Eric F. Hartman v. Vincent Doctor, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 ERIC F. HARTMAN, Case No. 5:25-cv-09816-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 VINCENT DOCTOR, et al., [Re: ECF Nos. 64, 65] 11 Defendants.

12 13 Plaintiff Eric Hartman, an attorney proceeding pro se, filed this action against his 14 neighbors Koshy George and Lynn Kuehn, California State Senator Dave Cortese, Santa Clara 15 Superior Court Judge Evette Pennypacker, Santa Clara Assistant District Attorney Vincent Doctor, 16 and the County of Santa Clara. ECF No. 23 (“Compl.”). On April 13, 2026, the Court dismissed 17 all claims against Mr. George, Ms. Kuehn, Senator Cortese, and Judge Pennypacker with 18 prejudice. ECF No. 57 (“Order”). ADA Doctor and the County of Santa Clara (together, 19 “Defendants”)1 now move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 20 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, to strike the complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil 21 Procedure § 425.16. See ECF No. 64 (“Strike Mot.”); ECF 65 (“MTD”); ECF No. 68 (“Reply”). 22 Mr. Hartman opposes the motion. ECF No. 67 (“Opp.”). The Court finds the matter suitable for 23 decision without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for August 20, 2026. See Civ. 24 L.R. 7-1(b). 25 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. 26 27 I. BACKGROUND 1 As the Court explained in its prior order, see Order at 1–2, Mr. Hartman’s complaint is 2 difficult to parse but is essentially based on a series of state court actions he brought against 3 Mr. George and Ms. Kuehn, over which Judge Pennypacker presided. Compl. ¶¶ 34–35, 38. 4 Mr. Hartman alleges that ADA Doctor, Judge Pennypacker, and Senator Cortese entered a 5 conspiracy against him because Senator Cortese’s staff improperly contacted Judge Pennypacker’s 6 staff regarding Mr. Hartman’s conduct toward Mr. George (i.e., Senator Cortese’s constituent) and 7 Judge Pennypacker engaged in “stealing cases” by consolidating the state court lawsuits that 8 Mr. Hartman filed. Id. ¶¶ 53, 61. 9 ADA Doctor’s connection to this alleged conspiracy is quite unclear. ADA Doctor is an 10 assistant district attorney involved in the prosecution of a criminal action against Mr. Hartman. 11 Compl. ¶ 9. Based on the alleged circulation by Judge Pennypacker’s staff of the email from 12 Senator Cortese’s staff, Mr. Hartman alleges that ADA Doctor, Judge Pennypacker, and Senator 13 Cortese “became Bias [sic] and no longer impartial in their legal capacities towards plaintiff 14 Hartman thus depriving [him] under Color of Law of his Constitution [sic] Right to a Fair Hearing 15 before an Impartial Judge and also a Fair Prosecution/Prosecutor.” Id. ¶ 45. 16 Mr. Hartman avers that evidence of the “[c]rimes against governmental authority [sic] . . . 17 evidencing disqualifying bias or prejudice and lack of impartiality” is set forth in exhibits 15 and 18 16 attached to the complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 45–47. The Court previously summarized these exhibits 19 as follows: 20 Exhibit 15 apparently depicts Mr. George’s “unlawful . . . April 23, 2025[,] email . . . entreating Legislative Branch – State Senator Dave 21 Cortese to entreat adverse Judicial Action Against Hartman” by complaining about Mr. Hartman’s conduct. Compl. ¶ 47; see also id. 22 Ex. 15. Exhibit 16 apparently depicts an email from Senator Cortese’s staff to Judge Pennypacker’s staff regarding “contact[] by 23 a constituent . . . indicating difficulties with his next door neighbor,” which, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution, and to avoid any concern 24 of ex parte communications, [Judge Pennypacker] . . . forward[ed] . . . to the parties.” Id. Ex. 16. Mr. Hartman alleges that, 25 when he asked Judge Pennypacker “about this Ex Parte Communication [she] shouted ‘I will not discuss it[.]’” Compl. ¶ 67. 26 Order at 3. Exhibit 16 shows that ADA Doctor was also copied to that email. 27 The complaint asserts (1) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1 § 52.1 (“Bane Act”), see Compl. ¶¶ 29–43; (2) deprivation of his state and federal constitutional 2 rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see id. ¶¶ 44–72; and (3) injunctive relief prohibiting certain 3 Defendants from bringing state criminal charges against him, see id. ¶¶ 73–75. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction tests whether a complaint 6 alleges grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. “A plaintiff suing in a federal court must 7 show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal 8 jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having the defect called to its attention or on 9 discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the defect be corrected by amendment.” Smith 10 v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926). A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. 11 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack, 12 the Court determines whether the allegations contained in the complaint, taken as true, are 13 sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. In evaluating a factual attack, the existence 14 of disputed material facts does not preclude the Court from evaluating for itself the merits of 15 jurisdictional claims. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Safe Air for Everyone, 16 373 F.3d at 1039. 17 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 19 (9th Cir. 2001). A defendant may move to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 20 to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 21 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 22 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 23 for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 24 but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft 25 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[F]or a complaint to 26 survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from 27 that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. 1 If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide 2 whether to grant leave to amend. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) gives the trial 3 court discretion over this matter, the Ninth Circuit has explained that leave to amend “should be 4 freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind that “the underlying purpose of 5 Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” 6 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (first alteration in original) (first 7 quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), then quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). 8 “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that 9 the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 10 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the Court 11 considers the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), and 12 discussed at length by the Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital. The Ninth Circuit in Eminence 13 Capital identified several factors to consider, including (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory 14 motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the 15 opposing party, and (5) futility of amendment. 316 F.3d at 1052. 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 Defendants argue that Mr. Hartman’s § 1983 claim and injunctive relief claim are barred 18 by the Eleventh Amendment because they are based on ADA Doctor’s actions in his capacity as 19 an assistant district attorney and that Mr. Hartman’s Bane Act claim is barred for failure to comply 20 with the Government Claims Act. MTD at 5–6.2 21 A. Federal Claims 22 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief 23 2 As with the prior motion to dismiss, Mr. Hartman does not address Defendants’ arguments. 24 Instead, he renews his argument that it is impermissible to file motions to dismiss (and in this case to strike) on different grounds. See Opp. at 6 (“As a matter of law and operation of law, 25 Defendants CCP § 425.16 Anti-SLAPP Motion constitutes their FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the entire First Amended Complaint and as set forth above the Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion is 26 treated as Defendants’ FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and fails and thus also resolves the second FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss as also being denied. The Motion to Dismiss the entire 27 First Amended Complaint only has one life and not two.”). As the Court previously explained to 1 against a state, an ‘arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v. Schwartz, 2 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity bars 3 monetary relief against state entities and extends to individual defendants acting in their official 4 capacities. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); Pena 5 v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). There are three exceptions to the Eleventh 6 Amendment bar. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 “First, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment defense.” Id. “Second, Congress may abrogate 8 the States' sovereign immunity by acting pursuant to a grant of constitutional authority.” Id. 9 “Third, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a ‘suit against a 10 state official when that suit seeks . . . prospective injunctive relief.’” Id. at 817–18 (quoting 11 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996)). 12 Mr. Hartman’s § 1983 claim is based on ADA Doctor allegedly “depriving plaintiff 13 Hartman under Color of Law of his Constitution [sic] Right to a Fair Hearing before an Impartial 14 Judge and also a Fair Prosecution/Prosecutor” based on the email exchange between Judge 15 Pennypacker and Senator Cortese’s staff. Compl. ¶ 45. As the Court previously explained, 16 “Mr. Hartman . . . appears to more broadly allege some sort of vague structural offense committed 17 by the [ADA Doctor, Judge Pennypacker, and Senator Cortese], complaining that they have 18 violated separation-of-powers principles by conspiring against him.” Order at 7 (citing Compl. 19 ¶¶ 52–60). ADA Doctor’s actual involvement in this scheme is entirely passive; Mr. Hartman 20 alleges that “Judge Pennypacker advance[d] . . . Hi-Jacking the Legal and Court System . . . by 21 emailing it to the Executive Branch.” Compl. ¶ 56. 22 Mr. Hartman’s injunctive relief claim is “based on the . . . First and Second Causes of 23 Action and on California Constitution. ART 5 § 13.3” Compl. ¶ 74. Mr. Hartman further alleges 24 that ADA Doctor has retaliated against Mr. Hartman “in . . . furtherance of the unlawful combined 25 criminal entreaties by the Legislative Branch and Judicial Branch” by a “[r]etaliatory failure to 26 prosecute” his neighbors and a “Retaliatory Prosecution” of Mr. Hartman (presumably, a reference 27 1 to the state court criminal proceedings against him) because “the Prosecution cannot prove beyond 2 a reasonable doubt” that Mr. Hartman has violated a criminal statute. Id. ¶ 75. 3 A district attorney acts as a state official when prosecuting defendants. Weiner v. San 4 Diego Cnty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2000). It is apparent from the face of the complaint 5 that all allegations against DA Doctor, to wit, his passive receipt of an email and prosecutorial 6 decisions, are based on his acting in his official capacity. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 74–75. As the Court 7 previously explained, “[t]he fact that the complaint purports to name the State Defendants in their 8 ‘individual capacity,’ see Compl. ¶ 10, does not change this outcome.” Order at 8 (citing 9 Barrilleaux v. Mendocino Cnty., 61 F. Supp. 3d 906, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 10 Mr. Hartman’s § 1983 claim accordingly is barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it 11 is “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 12 58, 71 (1989). To the extent Mr. Hartman’s third claim is intended to supply an independent 13 cause of action, it is barred by the abstention doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Younger 14 v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971), which compels dismissal of a federal action that would have the 15 practical effect of enjoining an ongoing state court proceeding. Younger compels dismissal here 16 because Mr. Hartman admits the pendency of state criminal proceedings against him, see Compl. 17 ¶ 9, there is no indication that Mr. Hartman would be unable to raise his federal claims in those 18 proceedings, and Mr. Hartman’s request for relief seeks to terminate said proceedings. See, e.g., 19 San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 20 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 B. State Claims 22 The Court previously explained that, “[w]hile the complaint asserts that the first cause of 23 action for violation of the Bane Act is also asserted against the State Defendants, the only 24 invocation of the State Defendants is the allegation the Private Defendants caused the State 25 Defendants to deprive Mr. Hartman of ‘a Fair Hearing before an impartial Judge’ and ‘a Fair 26 Hearing and Impartial Prosecutor,’ which is essentially a restatement of his second cause of 27 action.” Order at 7 (citing Compl. ¶ 37) Id. ¶ 37. Any Bane Act claim is barred because ] claim against a public entity or its employees “for injury to person” to be presented to the public 2 || entity within six months of the injury. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a); see also State of California 3 v. Sup. Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240 (2004) (“California statutes or ordinances which condition 4 || the right to sue the sovereign upon timely filing of claims and actions are . . . elements of the 5 || plaintiff's cause of action and conditions precedent to the maintenance of the action.” (internal 6 || citation omitted)). 7 C. Leave to Amend 8 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Hartman’s federal claims and would 9 || decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any permutation of Mr. Hartman’s injunctive 10 || relief claim to the extent it is brought under state law and over Mr. Hartman’s Bane Act claim to 11 the extent it is asserted against ADA Doctor. As to the Bane Act claim, Mr. Hartman has not 12 || stated that he could amend to allege timely compliance with the Government Claims Act, so 13 amendment would additionally be futile. See FAC Order at 10. The Court need not and does not 14 || reach Defendants’ remaining 12(b)(6) arguments or alternative motion to strike pursuant to 3 15 California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. Amendment clearly being futile, the Court will not a 16 || grant leave to amend and will instead dismiss this action against Defendants with prejudice. 17 || IV. ORDER Zz 18 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 19 (1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 20 (2) The action is DISMISSED. 21 (3) The Court will enter judgment for Mr. George, Ms. Kuehn, Senator Cortese, 22 Judge Pennypacker, DA Doctor, and the County of Santa Clara and against 23 Mr. Hartman and direct that this case be closed. 24 25 Dated: June 25, 2026

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 27 United States District Judge 28