NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-430
ERIC LEGERE
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The claimant, Eric Legere, appeals from a District Court
judgment affirming a determination by the Department of
Unemployment Assistance (DUA) that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151, § 24 (b). We
affirm.
Background. The essential facts are not in dispute. The
claimant holds a bachelor's degree and has prior work experience
as a teacher in a variety of subject areas. Since 2008, he has
worked exclusively in part-time positions for health reasons.
Each week, he volunteers approximately twelve hours as a
minister and is self-employed working approximately five hours a
week as a tutor and a cleaner.
In June 2024, after being laid off for summer break from a
part-time teaching position in Salem, the claimant filed for unemployment insurance benefits. Following a hearing on August
16, 2024, at which the claimant testified, a DUA review examiner
issued a written decision concluding that Legere was ineligible
for benefits because he did not meet the availability and work
search requirements of G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b).
The examiner found that the Legere "admitted to a failure
on his part to apply for a single job since filing for
unemployment benefits" and "had no explanation" for failing to
apply to part-time jobs consistent with his work history and
qualifications. The examiner further noted that the claimant
"was cagey, evasive, and vague when describing his work search
activities," and therefore found his testimony not credible.
The examiner concluded that "due to his scheduling restrictions
and his failure to complete a single job application, the
claimant [had] effectively removed himself from the workforce."
The DUA board of review (board) summarily affirmed the
review examiner's decision, concluding that it was based on
substantial evidence and free from any error of law. Legere
then appealed the agency's decision to the District Court
pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 42. In a written memorandum and
order, a judge of the District Court concluded, among other
things, that the DUA's decision was supported by substantial
evidence and affirmed.
2 Discussion. We review the DUA's decision based on the
standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L.
c. 151, § 42. "The agency's decision may only be set aside if
the court determines that the decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not in accordance with law." Coverall N. Am.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447
Mass. 852, 857 (2006).
The burden of proving eligibility for benefits rests on the
claimant. Whether a claimant is capable of, available for, and
actively seeking work within the meaning of G. L. c. 151A,
§ 24 (b), is a question of fact. See Bellotti v. Director of
the Div. of Employment Sec., 382 Mass. 600, 601 (1981). The
board implicitly adopted the review examiner's findings and
concluded that Legere was not eligible for benefits because he
was neither available nor actively seeking work. "[O]ur duty is
to examine the record and to determine whether there is an
evidentiary basis" for those findings. Farrar v. Director of
the Div. of Employment Sec., 324 Mass. 45, 47-48 (1949). If
there is, those findings must stand. Id. at 48.
The claimant first argues that the review examiner's
conclusion that he was unavailable to work was not supported by
substantial evidence and was based on an error of law. "[I]n
order to be eligible for benefits an individual need only be
3 available for suitable employment which he has no good cause to
refuse." Conlon v. Director of the Division of Employment Sec.
382 Mass. 19, 21 n.1 (1980). The Supreme Judicial Court has
recognized that "in certain circumstances, 'good cause' may
include personal reasons," and rejected the notion that a
claimant "must be willing and able to work full time on any
shift normally operated in the occupation for which [the
claimant] is suited by training and experience." Id. at 23-24.
See, e.g., Manias v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.,
388 Mass. 201, 204 (1983) ("domestic responsibilities can
entitle a claimant to reject certain employment situations as
unacceptable and restrict . . . work availability under
§ 24 [b]").
Here, the review examiner expressly found that "[f]or the
period beginning June 30, 2024, and thereafter, the [claimant]
has not been available and prepared for full-time or part-time
work due to his mental health conditions, his religious
restrictions on his schedule, [and] his self-employment work."
As an initial matter, with respect to his self-employment
activities, Legere testified that he would have "let go" of that
work if he had been offered a job. In the absence of a specific
finding that this aspect of the claimant's testimony was not
credible, or any evidence of such activities interfering with
his willingness to accept work, the examiner's conclusion that
4 Legere's self-employment played a role in rendering him
unavailable for work was not supported by substantial evidence.
It was also error for the examiner to conclude that Legere
was not available for part-time work due to his mental health
conditions where the mental health conditions at issue are the
reasons that necessitated his limitation to part-time work in
the first place. Thus, the fact that he was restricted to part-
time work did not diminish his availability for such work but
simply defined the scope of it.
It follows that the record only supports the conclusion of
unavailability insofar as it is based on the claimant's
religious activities. Testimony and documentary evidence
indicate that Legere dedicated twelve hours each week --
Fridays, Saturdays, and every other Monday -- to his volunteer
ministry and he participated in other religious activities on
Tuesday and Thursday evenings. Whether these religious
activities, standing alone, rendered him unavailable for work
was a determination that must be made by the board. See Keough
v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 370 Mass. 1, 4
(1976) (whether claimant has so restricted employability to
render themselves unavailable for work "is primarily a question
of fact that has been entrusted to the informed judgment of the
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-430
ERIC LEGERE
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The claimant, Eric Legere, appeals from a District Court
judgment affirming a determination by the Department of
Unemployment Assistance (DUA) that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151, § 24 (b). We
affirm.
Background. The essential facts are not in dispute. The
claimant holds a bachelor's degree and has prior work experience
as a teacher in a variety of subject areas. Since 2008, he has
worked exclusively in part-time positions for health reasons.
Each week, he volunteers approximately twelve hours as a
minister and is self-employed working approximately five hours a
week as a tutor and a cleaner.
In June 2024, after being laid off for summer break from a
part-time teaching position in Salem, the claimant filed for unemployment insurance benefits. Following a hearing on August
16, 2024, at which the claimant testified, a DUA review examiner
issued a written decision concluding that Legere was ineligible
for benefits because he did not meet the availability and work
search requirements of G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b).
The examiner found that the Legere "admitted to a failure
on his part to apply for a single job since filing for
unemployment benefits" and "had no explanation" for failing to
apply to part-time jobs consistent with his work history and
qualifications. The examiner further noted that the claimant
"was cagey, evasive, and vague when describing his work search
activities," and therefore found his testimony not credible.
The examiner concluded that "due to his scheduling restrictions
and his failure to complete a single job application, the
claimant [had] effectively removed himself from the workforce."
The DUA board of review (board) summarily affirmed the
review examiner's decision, concluding that it was based on
substantial evidence and free from any error of law. Legere
then appealed the agency's decision to the District Court
pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 42. In a written memorandum and
order, a judge of the District Court concluded, among other
things, that the DUA's decision was supported by substantial
evidence and affirmed.
2 Discussion. We review the DUA's decision based on the
standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L.
c. 151, § 42. "The agency's decision may only be set aside if
the court determines that the decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not in accordance with law." Coverall N. Am.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447
Mass. 852, 857 (2006).
The burden of proving eligibility for benefits rests on the
claimant. Whether a claimant is capable of, available for, and
actively seeking work within the meaning of G. L. c. 151A,
§ 24 (b), is a question of fact. See Bellotti v. Director of
the Div. of Employment Sec., 382 Mass. 600, 601 (1981). The
board implicitly adopted the review examiner's findings and
concluded that Legere was not eligible for benefits because he
was neither available nor actively seeking work. "[O]ur duty is
to examine the record and to determine whether there is an
evidentiary basis" for those findings. Farrar v. Director of
the Div. of Employment Sec., 324 Mass. 45, 47-48 (1949). If
there is, those findings must stand. Id. at 48.
The claimant first argues that the review examiner's
conclusion that he was unavailable to work was not supported by
substantial evidence and was based on an error of law. "[I]n
order to be eligible for benefits an individual need only be
3 available for suitable employment which he has no good cause to
refuse." Conlon v. Director of the Division of Employment Sec.
382 Mass. 19, 21 n.1 (1980). The Supreme Judicial Court has
recognized that "in certain circumstances, 'good cause' may
include personal reasons," and rejected the notion that a
claimant "must be willing and able to work full time on any
shift normally operated in the occupation for which [the
claimant] is suited by training and experience." Id. at 23-24.
See, e.g., Manias v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.,
388 Mass. 201, 204 (1983) ("domestic responsibilities can
entitle a claimant to reject certain employment situations as
unacceptable and restrict . . . work availability under
§ 24 [b]").
Here, the review examiner expressly found that "[f]or the
period beginning June 30, 2024, and thereafter, the [claimant]
has not been available and prepared for full-time or part-time
work due to his mental health conditions, his religious
restrictions on his schedule, [and] his self-employment work."
As an initial matter, with respect to his self-employment
activities, Legere testified that he would have "let go" of that
work if he had been offered a job. In the absence of a specific
finding that this aspect of the claimant's testimony was not
credible, or any evidence of such activities interfering with
his willingness to accept work, the examiner's conclusion that
4 Legere's self-employment played a role in rendering him
unavailable for work was not supported by substantial evidence.
It was also error for the examiner to conclude that Legere
was not available for part-time work due to his mental health
conditions where the mental health conditions at issue are the
reasons that necessitated his limitation to part-time work in
the first place. Thus, the fact that he was restricted to part-
time work did not diminish his availability for such work but
simply defined the scope of it.
It follows that the record only supports the conclusion of
unavailability insofar as it is based on the claimant's
religious activities. Testimony and documentary evidence
indicate that Legere dedicated twelve hours each week --
Fridays, Saturdays, and every other Monday -- to his volunteer
ministry and he participated in other religious activities on
Tuesday and Thursday evenings. Whether these religious
activities, standing alone, rendered him unavailable for work
was a determination that must be made by the board. See Keough
v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 370 Mass. 1, 4
(1976) (whether claimant has so restricted employability to
render themselves unavailable for work "is primarily a question
of fact that has been entrusted to the informed judgment of the
board").
5 We need not remand for additional findings, however,
because substantial evidence supported the examiner's
conclusion, adopted by the board, that Legere failed to
establish that he was actively seeking suitable employment. See
G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b). With respect to his alleged efforts to
search for jobs, the examiner declined to credit the claimant's
testimony. 1 See Manias, 388 Mass. at 205 (credibility
determinations are "for the review examiner, and not for this
court" [citation omitted]). The examiner did, however, credit
the claimant's admission that he had not submitted any job
applications despite coming across postings for jobs for which
he was qualified. When the examiner asked Legere why he had
failed to submit any applications, Legere replied, "I'll be
honest with you. I don't have a good reason why." Legere's
failure to apply for jobs without good reason was a sufficient
basis upon which to conclude that he was not making a good faith
effort to find work, as required by G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b).
See Corrado v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 325
Mass. 711, 713 (1950) (claimant "must act in good faith and make
reasonable effort to secure employment"). Because the
examiner's conclusion that the claimant failed to make a good
1 The claimant has submitted additional arguments and evidence with respect to this issue that we decline to consider because they were not presented to the DUA.
6 faith effort to secure employment was supported by substantial
evidence and was free from legal error, we affirm the District
Court judgment affirming the DUA's determination that the
claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Walsh, Toone & Tan, JJ. 2),
Clerk
Entered: February 9, 2026.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.