Eric Lamont Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 25, 2024
Docket2023-CA-1415
StatusPublished

This text of Eric Lamont Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Eric Lamont Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eric Lamont Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, (Ky. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 25, 2024; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1415-MR

ERIC LAMONT ADAMS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00978

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CALDWELL, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Eric Lamont Adams appeals from an order

denying his motion to suppress. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 1, 2022, at 9:53 p.m., Officer Daniel Hempel of the

Lexington Police Department initiated a traffic stop after witnessing Appellant

enter into the wrong lane of traffic to pass multiple vehicles stopped at a stop sign.

After seeing Officer Hempel’s emergency lights, Appellant pulled over into a parking lot. He then exited his vehicle with his hands raised. Officer Hempel gave

Appellant multiple orders to get back into his vehicle, but Appellant did not.

Officer Hempel approached Appellant, patted him down for weapons, and took

him to the front of the police cruiser. Officer Hempel also called for backup,

which arrived three minutes after the traffic stop began.

Once backup had arrived, Officer Hempel got into his vehicle and

began the usual traffic stop checks on the vehicle and Appellant. Officer Hempel

was informed that Appellant had active arrest warrants. Officer Hempel then

requested a confirmation of the warrants from dispatch. He also requested a drug

dog come and perform a check around the vehicle. The dog arrived at 10:10 p.m.

and began its check around the exterior of the vehicle. While the dog was

performing the search, dispatch confirmed the warrants were valid. Also during

the dog’s search, Officer Hempel was in his vehicle completing the traffic stop

paperwork.

The dog ultimately alerted to the vehicle. At that time, Appellant

informed the officers that there was a handgun1 in the car. The officers searched

the car and found the gun. Officers also found a small amount of marijuana

residue in the car, but Appellant was not charged with any crime related to it.

1 The gun was later determined to have been stolen.

-2- Appellant was arrested and charged with improper passing,2 operating

a vehicle with a suspended or revoked license,3 being a convicted felon in

possession of a handgun,4 and receiving stolen property.5 Appellant later moved to

suppress the search of the car, arguing that the drug dog’s search around the

exterior of the car impermissibly extended the length of the stop. After a hearing

in which Officer Hempel testified, the trial court denied the motion. Appellant

later entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the suppression

issue. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under a two-prong test. First, we review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Under this standard, the trial court’s findings of fact will be conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Second, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.

Rhoton v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d 273, 275-76 (Ky. 2020) (footnotes and

citations omitted).

Although an officer may detain a vehicle and its occupants in order to conduct an ordinary traffic stop, any subsequent detention . . . must not be excessively

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189.340. 3 KRS 186.620(2). 4 KRS 527.040. 5 KRS 514.110.

-3- intrusive in that the officer’s actions must be reasonably related in scope to circumstances justifying the initial interference. Thus, an officer cannot detain a vehicle’s occupants beyond completion of the purpose of the initial traffic stop unless something happened during the stop to cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot. If the traffic stop is prolonged beyond the time required for the purpose of the stop, the subsequent discovery of contraband is the product of an unconstitutional seizure.

Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Ky. 2016) (internal quotation

marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).

An officer’s ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop do not impermissibly extend such stop. Included in such ordinary inquiries are an officer’s review of the driver’s information, auto insurance and registration, and the performance of criminal background checks of the driver and any passengers. In order to extend the stop beyond that required to complete its initial purpose, something must occur during the stop to create a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

Rhoton, 610 S.W.3d at 276 (footnotes and citations omitted).

On appeal, Appellant argues that the length of the traffic stop was

impermissibly prolonged when Officer Hempel patted Appellant down for

weapons at the beginning of the stop. As the Commonwealth correctly points out,

this issue is not preserved because it was not raised before the trial court. The only

argument about the alleged prolonging of the stop was regarding the police dog.

The dog search was also the only issue addressed by the trial court. “The Court of

-4- Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial

court.” Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989); see

also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. App. 1996). “[E]rrors

to be considered for appellate review must be precisely preserved and identified in

the lower court.” Skaggs v. Assad, by and through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950

(Ky. 1986) (citation omitted).

Even if this issue had been properly preserved, we would conclude

that this minimal extension of the stop was reasonable. “[O]fficers performing a

traffic stop are ‘authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to

protect their personal safety and to maintain their status quo.’ United States v.

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).” Carlisle v.

Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 168, 179 (Ky. 2020). “Traffic stops are especially

fraught with danger to police officers, so an officer may need to take certain

negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.”

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616, 191 L. Ed.

2d 492 (2015) (citations omitted). Here, Appellant exited his car without

permission from the officer and refused orders to get back into the vehicle. Officer

Hempel’s pat down of Appellant was reasonable under the circumstances.

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Related

United States v. Hensley
469 U.S. 221 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett
770 S.W.2d 225 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1989)
Shelton v. Commonwealth
928 S.W.2d 817 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1996)
Skaggs v. Assad, by and Through Assad
712 S.W.2d 947 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1986)
Rodriguez v. United States
575 U.S. 348 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Thomas J. Davis v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
484 S.W.3d 288 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2016)

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Eric Lamont Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eric-lamont-adams-v-commonwealth-of-kentucky-kyctapp-2024.