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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 ERIC J. KIKKERT, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00950-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 NICK BROWN, in his official capacity 11 as Attorney General of the State of Washington, PAM BONDI, in her 12 official capacity as General of the United States, 13 Defendants. 14
15 1. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Nick Brown and Pam 17 Bondi’s Motions to Dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 21, 26. Having reviewed the motions, Plaintiff 18 Eric Kikkert’s responses, Dkt. Nos. 22, 29, Defendant Brown’s reply, Dkt. No. 30, 19 and all other materials, the Court GRANTS the Motions and DISMISSES the First 20 Amended Complaint WITH PREJUDICE. 21 22 23 1 2. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Eric Kikkert describes himself as “a naturalist and religious
3 practitioner” and a veteran who served in the United States Army. Dkt. No. 19 4 (FAC) at 3, 6. He originally filed suit in King County Superior Court on or about 5 April 7, 2025, against the State of Washington and the “United States Federal 6 Government.” Dkt. 1-1. The United States removed the action to federal court, Dkt. 7 1, and Judge Marsha J. Pechman dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and 8 failure to state a claim but granted leave to amend, despite doubting whether the
9 complaint could be salvaged. Dkt. 17. Kikkert filed his First Amended Complaint 10 (“FAC”) on September 8, 2025, naming Brown and Bondi as defendants. Dkt. No. 19 11 Kikkert’s amended claims fall into three categories. First, he alleges that 12 state and federal policies related to the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily vaccine 13 mandates, violated his constitutional rights to “live and raise potential children” in 14 accordance with his religion and “attend[ ] in-person religious services and 15 community rituals at his place of worship[.]” Dkt. No. 19 at 6–8. He also claims that
16 state and federal medical and religious exemptions to the COVID-19 vaccine 17 requirements violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 18 Amendments because they are “not uniformly applied or guaranteed.” Id. at 7. 19 Second, Kikkert claims that Defendants, along with “tens of thousands of 20 past and present actors,” engaged in a decades-long conspiracy to employ and 21 enforce various legal immunities to deprive him of various constitutional rights, and
22 claims that these immunities are preempted under the Supremacy Clause. See id. 23 at 1–6. 1 Third, Kikkert accuses Defendants of enforcing or defending “anti-BDS” 2 laws1, and claims these laws violate his expressive rights under the First
3 Amendment. Id. at 2, 6, 8, 10. 4 Kikkert brings six causes of action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. 5 § 1983, alleging the constitutional violations discussed above, and claiming that 6 Defendants conspired to deny him his constitutional rights. FAC at 10–11. 7 3. DISCUSSION 8 Defendants argue that the FAC should be dismissed for lack of subject-
9 matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to 10 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 21, 26. 11 The Court first reviews the relevant legal standards and then Kikkert’s motion for 12 an overlength brief before turning to the Parties’ arguments for and against 13 dismissal. 14 3.1 Legal standards. 15 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s subject-matter 16 jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumed to 17 lack jurisdiction until the plaintiff establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 18 Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Article III standing is an essential 19
20 1 While Kikkert does not define “anti-BDS,” the term appears to be an acronym for the “Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions” movement, which “seeks the peaceful end 21 of Israeli discrimination against and maltreatment of Palestinians imposing economic pressure on Israel to cease its settlement activity in Palestinian 22 Territory.” See Ali v. Hogan, 496 F. Supp. 3d 917, 920 (D. Md. 2020), aff’d as modified, 26 F.4th 587 (4th Cir. 2022). Defendants agree with this interpretation. 23 See Dkt. No. 21 at 2 n.1; Dkt. No. 26 at 3 n.2 1 ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction.” Perry v. Newsom, 18 F.4th 622, 630 (9th 2 Cir. 2021) (quoting Whitaker v. Tesla Motors Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.
3 2021)). When evaluating a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court accepts the 4 factual allegations in the complaint as true. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. Elec., 5 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 6 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 7 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be 8 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
9 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 10 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro 11 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 12 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 13 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 14 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988))). 15 3.2 Kikkert’s motion for overlength brief and surreply. 16 As an initial matter, Kikkert seeks leave to file an overlength response to 17 Defendant Brown’s motion to dismiss, certifying that “the opposition is not verbose 18 but responsive to the motion’s breadth.” Dkt. No. 28 at 2. Kikkert’s 12,000 word 19 brief—nearly 4,000 words over the limit provided by LCR 7(e)(4)—is not the model 20 of brevity. But given his pro se status, and in light of Defendants’ non-opposition to 21 the request, the Court GRANTS the motion. The Court has considered Kikkert’s full 22 opposition in resolving these motions. 23 1 For similar reasons, the Court has also considered Kikkert’s surreply to 2 Defendant Brown’s reply brief, Dkt. No. 31, even though it was filed without leave
3 of court and outside the narrow circumstances permitted by LCR 7(g). 4 3.3 Kikkert lacks Article III standing to sue. 5 Federal judicial power extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” Spokeo, 6 Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, (2016), as rev’d (May 24, 2016). “Standing to sue is 7 a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” Id. at 8 338.
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 ERIC J. KIKKERT, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00950-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 NICK BROWN, in his official capacity 11 as Attorney General of the State of Washington, PAM BONDI, in her 12 official capacity as General of the United States, 13 Defendants. 14
15 1. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Nick Brown and Pam 17 Bondi’s Motions to Dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 21, 26. Having reviewed the motions, Plaintiff 18 Eric Kikkert’s responses, Dkt. Nos. 22, 29, Defendant Brown’s reply, Dkt. No. 30, 19 and all other materials, the Court GRANTS the Motions and DISMISSES the First 20 Amended Complaint WITH PREJUDICE. 21 22 23 1 2. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Eric Kikkert describes himself as “a naturalist and religious
3 practitioner” and a veteran who served in the United States Army. Dkt. No. 19 4 (FAC) at 3, 6. He originally filed suit in King County Superior Court on or about 5 April 7, 2025, against the State of Washington and the “United States Federal 6 Government.” Dkt. 1-1. The United States removed the action to federal court, Dkt. 7 1, and Judge Marsha J. Pechman dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and 8 failure to state a claim but granted leave to amend, despite doubting whether the
9 complaint could be salvaged. Dkt. 17. Kikkert filed his First Amended Complaint 10 (“FAC”) on September 8, 2025, naming Brown and Bondi as defendants. Dkt. No. 19 11 Kikkert’s amended claims fall into three categories. First, he alleges that 12 state and federal policies related to the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily vaccine 13 mandates, violated his constitutional rights to “live and raise potential children” in 14 accordance with his religion and “attend[ ] in-person religious services and 15 community rituals at his place of worship[.]” Dkt. No. 19 at 6–8. He also claims that
16 state and federal medical and religious exemptions to the COVID-19 vaccine 17 requirements violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 18 Amendments because they are “not uniformly applied or guaranteed.” Id. at 7. 19 Second, Kikkert claims that Defendants, along with “tens of thousands of 20 past and present actors,” engaged in a decades-long conspiracy to employ and 21 enforce various legal immunities to deprive him of various constitutional rights, and
22 claims that these immunities are preempted under the Supremacy Clause. See id. 23 at 1–6. 1 Third, Kikkert accuses Defendants of enforcing or defending “anti-BDS” 2 laws1, and claims these laws violate his expressive rights under the First
3 Amendment. Id. at 2, 6, 8, 10. 4 Kikkert brings six causes of action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. 5 § 1983, alleging the constitutional violations discussed above, and claiming that 6 Defendants conspired to deny him his constitutional rights. FAC at 10–11. 7 3. DISCUSSION 8 Defendants argue that the FAC should be dismissed for lack of subject-
9 matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to 10 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 21, 26. 11 The Court first reviews the relevant legal standards and then Kikkert’s motion for 12 an overlength brief before turning to the Parties’ arguments for and against 13 dismissal. 14 3.1 Legal standards. 15 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s subject-matter 16 jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumed to 17 lack jurisdiction until the plaintiff establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 18 Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Article III standing is an essential 19
20 1 While Kikkert does not define “anti-BDS,” the term appears to be an acronym for the “Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions” movement, which “seeks the peaceful end 21 of Israeli discrimination against and maltreatment of Palestinians imposing economic pressure on Israel to cease its settlement activity in Palestinian 22 Territory.” See Ali v. Hogan, 496 F. Supp. 3d 917, 920 (D. Md. 2020), aff’d as modified, 26 F.4th 587 (4th Cir. 2022). Defendants agree with this interpretation. 23 See Dkt. No. 21 at 2 n.1; Dkt. No. 26 at 3 n.2 1 ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction.” Perry v. Newsom, 18 F.4th 622, 630 (9th 2 Cir. 2021) (quoting Whitaker v. Tesla Motors Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.
3 2021)). When evaluating a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court accepts the 4 factual allegations in the complaint as true. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. Elec., 5 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 6 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 7 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be 8 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
9 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 10 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro 11 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 12 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 13 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 14 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988))). 15 3.2 Kikkert’s motion for overlength brief and surreply. 16 As an initial matter, Kikkert seeks leave to file an overlength response to 17 Defendant Brown’s motion to dismiss, certifying that “the opposition is not verbose 18 but responsive to the motion’s breadth.” Dkt. No. 28 at 2. Kikkert’s 12,000 word 19 brief—nearly 4,000 words over the limit provided by LCR 7(e)(4)—is not the model 20 of brevity. But given his pro se status, and in light of Defendants’ non-opposition to 21 the request, the Court GRANTS the motion. The Court has considered Kikkert’s full 22 opposition in resolving these motions. 23 1 For similar reasons, the Court has also considered Kikkert’s surreply to 2 Defendant Brown’s reply brief, Dkt. No. 31, even though it was filed without leave
3 of court and outside the narrow circumstances permitted by LCR 7(g). 4 3.3 Kikkert lacks Article III standing to sue. 5 Federal judicial power extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” Spokeo, 6 Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, (2016), as rev’d (May 24, 2016). “Standing to sue is 7 a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” Id. at 8 338. To have standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that 9 is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 10 to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. To show an injury in fact, a 11 plaintiff must show “that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, 12 particularized, and actual or imminent.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 13 423 (2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992)). 14 Defendants argue that Kikkert’s alleged injuries are neither particularized 15 nor concrete. Dkt. No. 21 at 4–5 (Defendant Bondi); Dkt. No. 26 at 3–4 (Defendant 16 Brown). The Court agrees and addresses both deficiencies in turn. 17 3.3.1 Kikkert’s general grievances about government policies are 18 not particularized. 19 Kikkert’s constitutional challenges to the policies, rules, and laws upheld and 20 enforced by Defendants is not particularized. To be “particularized,” the injury must 21 affect Kikkert “in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (quoting 22 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). 23 1 Kikkert alleges that because he is “a citizen injured by deprivations of 2 constitutional rights, liberties, and freedoms,” he thus has standing to “enjoin the
3 Defendants from enforcing and maintaining unconstitutional laws, policies, rules, 4 and treaties that violate the U.S. Constitution[.]” FAC at 1, 9. But it is well-settled 5 that “a citizen does not have standing to challenge a government regulation simply 6 because the plaintiff believes that the government is acting illegally.” Food & Drug 7 Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). Indeed, Kikkert’s 8 claims present the type of “generally available grievance about government,” which
9 courts have consistently held “do not state an Article III case or controversy.” Lujan, 10 504 U.S. at 556; see also All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 (“[G]eneral legal, 11 moral, ideological, and policy concerns do not suffice on their own to confer Article 12 III standing to sue in federal court.”); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) 13 (collecting cases). The Court thus finds that the FAC should be dismissed for lack of 14 Article III standing. 15 3.3.2 Kikkert’s alleged harms are purely speculative and not concrete. 16 Even if Kikkert’s alleged injuries were particularized, he still wouldn’t have 17 standing to bring sue because his alleged injury is not concrete. For an injury-in- 18 fact to be “concrete,” it must “actually exist,” meaning that it is “real, and not 19 abstract.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. 20 Kikkert’s alleged injuries are entirely abstract. For example, he admits that 21 the state vaccination policies at issue were not forced upon him. FAC at 5. Kikkert 22 does not claim that any policy or action by Defendants has actively restrained his 23 1 exercise of his constitutional rights, but rather alleges that he was “deterred” from 2 certain opportunities through his “fears” of various threats due to his “non-
3 compliance with vaccine authorizations.” See, e.g., FAC at 6 (claiming that ongoing 4 threats under current vaccine policies have “deprived [him] of the right to live and 5 raise potential children”); id. at 7 (Kikkert’s own fears of “sudden mandate 6 imposition” resulted in his aversion to enrolling in courses at Cascadia College); id. 7 at 8 (alleging that he was “deterred” from applying for federal grants by unspecified 8 “unlawful controls” and “anti-BDS laws.”). But nowhere does Kikkert allege that he
9 received any actual threats or was himself subjected to these policies, laws, or 10 conspiracies, i.e., a “real, and not abstract” injury. Rather, he lists a slew of 11 opportunities—educational, economical, and personal—that he has failed to act on 12 due to his own unfounded fears of undefined penalties.2 These are not sufficiently 13 concrete to support an injury-in-fact. 14 The Court thus finds that Kikkert lacks standing and that his claims must be 15 dismissed. Because Kikkert has not alleged an injury-in-fact, the Court need not
16 reach the issues of traceability and redressability. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions 17 are GRANTED. 18 19
20 2 Additionally, Kikkert’s alleged harms are premised on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” and are therefore unable to satisfy the requirement that the 21 threatened injury-in-fact is “certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013). See also Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, 675 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 22 1188 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (to establish standing for a threat alone, plaintiff must identify a particular—not merely generalized—threat of enforcement). 23 1 3.4 No leave to amend. Kikkert has already been given several chances to state a cognizable federal 2 claim. He filed an original complaint, an amended complaint, and comprehensive 3 responses to both Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Despite these multiple attempts 4 to articulate Article III standing, he remains unable to show a cognizable injury-in- 5 fact, as explained above. 6 While courts ordinarily grant pro se plaintiffs leave to amend, “dismissal 7 without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved 8 by amendment.” Est. of Strickland v. Nevada Cnty., 69 F.4th 614, 623 (9th Cir. 9 2023). Courts have “’particularly broad’ discretion to deny leave to amend when the 10 plaintiff has already had a chance to amend[.]” Id. (quoting Salameh v. Tarsadia 11 Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)). Given his repeated inability to 12 articulate Article III standing despite explicit guidance and multiple chances, the 13 Court, the Court finds further amendment would be futile. 14 The Court thus DENIES leave to amend further and DISMISSES this action 15 WITH PREJUDICE. See Dillon Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Dillon, 333 F. App’x 16 195, 196 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) for 17 lack of standing). 18 4. CONCLUSION 19 The Court finds that Kikkert has failed to establish an injury in fact 20 necessary to confer Article III standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“The party 21 invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”). 22 Federal courts are available to plaintiffs with “a real controversy with real impact 23 1 on real persons.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424. Kikkert has shown neither. 2 Accordingly, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED. Kikkert’s claims are DISMISSED
3 WITH PREJUDICE. 4 5 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2026. 6 A Jamal N. Whitehead 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
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