Eric Gonzalez v. Bill Zika

Ninth Circuit

Eric Gonzalez v. Bill Zika

623 F. App'x 478

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 27, 2015

Docket13-16786

StatusUnpublished

This text of 623 F. App'x 478 (Eric Gonzalez v. Bill Zika) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Eric Gonzalez v. Bill Zika, 623 F. App'x 478 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Eric Lamont Gonzalez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San *479 Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir.2011), and we affirm.

Contrary to Gonzalez’s contention, defendants’ January 3, 2013 recommendation did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether deféndants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs. See Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir.1989) (“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

Gonzalez’s challenges to the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction are moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of a preliminary injunction would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gonzalez’s motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Gonzalez failed to establish any ground warranting reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multno-mah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).

We reject Gonzalez’s contention that the district court should have, sua sponte, appointed a neutral expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim[.]”).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir, R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Eric Lamont Gonzalez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San *479 Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir.2011), and we affirm.

Contrary to Gonzalez’s contention, defendants’ January 3, 2013 recommendation did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether deféndants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs. See Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir.1989) (“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

Gonzalez’s challenges to the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction are moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of a preliminary injunction would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gonzalez’s motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Gonzalez failed to establish any ground warranting reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multno-mah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).

We reject Gonzalez’s contention that the district court should have, sua sponte, appointed a neutral expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim[.]”).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir, R. 36-3.

5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

Ashley Hunt Greenwood v. Federal Aviation Administration

28 F.3d 971 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)

Padgett v. Wright

587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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