Eric J Mapes v. Carroll County Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 25A-CC-00660
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Eric J. Mapes, FILED Appellant-Petitioner Dec 18 2025, 8:56 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court

Carroll County and Carroll County Treasurer, Appellees-Respondents

December 18, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CC-660 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Morrissey, Special Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 79D06-2501-CC-275 08D01-2408-CC-206

Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judges Tavitas and Felix concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 1 of 13 Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary [1] Eric J. Mapes brought a complaint against Carroll County and the Carroll

County Treasurer alleging illegal garnishment of his federal disability income.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to provide a tort-claim notice,

and Mapes now appeals that dismissal. We affirm. Additionally, due to

Mapes’s persistent pattern of abusive litigation practices—including

disregarding warnings from this Court and our Supreme Court that continuing

such practices could result in filing restrictions—we remand to the trial court

with instructions to impose any conditions or restrictions on Mapes’s filings it

deems appropriate to prevent future abusive litigation.

Facts and Procedural History Background

[2] Mapes has a history of repetitive litigation, excessive filings, and harassment of

court staff. This history began in 2017, when Mapes moved to Indiana and

attempted to “appeal” his placement on the Indiana sex-offender registry due to

a conviction in Texas. See Cause No. 49A02-1706-MI-1465. From 2020 to

2021, Mapes filed five different cases challenging his sex-offender registration

requirements. See Cause Nos. 49G08-2002-PC-8402; 49D34-2102-PC-4134

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 2 of 13 (petition denied because Mapes was attempting to challenge his Texas

conviction); 49D34-2108-PC-25009; 49D34-2108-PC-25288 (case closed

because Mapes was seeking the same relief that was denied in PC-4134 (which

was affirmed on appeal in Case No. 21A-PC-250)); 08C01-2112-MI-27 (case

barred by res judicata because issue was already decided in Case No. 21A-PC-

250). In the Carroll County case, the trial court admonished Mapes for his

“disruptive” calls to the court and ordered him “to stop calling the court to ask

about this matter.” Order, Cause No. 08C01-2112-MI-27 (Apr. 5, 2022). After

Mapes’s challenges were rejected, he tried to sue one of the trial judges who

denied him relief. See Cause No. 49D05-2108-MI-43075. While that case was

pending, Mapes repeatedly contacted the court and was “verbally abusive to

Court staff.” See id. (Sept. 12, 2022 CCS entry).

[3] Mapes has also exhibited abusive conduct at the appellate level. From 2017 to

2022, Mapes brought eleven appeals in either this Court or the Indiana

Supreme Court. Mapes’s cases “consistently involved procedural or substantive

deficiencies.” Mapes v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1168, 1169 (Ind. 2023). Only one

appeal resulted in a decision on the merits; the rest were dismissed. Further, the

numerous filings within each appeal were “repetitive, immaterial, or otherwise

abusive of the judicial process” and often involved “additional merits

arguments under the guise of motions practice.” Id. And Mapes “for several

years engaged in a pattern of repeated, lengthy phone calls” to the Appellate

Clerk’s Office “with questions that Clerk staff cannot answer, or simply venting

about his cases.” Id. at 1170.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 3 of 13 [4] In 2023, our Supreme Court admonished Mapes for “his pattern of misuse of

motions practice, and his misuse of Clerk’s Office resources and abuse towards

its personnel.” Id. at 1168. Although it declined to impose filing restrictions at

that time, the Court warned Mapes that continuing his abusive practices would

“likely result in the Court restricting his filings and his communications with

Clerk personnel.” Id. But Mapes flouted this warning and has since filed seven

more appeals, all of which have been dismissed except this appeal.

Additionally, about a week after the Supreme Court issued its order, Mapes

filed a complaint against Chief Justice Rush in the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, alleging that she “used forms of intimidation and

threats of illegal sanctions all because [he] continues to exercise his

Constitutional Disability rights.” Mapes v. Rush, No. 4:23-CV-17, 2023 WL

2264659, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2023). Mapes requested “monetary, punitive

and injunctive relief,” including “a permanent injunction against Rush and to

overturn all of the orders she has made.” Id. The District Court dismissed the

complaint, finding that Mapes’s claims were frivolous.

Trial Court Proceedings

[5] In August 2024, Mapes, pro se, brought a complaint against Carroll County

and the Carroll County Treasurer (collectively, “the County”) alleging that the

County was illegally garnishing his federal disability income by levying taxes on

his property. Mapes sought damages and reimbursement of the “illegally

garnished” funds. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 p. 22. The County was served with a

copy of the complaint, but Mapes admittedly did not tender a summons to the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 4 of 13 clerk when he filed his complaint, see Appellant’s Br. p. 16, so the County was

never served a summons. Mapes initially filed the action in the Carroll Superior

Court, but because the County was a party, a special judge was appointed, and

the case was later transferred to the Tippecanoe Superior Court.

[6] From August 2024 to February 2025, before the County took any action in the

case, Mapes filed approximately 28 documents in the trial court. See Appellees’

App. Vol. 2 pp. 3-8. He characterized some of the filings as motions while

labeling others as “Declarations[s]” or “Notice[s] to [the] Court.” Id. at 4. These

filings included an “Affidavit of Retaliation,” a “Notice of Court and Court

Employees Unlawful Practice of Medicine, Discrimination and Disability,” and

a request for records of the oaths of office of the special judge and Carroll

County Clerk’s Office employees. Id. at 5-6 (capitalization omitted). Just one

week after the special judge assumed jurisdiction, Mapes moved for recusal,

alleging that the special judge was biased and prejudiced against him. See

Motion to Recuse, Cause No. 08D01-2408-CC-206 (Jan. 29, 2025). In its order

denying that motion, the trial court noted that Mapes “has engaged in a pattern

of making numerous telephone calls to the Tippecanoe Superior Court No. 6

Staff and Clerks where he has proven to be an abusive litigant with long and

rambling claims of misconduct.” Order, Cause No. 08D01-2408-CC-206 (Feb.

6, 2025). Mapes tried to appeal that order, but we dismissed the appeal because

the order wasn’t a final judgment or eligible for an interlocutory appeal. See

Mapes v. Carroll Cnty. Treasurer, No. 25A-CC-295.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 5 of 13 [7] Mapes also moved for default judgment. The County moved to dismiss Mapes’s

claim for insufficient service of process due to Mapes’s failure to serve a

summons. In the alternative, the County argued that Mapes’s claim should be

dismissed with prejudice because he didn’t serve a tort-claim notice as required

by the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). After the County filed its motion,

Mapes filed twelve more documents in the trial court in less than two weeks.

[8] Finding that service on the County hadn’t been perfected due to Mapes’s failure

to serve a summons, the trial court denied Mapes’s motion for default

judgment. The court then dismissed Mapes’s complaint with prejudice on the

ground that Mapes failed to provide the County with a tort-claim notice as

required by the ITCA.

Appeal and Subsequent Actions

[9] Mapes, still pro se, brought this appeal in March 2025. A week later, he sued

the Carroll County Superior Court and the Carroll County Clerk’s Office,

alleging, among other things, violations of his rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) and that “the Court corruptly influenced the due

administration of justice.” Mapes v. Carroll Cnty. Superior Ct., No. 4:25-CV-26,

2025 WL 3012755, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 27, 2025). The District Court

dismissed Mapes’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 1

1 In its order dismissing Mapes’s complaint, the District Court took judicial notice of our Supreme Court’s order in Mapes v. State and noted the “numerous cases” Mapes has filed in the Northern District of Indiana. Mapes v. Carroll Cnty. Superior Ct., 2025 WL 3012755, at *3 n.2.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 6 of 13 [10] What ensued after Mapes initiated this appeal was detailed in our Court’s July

17, 2025 order:

In the span of four months, Appellant has filed nearly fifty (50) separate documents, many accompanied by attachments. On July 11, 2025, the Court issued an order noting that Appellant’s filings have been excessive, repetitive, and a drain on Court resources. The Court warned Appellant that continued excessive and repetitive filings may result in the imposition of filing restrictions.

Appellant, again, did not heed the Court’s warning and proceeded to unleash a flood of filings. Some of the filings appear to predate the Court’s July 11 order. . . . But since the Court issued its order on July 11, Appellant has tendered or filed ten documents including . . . [a] Motion to Recuse Judge Elizabeth F. Tavitas and Associated Panel Members . . . and Motion to Vacate July 14, 2025 Order as Void Due to Judicial Disqualification, Retaliation, and Structural Rights Violations . . . . Like his filings earlier in this case, Appellant’s filings since the Court issued its July 11 order are excessive, repetitive, and a drain on judicial resources.

Additionally, the Clerk of the Court confirms that the abusive interactions between Appellant and personnel in the Clerk’s Office noted by our Supreme Court in 2023 continue to this day.

Order, Mapes v. Carroll Cnty., 266 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. July 17, 2025).

Finding Mapes to be “a prolific, abusive litigant whose numerous filings have

been a drain on judicial resources,” we prohibited further filings by Mapes in

this case (other than a petition for rehearing or petition to transfer) and ordered

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 7 of 13 that he may only communicate with the Clerk’s Office in writing. Id. We also

imposed the following screening mechanisms for any future appeals by Mapes:

a. Any Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant must fully comply with the content requirements of Appellate Rule 9(F) and Form #App.R. 9-1. If it does not, then the Clerk is directed to return the Notice of Appeal to Appellant without it being docketed.

b. At the time Appellant tenders a Notice of Appeal, Appellant must either pay the appellate filing fee as required by Appellate Rule 9(E) or comply with Appellate Rule 40 by showing that he has been granted permission by the trial court to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. If Appellant does not pay the appellate filing fee or comply with Appellate Rule 40, then the Clerk is directed to return the Notice of Appeal to Appellant without it being docketed.

c. Any documents/motions tendered by Appellant in a case after the Notice of Appeal has been filed must fully comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. If the tendered document/motion does not fully comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, then the Clerk is directed to return the noncompliant document/motion to Appellant without it being docketed.

Id. at 286.

[11] In September, Mapes brought a complaint against this Court and the Appellate

Clerk in federal court, contending that the restrictions we imposed violate his

federal and state constitutional rights and several federal statutes, including the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 8 of 13 ADA. 2 See Mapes v. Ind. Ct. of Appeals, 2:25-CV-404 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2025).

The District Court concluded that Mapes was essentially asking it to alter our

July 17 decision, which it doesn’t have jurisdiction to review, and dismissed the

case. Id.

Discussion and Decision I. The trial court did not err in dismissing Mapes’s complaint [12] Mapes contends the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. The court

dismissed the complaint for failure to provide the County with a tort-claim

notice as required by the ITCA. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 2. Under the

ITCA, a claim against a political subdivision is barred unless the plaintiff

provides notice of the claim within 180 days after the alleged loss occurs. Ind.

Code § 34-13-3-8. A plaintiff’s failure to comply with the ITCA’s notice

provisions entitles the government entity to a dismissal. Stone v. Wright, 133

N.E.3d 210, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[13] Mapes acknowledged in the trial court that he didn’t provide a tort-claim notice

to the County. In his “Notice To The Court Urging Affirmance” (seemingly

filed in response to the County’s motion to dismiss), Mapes stated that “there is

no need to prove compliance with I.C. 34-13-3-1 since [he] did not file a Tort

Claim, he filed a Civil lawsuit as affirmed by the Plaintiff’s Civil Complaint.”

2 This is not the first time Mapes has tried to sue this Court, and he has been advised that he cannot do so. See Mapes v. Ind. Ct. of Appeals, No. 1:17-CV-2591, 2017 WL 4570552, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 4, 2017) (“[T]he Indiana Court of Appeals is not a ‘person’ under section 1983 and is not a suable entity.”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 9 of 13 Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 2. On appeal, he maintains that he wasn’t required

to provide a tort-claim notice because his claim is not based in tort. “[W]hen

determining whether a claim is governed by the ITCA, we . . . look to the

claim’s underlying substance.” City of Evansville v. Magenheimer, 37 N.E.3d 965,

971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied, trans. denied. The ITCA applies to claims

where the plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the government to

compensate for a loss. Id. at 969. While the ITCA does not provide a statutory

definition of “tort,” “loss” for purposes of the ITCA is defined as an “injury to

or death of a person or damage to property.” I.C. § 34-6-2.1-117. We have held

that “[t]he ITCA’s coverage also extends to claims alleging damage to property

rights,” Magenheimer, 37 N.E.3d at 969, including loss of property, see Chariton

v. City of Hammond, 146 N.E.3d 927, 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; City

of Indianapolis v. Cox, 20 N.E.3d 201, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[14] Here, the underlying substance of Mapes’s claim is a loss of property, for which

he sought compensation—he alleged that the County illegally garnished his

federal disability income by levying property taxes, and he sought damages and

reimbursement of the “illegally garnished” funds. Regardless of how Mapes

characterizes his action, his claim is based in tort and is therefore governed by

the ITCA. See Chariton, 146 N.E.3d at 933-34 (“[I]n essence, [Chariton] seeks

an award of damages in the amount of fees and fines collected by the allegedly

illegal enforcement of the Ordinance. . . . Chariton is claiming a loss of

property, and therefore his claims sound in tort.”); Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Marion

Cnty. Treasurer, 816 N.E.2d 439, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“Regardless of how

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 10 of 13 Irwin deigns to describe its claims, its assertion that Marion County committed

a legal wrong causing harm to Irwin’s property when it extracted an allegedly

illegal property tax payment sounds in tort.”). Because Mapes undisputedly

failed to provide the County with a tort-claim notice, the trial court did not err

in dismissing his complaint.

II. Mapes’s persistent abuse of the judicial process and disregard for prior warnings warrant filing restrictions at the trial-court level [15] Given Mapes’s history of excessive litigation and abuse of the judicial process,

the County asks us to remand for the trial court to impose filing restrictions at

the trial level. As we found in our July 17 order, Mapes is “a prolific, abusive

litigant whose numerous filings have been a drain on judicial resources.” His

abuse includes bringing frivolous claims and raising the same issue in multiple

cases, even after the issue has already been decided adversely to him. When an

adverse decision or order is issued, Mapes often sues the judge or court who

issued it. (Or, as in this case, requests recusal or judicial disqualification of the

judge who signed the order.) In each of his cases, Mapes submits a plethora of

filings that are “repetitive, immaterial, or otherwise abusive of the judicial

process” and often include impermissible attempts to make additional

arguments on the merits under the guise of motions practice. And for years,

Mapes has been abusive in his interactions with Clerk’s Office staff.

Remarkably, all of this has occurred despite explicit warnings to Mapes from

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 11 of 13 our Supreme Court and this Court that continuing such conduct could result in

restrictions on his filings and communications with Clerk staff.

[16] Mapes’s “right of access to the courts is not a license to engage in such conduct

with impunity.” Mapes, 201 N.E.3d at 1170. “There is no right to engage in

abusive litigation, and the state has a legitimate interest in the preservation of

valuable judicial and administrative resources.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d

259, 264 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, “[t]he courts of this state, after due

consideration of an abusive litigant’s entire history, may fashion and impose

reasonable conditions and restrictions . . . on the litigant’s ability to commence

or continue actions in this state that are tailored to the litigant’s particular

abusive practices.” Id. at 266.

[17] While we already imposed conditions on any future appeals by Mapes, we

agree with the County that restrictions at the trial-court level are also warranted

to prevent further abusive litigation. We therefore remand to the trial court with

instructions to consider the specific abusive conduct by Mapes and impose any

conditions or restrictions it deems appropriate to thwart such conduct. See

Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“We . . .

remand to the trial court to determine, after due consideration of Holland’s

history of abuse, which of the restrictions authorized by our Supreme Court in

Zavodnik . . . should be imposed against Holland.”), reh’g denied, trans. denied; see

also Holland v. Ind. Univ., 254 N.E.3d 1110, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)

(upholding filing restrictions imposed by trial court on remand), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 12 of 13 [18] We recognize that while remand is to the Tippecanoe Superior Court given the

change of venue, the Carroll County court system is likely more in need of

restrictions on Mapes’s filings—Mapes lives in Carroll County and has filed

most of his state-court litigation there. Under Zavodnik, the Carroll County

courts (and any other trial courts in the state) have the authority to impose

reasonable restrictions on an abusive litigant. See 17 N.E.3d at 265-66 (sampling

cases where appellate courts affirmed sanctions and restrictions placed on

abusive litigants by trial courts). 3 We therefore advise the Carroll County courts

that they may also implement any conditions or restrictions they deem

necessary given Mapes’s history of abusive litigation.

[19] Affirmed and remanded.

Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.

APPELLANT PRO SE Eric Mapes Delphi, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Mark J. Crandley Barnes & Thornburg LLP Indianapolis, Indiana

3 We note that our Supreme Court is currently considering a proposed new trial rule, Trial Rule 11.2, which would lay out the Zavodnik language in one convenient place.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CC-660 | December 18, 2025 Page 13 of 13