Eric Jordan v. Transit Authority of River City D/B/A Tarc
Opinion
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0479-MR
ERIC JORDAN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 15-CI-002016
TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF RIVER CITY D/B/A TARC AND BESSIE REED APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES. THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Eric Jordan (“Appellant”) appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict in favor of Transit Authority of River City d/b/a TARC (“TARC” or “Appellee”). Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in 1) failing to exclude the testimony of TARC’s expert witness; 2) granting Appellee’s motion to exclude the testimony of a lay witness; 3) denying
Appellant’s motion to exclude video footage that was not disclosed in discovery; and 4) in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. For the reasons addressed below, we find no error and affirm the judgment on appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 12, 2014, Appellant was a passenger on a TARC coach owned by Appellee and operated by TARC driver Bessie Reed (“Ms. Reed”). As the coach approached a stop at the intersection of Dixie Highway and Garland Avenue in Louisville, Kentucky, Appellant observed a small group of passengers, including a child in a wheelchair, who wanted to exit the coach. In order to make room for these individuals to depart from the crowded coach, Appellant exited the coach and stood on the sidewalk. While Appellant and other passengers were standing near the coach, Ms. Reed lowered a mechanical ramp to allow the wheelchair passenger to exit the coach. While the ramp is in motion, it makes a beeping sound to warn persons of its movement.
The wheelchair passenger used the ramp to exit the coach. Ms. Reed then began lifting the ramp to restore it to its stored position. While the ramp was in motion, Appellant began walking toward the bus entrance while talking to other individuals. He struck the ramp, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.
On April 15, 2015, Appellant filed the instant action in Jefferson Circuit Court against TARC and Ms. Reed alleging damages resulting from
negligence, recklessness, and willful or gross negligence. The matter proceeded to trial in February 2020, after which the jury returned a verdict in favor of TARC and Ms. Reed. A judgment reflecting the verdict was rendered on March 5, 2020, and this appeal followed.
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Appellant, through counsel, first argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court committed reversible error in allowing TARC’s expert witness, Dr. Kevin McGann, to testify at trial. Appellant appears to argue that while TARC properly disclosed Dr. McGann as an expert witness in pre-trial filings, it did not fully disclose the scope of Dr. McGann’s testimony in violation of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 26.02(4) and the Jefferson Circuit Court’s pre-trial order. Appellant asserts that he propounded interrogatories on TARC with the specific request to produce the subject matter and scope of his testimony, that TARC responded to the interrogatories, and that Dr. McGann’s testimony exceeded the scope of TARC’s disclosure. While Appellant acknowledges Dr. McGann’s expertise in emergency medical care, he contends that Dr. McGann never examined Appellant and is not an orthopedist, hand surgeon, or practitioner of pain management.
We must first note that Appellant has not complied with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), which requires that the appellant state at the beginning of the
written argument if the issue was preserved and, if so, in what manner. We are not required to consider portions of the Appellant’s brief not in conformity with CR 76.12, and may summarily affirm the circuit court on the issues contained therein. Skaggs v. Assad, By and Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986); Pierson v. Coffey, 706 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. App. 1985). “In Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. App. 1990), we established the principle that, where an appellant fails to comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv), a reviewing court need only undertake an overall review of the record for manifest injustice. We believe that principle applies as well to the failure to comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).” J.M. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet For Health and Family Services, 325 S.W.3d 901, 902 n. 2 (Ky. App. 2010). As in J.M. v. Commonwealth, we have chosen the less severe alternative of reviewing the proceeding below for manifest injustice rather than summarily affirming the decision of the circuit court. “Manifest injustice is found if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.” Kingrey v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 824, 831 (Ky. 2013) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted).
The record refutes Appellant’s argument on this issue. TARC’s disclosure expressly stated that Dr. McGann would offer testimony regarding the following: the nature and scope of the accident; the nature and cause of the injuries to Appellant; Appellant’s pre-existing conditions; and the medical
treatment rendered to Appellant. The record reasonably supports the Jefferson Circuit Court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to exclude Dr. McGann’s testimony. We find no error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding. Id.
Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in granting TARC’s motion to exclude the testimony of lay witness Jihan Kellam. Appellant sought to have Kellam, a TARC coach driver, testify as to TARC’s “habit and/or modis operandi in handling injury incidents on its buses.” Appellant raised an allegation at trial that Ms. Reed did not follow policies and procedures with regard to the handling of injury accidents. Appellant characterizes Kellam’s testimony as directly on point, relevant, and admissible. He argues that the exclusion of this testimony was an abuse of discretion and constitutes reversible error.
Kellam took the stand and began to testify as to her own experiences as a TARC driver who dealt with accidents. TARC objected on the grounds that Kellam’s experiences were unrelated to the matter at trial and were not relevant. In considering TARC’s objection, Judge Edwards ruled that Kellam’s experience with unrelated accidents had no bearing on the matter at trial and, even if it did, TARC should have been given notice. Having closely examined the record and the law, we agree that the incidents and/or accidents Kellam may have had as a TARC driver were not relevant to the issue of TARC’s negligence, if any, as to Appellant.
The proper standard for review of evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 401. Kellam’s experiences with TARC incidents and/or accidents, if any, did not make the existence of any consequential fact in the matter before us more likely or less likely than it would have been without Kellam’s testimony. That is to say, Kellam’s testimony was not relevant. “Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” KRE 402. The circuit court properly concluded that Kellam’s testimony as to her own experiences was not relevant, and we find no abuse of discretion.
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