on mutual use of the property by
persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of
their number might permit the common area to be searched).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 7 of 16 [18] The record further demonstrates that Linhart validly and voluntarily consented
to entry into the home by the Officers. Officer Walters testified that Linhart
walked him and Officer Thalheimer up to the front door, opened the door, and
escorted them into the home. Officer Thalheimer also testified that Linhart
walked up to the front door with the Officers, pointed to Lynn who was lying
inside on the floor, opened the door, and allowed the Officers to walk in with
her.
[19] In light of Linhart’s position as a co-inhabitant of the home coupled with the
Officers’ testimony, the trial court reasonably concluded that Linhart gave
consent for the Officers to enter the home. Further, even though Linhart, who
later recanted her allegations against Lynn, and Lynn’s mother indicated during
the suppression hearing that the Officers entered without permission, the trial
court was in the position to assess the witnesses’ reliability and to determine
which witnesses it found to be more believable. See Graves v. State, 472 N.E.2d
190, 191 (Ind. 1984) (providing that in a case where the parties present
conflicting evidence, the trier-of-fact is not obliged to believe the testimony of
the defendant or any other particular witness and it is the trier-of-fact’s
prerogative to weigh the evidence and to determine who, in fact, is telling the
truth).
2. Article 1, Section 11
[20] Lynn also claims that the warrantless entry into his home by the Officers
violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Article I, Section II
reads: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 8 of 16 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
“Although this language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, we proceed
somewhat differently when analyzing the language under the Indiana
Constitution than when considering the same language under the Federal
Constitution.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006). “Instead of
focusing on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, we focus on the
actions of the police officer, concluding that the search is legitimate where it is
reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing Moran v. State,
644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind. 1994)). We will consider the following factors in
assessing reasonableness: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge
that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the
search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent
of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
[21] As is stated above, the Officers entered Lynn’s home at Linhart’s invitation. As
such, their entry was completely reasonable. See generally, Starks v. State, 846
N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (providing that officers’ entry into a
residence did not violate Article I, Section 11 because the officers were allowed
into the residence by a co-inhabitant of the residence who had the authority to
admit the officers into the residence).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 9 of 16 [22] Furthermore, despite Lynn’s claim to the contrary, the Officers’ entry into the
home was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The Officers had
a high degree of suspicion that a battery had occurred. The Officers were
dispatched to the home because of an alleged domestic disturbance and, upon
arriving, found Linhart standing outside, visibly upset. The Officers observed
that Linhart appeared to have suffered an injury to her lip. Linhart indicated
that she had been involved in a physical altercation with her boyfriend, Lynn,
with whom she lived in the home. Also, although the intrusion into one’s
home is generally a great intrusion upon their privacy, Lynn assumed the risk
that Linhart, a co-inhabitant in the home, might permit the Officers to enter the
common area See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (providing that that it is
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants of a home has the right to
permit entry into the home and that the others have assumed the risk that one
of their co-inhabitants might permit entry into the common area of the home).
Lynn, himself, never requested that the Officers leave the home or acted in a
manner that would seem to override or object to Linhart’s escorting the Officers
into the home. Additionally, the Officers’ need was substantial in that they
were investigating a potential physical domestic dispute that resulted in injury
to one of the parties. These factors indicate that the Officers’ entry into the
home was reasonable.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence [23] Lynn also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 10 of 16 A. Standard of Review [24] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind.
2002).
B. Relevant Authority [25] The offense of resisting law enforcement is governed by Indiana Code section
35-44-3-3, which provides, in relevant part, that “(a) A person who knowingly
or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law
enforcement officer … while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of
the officer’s duties … commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 11 of 16 misdemeanor.” The word “forcibly” modifies “resists, obstructs, or interferes,”
making force an element of the offense. See Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963,
965 (Ind. 2009); Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993). Thus, to
convict Lynn of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State
needed to prove that Lynn: (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) forcibly resisted,
obstructed, or interfered with the Officers (3) while the Officers were lawfully
engaged in the execution of their duties. One “forcibly resists,” for purposes of
forcibly resisting law enforcement, when one uses “strong, powerful, violent
means” to evade a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or her
duties. Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 965; Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 726.
[26] In Graham, the Indiana Supreme Court held that in determining that an
individual forcibly resisted, the force involved need not rise to the level of
mayhem, and discussed with approval this court’s determination in Johnson v.
State, 833 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), that a defendant had forcibly
resisted law enforcement officers by “push[ing] away with his shoulders while
cursing and yelling” as the officer attempted to search him and by “stiffen[ing]
up” as officers attempted to put him into a police vehicle, requiring the officers
to “get physical in order to put him inside.” Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 965-66. In
Glenn v. State, 999 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), this court concluded
that the defendant exhibited sufficient force to sustain her conviction for
resisting law enforcement when the defendant “on more than one occasion,
‘aggressively’ tried to pull away” from the arresting officer. In Lopez v. State,
926 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, this court concluded
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 12 of 16 that the defendant exhibited sufficient force to sustain his conviction for
resisting law enforcement when the defendant refused to stand or uncross his
arms upon being ordered to do so by the arresting officer and attempted to pull
away from the arresting officer, requiring the officer to use physical force to
arrest him. Likewise, in J.S. v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied, this court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the juvenile’s adjudication for what would be resisting law enforcement
if committed by an adult when the evidence demonstrated that the juvenile
“pulled,” “yanked,” and “jerked” away from the officer, and was “flailing her
arms,” “squirming her body,” and “making it impossible for [the officer] to
hold her hands.”
C. Analysis [27] Lynn claims on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial
court’s determination that the Officers were lawfully engaged in their duties as
law enforcement officers when they encountered Lynn. In making this claim,
Lynn relies on his contention that the Officers unlawfully entered his home.
However, having concluded above that the Officers did not unlawfully enter
Lynn’s home but rather entered with Linhart’s consent, we conclude that
Lynn’s claim in this regard is unavailing.1
1 In arguing that the Officers were not lawfully engaged in police duties when they entered the home he shared with Linhart, Lynn cites to Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Lynn’s reliance on Adkisson is misplaced, however, because, unlike in the instant matter,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 13 of 16 [28] Further, the Officers had probable cause to believe that Lynn was a suspect in
an ongoing police investigation. See generally Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660,
664 (Ind. 1987) (providing that probable cause exists where facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the officer, when based on reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient for a reasonable person to believe an
offense has been committed by the defendant). Again, the Officers were
dispatched to the home because of a domestic disturbance. Upon arriving at
the home, the Officers encountered Linhart, who was visibly upset and
appeared to have sustained an injury to her lip. Linhart indicated that she had
been engaged in a physical altercation with Lynn, identified Lynn to the
Officers, and permitted them to enter the home she shared with Lynn. This
evidence demonstrates that, despite Lynn’s claim to the contrary, the Officers
had probable cause to believe that Lynn had assaulted Linhart and, as such,
were lawfully engaged in the execution of their police duties when they
approached and detained Lynn. See generally Robles, 510 N.E.2d at 664.
[29] Lynn also claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a determination that
he forcibly resisted the Officers. The evidence, however, demonstrates that
Lynn, a suspect in the ongoing investigation into a potential domestic assault,
used force to resist Officer Walters’s attempt to detain Lynn.
in Adkisson, no resident of the apartment consented to the deputies’ entry into the defendant’s residence. 728 N.E.2d at 178.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 14 of 16 [30] Again, the evidence demonstrates that after Linhart allowed the Officers to
enter the home, Lynn, who appeared to be intoxicated, became belligerent
when Officer Walters asked him for identification. Lynn “became very upset”
and positioned himself in a manner which suggested that he was going to
engage the Officers in a physical altercation after he witnessed an interaction
between Officer Walters and his father. Tr. p. 40. The Officers repeatedly
[31] Officer Walters told Lynn that he was under arrest for the battery of Linhart
and instructed Lynn to place his hands behind his back. Lynn initially
complied. However, after Officer Walters got one handcuff on Lynn, Estel got
up and made a motion as if he was going to charge Officer Walters. Tr. p. 42.
Officer Thalheimer interceded, got between Officer Walters and Lynn’s father,
and pushed Lynn’s father down onto the nearby couch. Lynn, who appeared
determined to come to his father’s aid, attempted to “jump up” and charge
[32] After attempting to charge Officer Thalheimer, Lynn braced himself and locked
his legs and arms in an attempt to prevent Officer Walters from taking him to
the ground. Officer Walters eventually managed to use his body weight to force
Lynn to the ground. Lynn continued to struggle even after Officer Walters
managed to force Lynn to the ground. After “some struggle,” Officer Walters
was able to bring Lynn under control. Tr. p. 43.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 15 of 16 [33] The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that the Officers entered Lynn’s
home as they were investigating a potential domestic assault and were invited
into the home by one of the co-inhabitants of the home. This evidence is
sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination that the Officers were
engaged in the lawful execution of their police duties when they entered the
home. The evidence presented at trial also demonstrates that Lynn was
agitated, charged at Officer Thalheimer while Officer Walters was attempting to
place him in handcuffs, stiffened his arms and legs to resist being handcuffed,
and continued to struggle even after he had been forced to the ground. This
evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination that Lynn forcibly
resisted the Officers. Lynn’s claim to the contrary effectively amounts to an
invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See
Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435.
Conclusion [34] In sum, we conclude that the Officers’ entry into Lynn’s home did not violate
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11
because Linhart consented to the Officers’ entry into the home. We also
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Lynn’s conviction for Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
[35] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-710 | April 23, 2015 Page 16 of 16