IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Eric D. Wilson, Feb 16 2026, 8:26 am
Appellant-Defendant, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
February 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1542
Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court
The Honorable Brian H. Williams, Judge
Trial Court Cause No. 55D02-2406-CM-847
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 1 of 15 Opinion by Senior Judge Crone Judges Vaidik and Altice concur.
Crone, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Eric Wilson appeals his conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated,
contending that the traffic stop was illegal and that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop. Finding
that the totality of the circumstances does not support a finding of reasonable
suspicion for the investigatory traffic stop, we conclude that the evidence was
inadmissible and reverse.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Around 8:00 a.m. on June 13, 2024, Morgan County Sheriff’s Deputy Caleb
Merriman was on duty when he encountered Wilson at an intersection in
Martinsville. He noticed Wilson “making jerky movements” in his car. Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 43. Deputy Merriman followed Wilson and continued to watch him
“moving his head rapidly” and “fidgeting around the car[.]” Id. at 44. At one
of the stop lights, Wilson activated his turn signal right before the light changed.
Wilson then turned again so that he was going back in the original direction
from which he had come, an action that Deputy Merriman found peculiar.
Based on these observations, Deputy Merriman stopped Wilson. Wilson failed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 2 of 15 field sobriety tests, and a subsequent blood draw revealed the presence of both
amphetamine and methamphetamine in his system.
[3] The State charged Wilson with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while
intoxicated endangering a person, Class C misdemeanor operating while
intoxicated, and Class C infraction failure to signal turn. Wilson filed a pretrial
motion to suppress the evidence acquired as a result of the traffic stop. The trial
court conducted a hearing and subsequently denied the motion. Prior to the
start of the bench trial, the State dismissed two counts and proceeded to trial
only on the Class C misdemeanor. During trial, Wilson renewed his objection
to the admission of the evidence obtained during the stop, which the trial court
overruled. Wilson also requested that the evidence from the suppression
hearing be incorporated into the evidence at trial. Ultimately, the trial court
found Wilson guilty of Class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated.
Wilson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [4] Wilson challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of the investigatory traffic stop. Because he is appealing
after a completed trial, the issue is properly framed as whether the trial court
erred by admitting the challenged evidence at trial. Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d
230, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We review a trial court’s admission
of evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we reverse only if the court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 3 of 15 before it. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider any conflicting
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We also
consider any uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.
[5] Wilson argues that Deputy Merriman lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his
vehicle and thus violated his rights under both the federal and state
constitutions. When a defendant argues that the admission of evidence gives
rise to a constitutional violation, we apply a de novo standard of review. Miller
v. State, 201 N.E.3d 683, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, cert. denied
(2025). Accordingly, we will review de novo the trial court’s ultimate
determination of reasonable suspicion.
[6] Within the broad issue of reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop,
this case presents a matter of first impression. Here, we consider whether a
driver’s “jerky” body movements, without more, are sufficient to create
reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop.
A. Fourth Amendment [7] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In order
to justify a traffic stop, which is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, a law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion of
criminal conduct. Clarke v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ind. 2007) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion entails specific,
articulable facts that criminal activity is under way. Pugh v. State, 52 N.E.3d
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 4 of 15 955, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30), trans. denied.
Reasonable suspicion is not a stringent standard, but it does require something
more than a police officer’s hunch. Parker v. State, 196 N.E.3d 244, 254 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2022) (quoting State v. Lefevers, 844 N.E.2d 508, 515 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied), trans. denied.
[8] Whether an officer’s suspicion was reasonable is a fact-sensitive inquiry that is
determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the
circumstances. Pugh, 52 N.E.3d at 965. The reasonable suspicion standard is
not prone to a neat set of legal rules but instead depends on the “‘practical
considerations of everyday life’” upon which reasonable persons act. Miller,
201 N.E.3d at 688 (quoting Paul v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1146, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App.
2022), trans. denied). We recognize that law enforcement officers assessing the
existence of reasonable suspicion will rely on their training and experience as
well as these commonsense judgments. Miller, 201 NE.3d at 688.
[9] At the suppression hearing, Deputy Merriman testified that he first observed
Wilson in his car across an intersection “being quick and jerky,” “jumping
around the car,” “unable to sit still,” and “[f]idgeting in the car.” Tr. Vol. 2, p.
24. The deputy further testified that he could not hear any loud music that
would indicate Wilson “was jamming out.” Id. at 25. Deputy Merriman
explained that his attention was drawn to Wilson’s vehicle by this behavior and
the fact that Wilson made several turns to go back in the direction from which
he had come. When asked if the movements were consistent with a person
“bobbing their head” to the beat of music, Deputy Merriman responded, “No.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 5 of 15 Very inconsistent. So looking different ways. Different parts of the body
moving. No part of the body was the same.” Id. at 26. 1 The deputy initiated
an investigative traffic stop based on his belief that the driver was under the
influence of a stimulant drug. Id. at 27.
[10] Deputy Merriman’s testimony during trial was consistent with his testimony at
the suppression hearing. The deputy observed Wilson “kind of moving about
in the car, making jerky movements,” “[u]nable to sit still,” “moving his head
rapidly,” and “fidgeting around the car.” Id. at 43-44. He followed Wilson and
noticed that, at one of the stop lights, Wilson activated his turn signal just
before the light changed. After making a series of turns, Wilson headed back in
the direction from which he had come, which Deputy Merriman found
“strange.” Id. at 44. The deputy testified that he initiated the traffic stop based
upon Wilson’s delay in activating his turn signal and his jerky body
movements. Id. At the close of trial, the court stated that the stop was
appropriate, even though “the turn signal wasn’t an issue[.]” Id. at 51. And, on
appeal, the State maintains that Wilson’s jerking and twitching body
movements reasonably led Deputy Merriman to initiate a stop. Appellee’s Br.
p. 10.
1 At the suppression hearing, the State played dash cam footage from the deputy’s patrol car. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 26-27. The video was not introduced as an exhibit at the hearing, and it was neither played nor admitted at trial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 6 of 15 [11] Where, as here, we are faced with an issue of first impression, we may consider
decisions from other jurisdictions for instructive guidance. King v. State, 153
N.E.3d 324, 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. To that end, we examine
State v. Rincon, 147 P.3d 233 (Nev. 2006). There, a police officer observed a
vehicle drive very slowly at 12:45 a.m. and cross the yellow center divider line
five times. The officer initiated an investigative stop based on his belief that the
driver was under the influence of alcohol. When the driver rolled down the
window, the officer smelled alcohol. The officer administered several field
sobriety tests and, later, had the driver submit to blood draws. Ultimately, the
driver was charged with operating while intoxicated. Defense counsel moved
to suppress the blood evidence, arguing there was no reasonable suspicion to
justify the traffic stop, and the trial court agreed.
[12] On appeal, the State contended that the fact that the defendant was driving
substantially under the speed limit was alone sufficient to satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard, and thus the stop was lawful. However, the Supreme Court
of Nevada disagreed and held that, “absent evidence of a traffic violation, there
must be additional indicia of erratic driving or unusual behavior before a
reasonable suspicion arises that a motorist who is driving slowly is intoxicated.”
Id. at 237. The court explained that “‘[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness[,]’” which requires striking a balance between
the interests of the public and an individual’s right to “‘personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers.’” Id. at 236 (quoting Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) and Semich v. State, 506 S.E.2d 216, 217
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 7 of 15 (1998)). The court further reasoned that, while there is a compelling public
policy interest to protect citizens from drunk drivers, “that interest is not served
by allowing a police officer unfettered discretion to stop a driver for what may
very well be a prudent driving decision.” Rincon, 147 P.3d at 236-37.
[13] The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that “‘[t]he mere fact that a driver is
traveling at a slower than usual speed on a roadway does not by itself create a
reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.’” Id. at 236.
The court noted that other jurisdictions have considered the issue and reached
the same conclusion. See id. n.18 (citing State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71
(N.D. 1993); Raulerson v. State, 479 S.E.2d 386, 387 (Ga. App. 1996); Faunce v.
State, 884 So.2d 504, 506-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
[14] The Nevada court also recognized that many jurisdictions have concluded that
the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied where the motorist is driving well
below the speed limit and is engaged in another unusual driving behavior 2 indicative of intoxication, such as swerving in the travel lane, driving on the 3 4 5 shoulder of the road, straddling the lane, crossing the center line, or weaving
2 Wells v. State, 772 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 3 U.S. v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003). 4 U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995). 5 U.S. v. Bertrand, 926 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 8 of 15 6 within or outside the travel lane. Notably, the Nevada court included in its list
Wells v. State, 772 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), a decision by this Court. In
Wells, we determined the traffic stop was not illegal where the officer was able
to corroborate an anonymous tip by identifying Wells’ vehicle as well as
observing both that the vehicle was traveling ten miles per hour below the
posted speed limit and that the vehicle was swerving in its lane of travel. Id. at
490.
[15] With this background in mind, we are wary here of accepting the State’s
argument that, in the absence of any traffic violation, an officer may acquire
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing simply because a person is making
jerky movements with his body. As discussed in the trial court, a reasonable
explanation unrelated to any criminal behavior is that Wilson was dancing or
grooving to music. The deputy discounted this premise because, according to
him, 8:00 in the morning was not a time of day that individuals would be 7 “jamming out,” “there wasn’t loud music playing,” and there was nothing
going on outside “that would make sense for [Wilson] to be acting in such a
manner.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 26, 25.
6 Veal v. State, 614 S.E.2d 143, 145 (Ga. App. 2005); Esteen v. State, 503 So.2d 356, 357-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), modified on other grounds by Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1988). 7 The record does not indicate whether the windows of either Wilson’s or the deputy’s vehicle were open or closed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 9 of 15 [16] While we recognize that we must look at the totality of the circumstances, the
State may not simply label whatever facts are present as “suspicious” to
demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a stop. Wilson’s movements, in the
context of the practical matters of everyday life upon which reasonable
suspicion is to be based and in the absence of erratic or unusual driving
behavior, would seem to indicate that Wilson was simply enjoying moving to
his music as he drove or had perhaps worked the night shift and was trying to
stay awake on the drive home by grooving to his music. In light of these
innocent explanations, the deputy’s conclusory explanation for Wilson’s
movements provides little, if any, support for reasonable suspicion that Wilson
was engaged in criminal activity.
[17] At most, Wilson’s twitchy body movements afforded the deputy a “hunch” that
criminal activity was occurring, but reasonable suspicion requires more. Parker,
196 N.E.3d at 254; see also Maye v. U.S., 260 A.3d 638, 645 (D.C. 2021) (where
officer saw defendant “doing something in his waistband” with his hand and
then put same hand into pants pocket, court determined that “[t]here is nothing
particularly suspicious about adjusting or manipulating one’s waistband in
itself, an action perfectly consistent with ‘too many innocent explanations[;]’”
court noted that defendant “could have simply been hiking up his pants,
resetting his underwear, or adjusting his belt”); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
596 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that officers “tender to us the picture of innocent
driving behavior but ask us to accept it as signifying criminal behavior to a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 10 of 15 trained and experienced eye. This we cannot do.”), amended on denial of reh’g,
997 F.2d 1306 (1993).
[18] Indeed, Deputy Merriman observed no erratic or abnormal driving behavior by
Wilson during the extended period in which he followed him driving on the
streets of Martinsville, observing traffic lights and negotiating turns. Indeed, the
trial judge, after viewing the video footage from Deputy Merriman’s in-car
camera at the suppression hearing, commented that Wilson was “driving very,
very thoughtfully.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 29. Hunches such as the one involved here
do not justify an investigatory stop and, if allowed, would lead to unfettered
discretion of police officers in the field.
[19] We therefore cannot accept the State’s argument that the fact that “Wilson did
not violate any traffic laws is immaterial” and that police officers observing
objective signs, as Deputy Merriman did here, are permitted to stop drivers
because they “could be” a danger to themselves or others. Appellee’s Br. pp.
10, 14. As a panel of our colleagues recently noted, “we are mindful of Justice
Scalia’s observation in Arizona v. Hicks that ‘there is nothing new in the
realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in
order to protect the privacy of us all.’” Ocampo v. State, 268 N.E.3d 823, 835
(Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987)). We are convinced
that, without some stronger indicia of criminal activity, the articulated facts did
not supply the deputy with the appropriate amount of suspicion necessary for
an investigatory stop.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 11 of 15 8 [20] Thus, while perhaps amounting to bad dancing, Wilson’s jerky and
inconsistent movements, alone, did not create reasonable suspicion for a traffic
stop. See U.S. v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Seemingly
innocuous behavior does not justify an investigatory stop unless it is combined
with other circumstances that tend cumulatively to indicate criminal activity.”).
[21] To the extent the State argues that there was a possibility that Wilson was
experiencing a medical episode for which emergency assistance was needed, the
trial court addressed that idea and found it lacking. At the suppression hearing,
after viewing the video footage of Wilson’s driving, the State suggested the
possibility that Wilson was having an epileptic seizure. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 28-29.
The court responded, “And driving very, very thoughtfully. Move on. I’m not
buying that one.” Id. at 29.
[22] We therefore hold that there must be additional indicia of erratic driving or
unusual driving behavior before a reasonable suspicion arises that a motorist
who is merely making jerky body movements is driving under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.
B. Article 1, Section 11 [23] Although its text mirrors the federal Fourth Amendment, we interpret article 1,
section 11 of our Indiana Constitution separately and independently. State v.
8 Seinfeld, The Little Kicks (NBC television broadcast Oct. 10, 1996).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 12 of 15 Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Ind. 2008). When a defendant raises a
section 11 claim, the State must show the police conduct “was reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1206. The reasonableness of a search
or seizure turns on a balance of three factors: “1) the degree of concern,
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion
the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities,
and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356,
361 (Ind. 2005).
[24] Under the first factor, we evaluate whether there was reasonable suspicion to
support the stop of a vehicle using the same standard as under the Fourth
Amendment. See Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008) (noting that
“[m]any search and seizure issues are resolved in the same manner” under both
the federal and Indiana Constitutions, one of which is reasonable suspicion).
That is, an officer has reasonable suspicion when, considering the totality of the
circumstances, there are specific, articulable facts that criminal activity is under
way. Pugh, 52 N.E.3d at 964, 965.
[25] As we explained above, in the absence of any erratic or unusual driving
behavior, Wilson’s twitchy body movements afforded the deputy a “hunch,” at
most, that criminal activity was occurring. This is insufficient to constitute
reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the first Litchfield factor weighs in favor of
Wilson.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 13 of 15 [26] As to the second Litchfield factor, the deputy’s testimony at trial shows that,
once he stopped Wilson, he administered several field sobriety tests. After
some discussion about a blood draw, Wilson was taken to the hospital where he
refused the test. The deputy then applied for and obtained a search warrant,
and Wilson’s blood was drawn. A routine traffic stop is typically a minor
intrusion on a citizen’s ordinary activities and short in duration. However, the
stop in this case was not of such nominal character as it included several field
sobriety checks at the stop location followed by transport to the hospital, time
obtaining a warrant, and the blood draw. As the degree of intrusion here was
moderate, this factor weighs in favor Wilson.
[27] We assess the third factor—the extent of law enforcement needs— by
considering both “the needs of the officers to act in a general way” (such as the
need to enforce traffic laws) and “the needs of the officers to act in the
particular way and at the particular time they did” (such as searching a vehicle
when its owner was not under arrest and could have driven the vehicle away).
Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 946-47 (Ind. 2020). Put simply, this case is
devoid of any traffic violation, erratic driving, or unusual driving behavior to
cause Deputy Merriman to act.
[28] The Litchfield factors weigh in favor of Wilson. Therefore, given the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that the stop of Wilson’s vehicle was
unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 14 of 15 Conclusion [29] We conclude that the seizure and subsequent search in this case violate both the
Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 11. The trial court therefore abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of the stop and anything that flowed from it.
[30] Judgment reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Glen E. Koch II Boren, Oliver, & Coffey, LLP Martinsville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Rebekah D. Bennett Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1542 | February 16, 2026 Page 15 of 15