Eric Jonjak v. Kathye Marlene Griffith

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 12, 2019
Docket03-18-00118-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Eric Jonjak v. Kathye Marlene Griffith (Eric Jonjak v. Kathye Marlene Griffith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eric Jonjak v. Kathye Marlene Griffith, (Tex. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-18-00118-CV

Eric Jonjak, Appellant

v.

Kathye Marlene Griffith, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-FM-15-003489, HONORABLE GISELA D. TRIANA, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Eric Jonjak appeals from a divorce decree dissolving his marriage to

Kathye Marlene Griffith and dividing their marital property. Jonjak asserts the decree divides

Jonjak’s retirement account contrary to the terms of the parties’ mediated settlement agreement

(MSA). Jonjak also challenges a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) implementing that

division. We will modify the decree and the QDRO and affirm as modified.

BACKGROUND

Jonjak filed for divorce from Griffith in 2015 on the grounds of insupportability. On

June 1, 2017, the parties signed an MSA dividing most of their marital property. In relevant part,

the MSA states Griffith “will receive $962,000 from the Bog Farm Profit Sharing 401k, which is

53% of the value of the account as represented by [Jonjak] on the day of the mediation via QDRO

prepared by [Jonjak].” The following day, the parties appeared before a district court and announced the agreement. The district court pronounced the divorce and instructed Jonjak to prepare a decree

consistent with the MSA.

Approximately six months later, both parties filed their own motions to enter

judgment, each accompanied by a proposed divorce decree and QDRO. Jonjak’s proposed decree

awards Griffith $962,000 from his 401k account via QDRO. In contrast, Griffith’s proposed decree

awards her 53% of Jonjak’s 401k account as of June 1, 2017, “together with any interest, dividends,

gains, or losses on that amount arising since that date” to be “more particularly defined” in a QDRO.

The district court held a hearing on the competing motions where the parties contested

whether the MSA divided the 401k on the date of the mediation or when the court signed a QDRO

implementing the division. See Quijano v. Quijano, 347 S.W.3d 345, 353–54 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“The purpose of a QDRO is to create or recognize an alternate payee’s

right, or to assign an alternate payee the right, to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable to

a participant under a retirement plan.”). The district court ruled that Griffith “gets $962,000 as of

June 1st, 2017, which is the date of the—the date of the mediation.” The district court then signed

Griffith’s proposed decree and QDRO after striking certain language. The decree awards Griffith:

A portion of Eric Jonjak’s retirement benefits in Bog Farm Profit Sharing 401k Acct. No. 803508-00000 arising out of ERIC JONJAK’S employment with Bog Farm as of June 1, 2017, that portion being 53 percent or $962,000, whichever is greater, together with any interest, dividends, gains, or losses on that amount arising since that date and more particularly defined in a set [sic] out in the Qualified Domestic Relations Order signed by the Court in this case.

2 Jonjak filed a timely motion for new trial arguing the district court erred by making

the division effective June 1, 2017. He further argued that awarding Griffith “interest, dividends,

gains, or losses” on the $962,000 was inconsistent with the MSA, which awarded the specific sum

only. The district court issued findings and conclusions explaining why the parties intended to

divide the 401k on June 1, 2017, but did not address the award of “interest, dividends, gains, or

losses.” Jonjak’s motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

The plan administrator of the 401k account subsequently determined the order did

not meet the statutory requirements of a QDRO.1 The district court then signed a modified QDRO

with substantially the same relevant language as the first.2 Paragraph 2 provides that Griffith:

shall be entitled to an interest in the [Bog Farm Profit-Sharing 401k] Plan equal to $962,000 of [Jonjak’s] Vested Account Balance under the Plan as of the date of transfer, which is June 1, 2017. [Griffith’s] interest in the Plan shall be adjusted for investment earnings and losses allocable thereto in accordance with the terms of the Plan thereafter. [Griffith] shall be permitted to make any elections regarding the form of payment which would be available to a Participant receiving the same payment. Once the benefits assigned to [Griffith] hereunder have been disbursed, [Griffith] shall have no further interest of any kind whatsoever in the remaining balance of [Jonjak’s] account(s) under the Plan.

1 The administrator’s exact reasons for rejecting the first QDRO do not appear in the record. 2 If a plan administrator rejects an order for not meeting statutory requirements, “the court retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the parties and their property to the extent necessary to render a qualified domestic relations order.” Tex. Fam. Code § 9.104.

3 We treat Jonjak’s appeal as challenging this QDRO. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.3 (providing that when

trial court replaces or modifies order that has been appealed, “the appellate court must treat the

appeal as from the subsequent order or judgment”).

DISCUSSION

Jonjak argues first that the decree conflicts with the MSA by awarding Griffith

“interest, dividends, gains, or losses” on the $962,000 rather than the flat sum. In his remaining

issues, Jonjak asserts the district court erred by concluding the MSA divides the 401k effective

June 1, 2017. Griffith responds that Jonjak failed to preserve his first issue and that neither issue

is meritorious.

Preservation of Error

We first address whether Jonjak preserved his argument that the divorce decree varies

from the terms of the MSA. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely

request, motion, or objection stating the grounds for the ruling “with sufficient specificity to make

the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.”

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The trial court must rule or the party urging the objection must object

to its failure to rule. Id. The preservation-of-error requirement “conserves judicial resources

by giving trial courts an opportunity to correct an error before an appeal proceeds.” In re B.L.D.,

113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003). Griffith argues Jonjak never gave the district court this

opportunity because he never challenged whether awarding “interest, dividends, gains, or losses” was

proper. Jonjak did not explicitly make this argument in the hearing but submitted a proposed decree

4 that awarded Griffith the flat sum of $962,000 and argued she was entitled to only that sum. In his

motion for new trial, Jonjak argued more explicitly that this language was improper because the

MSA “did not mention what would happen to gains and losses in the account for payment from the

401k.” We conclude Jonjak raised this issue clearly enough to preserve error. See Arkoma Basin

Expl. Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2008) (“[T]he cardinal rule for

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schaefer
124 S.W.3d 154 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster
128 S.W.3d 223 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd.
249 S.W.3d 380 (Texas Supreme Court, 2008)
Shanks v. Treadway
110 S.W.3d 444 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
Quijano v. Quijano
347 S.W.3d 345 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2011)
R.H. v. Smith Ex Rel. C.H.
339 S.W.3d 756 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2011)
Milner v. Milner
361 S.W.3d 615 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)
John David Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, Llc
547 S.W.3d 890 (Texas Supreme Court, 2018)
Bart Dalton v. Carol Dalton
551 S.W.3d 126 (Texas Supreme Court, 2018)
In the Interest of B.L.D.
113 S.W.3d 340 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C.
479 S.W.3d 231 (Texas Supreme Court, 2016)
Apache Deepwater, LLC v. McDaniel Partners, Ltd.
485 S.W.3d 900 (Texas Supreme Court, 2015)
Loya v. Loya
526 S.W.3d 448 (Texas Supreme Court, 2017)
Uri, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty.
543 S.W.3d 755 (Texas Supreme Court, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Eric Jonjak v. Kathye Marlene Griffith, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eric-jonjak-v-kathye-marlene-griffith-texapp-2019.