Eric Hood v. Stevens County

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 39811-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED JUNE 3, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

ERIC HOOD, ) ) No. 39811-1-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) STEVENS COUNTY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )

STAAB, A.C.J. — The trial court granted Stevens County’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that Eric Hood filed his complaint outside the one-year limitations

period for violations of the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW. Specifically, the

court found that an email sent to Hood by the County, reading “we believe this completes

your request,” triggered the commencement of the limitations period.

After the superior court dismissed Hood’s complaint, and while his appeal was

pending, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Cousins v. State, 3 Wn.3d 19, 546 P.3d

415 (2024), setting forth a three-part test to determine whether a closing letter is a final,

definitive response for the purpose of triggering the statute of limitations. Here, the email

sent from the County only satisfied one of the three inquiries. As such, the email was not No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

a final definitive response that triggered the one-year statute of limitations and the court

thus erred when it granted the County’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

On December 27, 2019, Eric Hood emailed a PRA request to Stevens County.

Hood’s request pertained to a recent audit:

Please give me all the records related to the audit. That would include communications between the Stevens County prosecutor’s office and the town, and any discussions among town officials and employees about the audit. Please send them to me electronically or let me know and I can share a dropbox with you.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 4. The next day, Hood sent another email to the County stating:

“[t]he time range for this request is from the date the Town of Springdale first contacted

your office regarding the audit up to and including March 8, 2018.” CP at 4. The County

acknowledged receipt of this request two days later on December 30, 2019, with the

following response:

Attached please find records related to Stevens County Sheriff’s Office incident report no. 1800114 in response to your December 30, 2019 public records request. Additional time will be needed to search our records for any email correspondence regarding this case. I anticipate that such records will be available within 2-3 weeks. Should the records be available sooner, I will let you know.

CP at 94.

On January 6, 2020, Hood received an email from Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

Christina Radzimska, which read:

2 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

We conducted a search of our email database with the following search terms:

1. Town of Springdale

2. Springdale City Clerk/Treasurer

3. Lisa Sheppard

4. Springdale Audit

This search resulted in no responsive emails. We believe this completes your request.

CP at 170. After sending this email, Radzimska closed the file. Later that day, Hood

responded to the email and asked if Radzimska could check for hardcopies or other

locations. After Hood did not hear back from her, he sent another email and asked

whether the County received his prior email.

On March 10, 2020, Hood received an email from Sasha Blackman, Radzimska’s

paralegal, who informed Hood that Radzimska no longer worked in their office. She

asked Hood to clarify what his email was regarding. Hood informed her that it was a

records request and asked her to refer to the email chain. On March 16, 2020, Hood

received an email from Blackman containing three responsive records as attachments that

stated: “Attached please find all the hard copies the Stevens County Prosecutor has

regarding the Audit on the City of Springdale. You can also Search more State Auditor’s

Office documents online.” CP at 85.

3 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

The following year, on March 10, 2021, Hood served his summons and complaint

on the County. The County moved for summary judgment, alleging that Hood’s

complaint was filed more than one year after Radzimska’s January 6, 2020 closing email.

Hood responded, arguing that the email was not definitive and did not put him on notice

that his PRA request was actually closed, and that the County released additional records

on March 16, 2020, which was within one year of Hood commencing this case. The trial

court agreed with the County and granted its motion for summary judgment.

Hood appeals.

ANALYSIS

1. TRIGGERING EVENT FOR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Hood contends the trial court erred by concluding that the County’s email was a

final, definitive response to Hood’s request for public records that triggered the one-year

statute of limitations outlined in RCW 42.56.550(6).

This court reviews orders on summary judgment de novo. Anderson v. Grant

County, 28 Wn. App. 2d 796, 803, 539 P.3d 40 (2023); Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358,

370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court “must

consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 28 Wn. App. 2d at 803. Summary

judgment is only appropriate if “there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

4 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This court “may affirm

summary judgment on any basis supported by the record.” Id.

Under the PRA, actions “must be filed within one year of the agency’s claim of

exemption or the last production of a record on a partial or installment basis.” RCW

42.56.550(6). The Washington State Supreme Court recently interpreted this statute and,

as a matter of first impression, determined whether “an agency’s ‘closing letter’ may

trigger the PRA’s limitations period.” Cousins, 3 Wn.3d at 36.

In Cousins, the court held that a sufficient closing letter “will generally trigger the

PRA’s statute of limitations” and that subsequently producing records may be relevant

for the purpose of determining penalties or liability but “ordinarily will not restart the

limitations period.” Id. However, the “closing letter must be sufficient; an agency’s use

of the word ʻclosed,’ without more, is not determinative.” Id. The court reiterated that a

closing letter must satisfy the “final, definitive response test” first discussed in Belenski v.

Jefferson County, 186 Wn.2d 452, 378 P.3d 176 (2016), in accordance with the “attorney

general’s Advisory Model Rules [AMR] and the guidance provided in [the Cousin’s]

opinion.” Cousins, 3 Wn.3d at 36.

The court went on to explain what makes a closing letter sufficient. Id. In

particular, the closing letter must provide the following information to the requestor:

(1) how the PRA request was fulfilled and why the agency is now closing the request, (2) that the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations to seek judicial review has started to run because the agency does not intend to

5 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

further address the request, and (3) that the requester may ask follow-up questions within a reasonable time frame, which may be specified by the agency.

Id. at 36-37. Additionally, the court explained that an agency is not required to search for

additional records if the requestor asks a follow-up question, but if the agency does not

intend to further address the request, “it must explicitly say so and reiterate that the

statute of limitations has started to run.” Id. at 37. This is because “[t]he final, definitive

response test is an objective inquiry, so the agency’s subjective intent . . . [is] not

relevant.” Id.

Cousins also provided a thorough overview of the one-year PRA statute of

limitations precedent. Id. at 37-38. It explained that Belenski provides “the correct

analytical framework for all PRA cases” and it also largely “affirm[ed] Dotson’s

application of Belenski to the [specific] closing letter in that case.” Id. at 38. However,

the court declined to adopt or recognize “a bright-line rule that Belenski is necessarily

satisfied by the word ‘closed.’” Id. Instead, the closing letter will trigger the PRA’s

limitation period only if “the letter satisfies the final, definitive response test in

accordance with the attorney general’s [AMR] and the guidance provided in [this]

opinion.” Id. Importantly, Cousins noted that its opinion does not “claim to impose a

retroactive standard of strict compliance.” Id. at 52 (emphasis added).

6 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

As discussed in Cousins, the attorney general’s AMR provides that a request “‘can

be closed’ by an agency only when the request ʻhas been fulfilled.’” 3 Wn.3d at 47

(quoting WAC 44-14-04006(1)). Fulfillment can occur in several ways:

[W]hen a requestor has inspected all the requested records, all copies have been provided, a web link has been provided (with assistance from the agency in finding it, if necessary), an entirely unclear request has not been clarified, a request or installment has not been claimed or reviewed, or the requestor cancels the request.

WAC 44-14-04006(1).

When a request has been fulfilled, the agency should provide the requestor with a

“closing letter stating the scope of the request and memorializing the outcome,” which

should include an explanation on how the request was fulfilled. WAC 44-14-04006(1).

Additionally, the closing letter “should also ask the requestor to promptly contact the

agency if [they] believe[ ] additional responsive records have not been provided.” WAC

44-14-04006(1). When the closing process has been completed, an agency no longer has

an obligation to search for records. WAC 44-14-04007.

Having reviewed the principles established in Cousins and the AMR, we must

now address whether the “closing letter” sent on January 6, 2020, was sufficient to trigger

the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations as the County contends.

First, although the email does indicate how the PRA request was fulfilled—

because no responsive records were found—and why Hood’s request was being closed—

because the County believed this fulfilled his request—it fails the second and third

7 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

requirements outlined in Cousins. The letter did not indicate that the statute of

limitations had begun to run or that the agency would not address the request any further

and it failed to inform Hood that he may ask follow-up questions within a reasonable

timeframe. Although Cousins clarifies that strict compliance is not required, two of the

three requirements were not fulfilled and thus the email would not put a reasonable lay

person on notice. See Cousins, 3 Wn.3d at 53 (“[T]he sufficiency of a closing letter must

be considered objectively, applying the standard of a reasonable lay person.”).

The County contends that because it did not respond to Hood’s January 6 email

asking if the County was sure there were no responsive records, that should have

reinforced to Hood that the request was closed. This argument fails. As discussed,

Cousins establishes that a requestor is allowed to ask follow-up questions, but if the

agency does not intend to further address the request, “it must explicitly say so and

reiterate that the statute of limitations has started to run.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added). As

such, failing to respond to Hood’s question was not sufficient, the County needed to

explicitly communicate to Hood that it did not intend to further address the request and

that the statute of limitations started to run.

The County cites Dotson v. Pierce County, 13 Wn. App. 2d 455, 464 P.3d 563

(2020) to support the argument that the later production of records does not extend the

date for calculating the statute of limitations. However, contrary to the case at hand, in

Dotson, the first letter sent to the requestor was sufficient to constitute a final, definitive

8 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

response. Id. at 471-72. Despite the fact the County later reopened the request and

produced more documents, because the first email satisfied the final, definitive response

test, the statute of limitations was not tolled simply by reopening the claim and producing

more documents. Id. at 470. Dotson is thus unhelpful for the County’s argument because

the initial email sent on January 6, 2020, did not satisfy the final, definitive response test.

The County argues that Cousins is intended to provide guidance for future PRA

closing letters and warned against retroactive application. The County misconstrues the

language in Cousins. “Washington has followed the general rule that a new decision of

law applies retroactively unless expressly stated otherwise in the case announcing the

new rule of law.” Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc. 166 Wn.2d 264, 271, 208 P.3d

1092 (2009). Cousins stated that it did “not claim to impose a retroactive standard of

strict compliance.” 3 Wn.3d at 52. However, nowhere in the opinion does the court

claim that the test or guidance outlined in the opinion was not intended to apply

retroactively to PRA cases. As such, the County’s argument fails.

While the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s decision in

Cousins, and we therefore do not fault it, we nonetheless hold that Cousins applies to this

case and requires reversal of the order dismissing Hood’s complaint on summary

judgment.

9 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

2. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Hood requests attorney fees on appeal should he prevail, pursuant to RCW

42.56.550(4) and RAP 18.1(a). The County contends that Hood would need to secure

reversal from this court to receive attorney fees and that Hood should not be the

prevailing party. We conclude that Hood prevailed on appeal and is entitled to attorney

fees.

The PRA provides that “[a]ny person who prevails against an agency in any action

in the courts seeking the right to inspect or copy any public record or the right to receive

a response to a public record request” “shall be awarded all costs, including reasonable

attorney fees.” RCW 42.56.550(4). “This includes attorney fees incurred on appeal.”

Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 473. Likewise, under RAP 18.1(a), we may award attorney

fees to the prevailing party on appeal if applicable law grants a party the right to recover

those fees and if the party requests them as prescribed by RAP 18.1. Wachovia SBA

Lending, Inc. v. Kraft, 165 Wn.2d 481, 493, 200 P.3d 683 (2009). Here, Hood has

prevailed against the County in a PRA action on appeal and has cited appropriate

authority. As such, we should award Hood his reasonable attorney fees on appeal as the

prevailing party.

10 No. 39811-1-III Hood v. Stevens County

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

_________________________________ Staab, A.C.J. WE CONCUR:

_________________________________ Fearing, J.

_________________________________ Murphy, J.