Eric Daniel v. Superintendent

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 30, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-05251
StatusUnknown

This text of Eric Daniel v. Superintendent (Eric Daniel v. Superintendent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eric Daniel v. Superintendent, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ERIC DANIEL, Petitioner, 25-CV-5251 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Petitioner Eric Daniel, who is currently incarcerated at Clinton Correctional Facility, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his October 3, 2023 conviction in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County. By order dated June 30, 2025, the court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court construes Petitioner’s submission as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and directs Petitioner to file an amended Section 2254 petition within 60 days of the date of this order as detailed below. DESIGNATION AS A SECTION 2254 HABEAS CORPUS PETITION If this action is to proceed, the petition must be construed as one seeking habeas corpus relief under Section 2254 because, in the petition, Petitioner seeks to challenge “the judgment of a State court . . . on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. If Petitioner does not want to pursue relief under Section 2254, he must notify the Court in writing within 60 days that he wishes to withdraw this action. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003); Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 282 (2d Cir. 2003). Petitioner will have one opportunity within the applicable one-year limitations period for a full adjudication of his claims for Section 2254 habeas corpus relief.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (a federal district court requires the authorization of the appropriate court of appeals before considering a second or successive Section 2254 habeas corpus petition); see also § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B) (standard to be satisfied in order for a court of appeals to authorize a federal district court to consider a second or successive Section 2254 habeas corpus petition). If Petitioner does not inform the Court of his intent to

withdraw this action within 60 days, his initial submission (his original petition in this action) will remain designated as a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court has the authority to review and dismiss a Section 2254 petition without ordering a responsive pleading from the state, “[i]f it plainly

1 The applicable one-year limitations period in which to bring a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition runs from the latest date of the four following situations: (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing [a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition] created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the [petitioner] was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). In addition, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation” to bring a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition. § 2244(d)(2). appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4; see Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Green v.

United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). DISCUSSION A. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases A state prisoner must submit a petition that conforms to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Rule 2(c) requires a petition to specify all of a petitioner’s available grounds for relief, setting forth the facts supporting each of the specified grounds and stating the relief requested. A petition must permit the Court and the respondent to comprehend both the petitioner’s grounds for relief and the underlying facts and legal theory supporting each ground so that the issues presented in the petition may be adjudicated.

This petition does not conform to the requirements of Rule 2(c). Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief: (1) he “was not sentence[d] under New York State Guideline for first felony conviction” (ECF 1 at 6); and (2) “mental health issues” (id. at 7). Petitioner, however, does not set forth facts in support of his grounds for relief. Mindful of the Court’s duty to construe pro se actions liberally, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), the Court has analyzed Petitioner’s submission and finds that neither the Court nor a respondent could discern the constitutional basis for the petition. B. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies A state prisoner must exhaust all available state remedies before filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). This exhaustion doctrine means that the state courts must be given the first opportunity to review constitutional errors associated with Petitioner’s confinement. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Eric Daniel v. Superintendent, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eric-daniel-v-superintendent-nysd-2025.