NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1387-20
ERIC CORDERO,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent. ____________________
Submitted April 25, 2022 – Decided August 8, 2022
Before Judges Messano and Enright.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Eric Cordero, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Eric Cordero appeals from a December 16, 2020 final agency decision by
the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) denying his request for parole and
imposing a forty-eight-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
In 1997, Cordero, then fifteen years old, was arrested on multiple charges
due to his involvement in a brutal murder in December 1996. After being waived
to adult court, Cordero pled guilty to an amended charge of first-degree
aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), and first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.
Cordero admitted that during the killing, he punched the victim in the face
twice, grabbed her head and banged it against a wall. Further, he acknowledged
he was present when a co-defendant stabbed the victim's head with an ice pick.
Cordero also stated he and his co-defendants threw rocks at the victim's face and
covered up her body. The victim's partially decomposed body was found
approximately two months after the murder.
Cordero was sentenced in 1998 to an aggregate custodial term of forty-six
years, with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-three years. While
incarcerated, he committed various institutional disciplinary infractions, many
A-1387-20 2 of which were "asterisk" infractions. 1 His most recent infraction occurred in
2019.
A two-member Board panel denied Cordero's request for parole in January
2020, citing various factors, including his lack of insight into his criminal
behavior, his lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future
criminal behavior, and the fact he "still struggle[d] w[ith] his behavior [and]
criminal thinking, as evidenced by his numerous infractions." The panel also
considered mitigating factors, such as Cordero's participation in programs
"specific to behavior" and that he obtained his GED and associate's degree while
in prison. The panel referred the matter to a three-member panel to establish an
FET outside of the administrative guidelines.
Five months later, a three-member Board panel reviewed the case. It
considered factors similar to those assessed by the two-member Board panel and
imposed an FET of forty-eight months.
In its final agency decision in December 2020, the Board affirmed the
decisions of the two- and three-member panels, finding "a preponderance of
evidence indicates that there is a substantial likelihood that [Cordero] would
1 "Prohibited acts preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most serious and result in the most severe sanctions." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). A-1387-20 3 commit a crime if released on parole." The Board concurred with the three-
member Board panel's reasoning in establishing a forty-eight-month FET,
finding "after twenty-three . . . years of incarceration, [Cordero] present[ed] as
not understanding the full extent of [his] actions, nor . . . understanding what
caused [his] actions resulting in the robbery and death of [his] friend's step -
mother." The Board also found Cordero "present[ed] as not having made
adequate progress in the rehabilitative process" and had "an institutional record
that reflects violence and noncompliance."
On appeal, Cordero contends the Parole Board: "disregarded and
undervalued substantial evidence, then relied on the same erroneous
justifications to deny parole"; arbitrarily failed "to assess [his] suitability for
parole to a residential community program"; and failed "to properly consider
[his] age at the time of the crime." Cordero also argues he was "denied due
process in violation of the New Jersey and United States constitutions." These
arguments are without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited.
See Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018)
(citing Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J.
1, 9 (2009)). "Our review of the Parole Board's determination[s] is deferential
A-1387-20 4 in light of its expertise in the specialized area of parole supervis ion . . . ." J.I.
v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). We recognize that "[t]o
a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole
Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary
appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 200 (2001)
(Trantino V) (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59
(1973)). Such appraisals are presumed valid. McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at
563. Accordingly, "[w]e will reverse a decision of the Board only if the offender
shows that the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable, lacked credible support
in the record, or violated legislative policies." K.G. v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
458 N.J. Super. 1, 30 (App. Div. 2019).
Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal principles,
including the materials contained in the confidential appendix, we affirm the
denial of parole substantially for the reasons expressed in the Board's well -
reasoned decision. We add the following.
Cordero is serving a sentence for offenses committed before August 18,
1997. Thus, "the issue before us is governed by the standards in N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.53(a) and 30:4-123.56(c) prior to the amendment of those statutes on that
A-1387-20 5 date." Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000)
(citing N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10).
For offenses committed before August 18, 1997, "the Parole Board may
deny parole release if it appears from a preponderance of the evidence that 'there
is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of
this State if released on parole at such time.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.53(a), L. 1979, c. 441, § 9). Under this standard, the Board must consider
a non-exhaustive list of twenty-four factors outlined under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11(b)2 to determine whether an inmate should be released on parole and in
analyzing these factors, "the Board [must] focus its attention squarely on the
likelihood of recidivism." McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 565.
The record reflects the Board fulfilled its obligation in this regard when it
established a forty-eight-month FET. In fact, it based its decision on a multitude
of aggravating factors, most notably the substantial likelihood Cordero would
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1387-20
ERIC CORDERO,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent. ____________________
Submitted April 25, 2022 – Decided August 8, 2022
Before Judges Messano and Enright.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Eric Cordero, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Eric Cordero appeals from a December 16, 2020 final agency decision by
the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) denying his request for parole and
imposing a forty-eight-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
In 1997, Cordero, then fifteen years old, was arrested on multiple charges
due to his involvement in a brutal murder in December 1996. After being waived
to adult court, Cordero pled guilty to an amended charge of first-degree
aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), and first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.
Cordero admitted that during the killing, he punched the victim in the face
twice, grabbed her head and banged it against a wall. Further, he acknowledged
he was present when a co-defendant stabbed the victim's head with an ice pick.
Cordero also stated he and his co-defendants threw rocks at the victim's face and
covered up her body. The victim's partially decomposed body was found
approximately two months after the murder.
Cordero was sentenced in 1998 to an aggregate custodial term of forty-six
years, with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-three years. While
incarcerated, he committed various institutional disciplinary infractions, many
A-1387-20 2 of which were "asterisk" infractions. 1 His most recent infraction occurred in
2019.
A two-member Board panel denied Cordero's request for parole in January
2020, citing various factors, including his lack of insight into his criminal
behavior, his lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future
criminal behavior, and the fact he "still struggle[d] w[ith] his behavior [and]
criminal thinking, as evidenced by his numerous infractions." The panel also
considered mitigating factors, such as Cordero's participation in programs
"specific to behavior" and that he obtained his GED and associate's degree while
in prison. The panel referred the matter to a three-member panel to establish an
FET outside of the administrative guidelines.
Five months later, a three-member Board panel reviewed the case. It
considered factors similar to those assessed by the two-member Board panel and
imposed an FET of forty-eight months.
In its final agency decision in December 2020, the Board affirmed the
decisions of the two- and three-member panels, finding "a preponderance of
evidence indicates that there is a substantial likelihood that [Cordero] would
1 "Prohibited acts preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most serious and result in the most severe sanctions." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). A-1387-20 3 commit a crime if released on parole." The Board concurred with the three-
member Board panel's reasoning in establishing a forty-eight-month FET,
finding "after twenty-three . . . years of incarceration, [Cordero] present[ed] as
not understanding the full extent of [his] actions, nor . . . understanding what
caused [his] actions resulting in the robbery and death of [his] friend's step -
mother." The Board also found Cordero "present[ed] as not having made
adequate progress in the rehabilitative process" and had "an institutional record
that reflects violence and noncompliance."
On appeal, Cordero contends the Parole Board: "disregarded and
undervalued substantial evidence, then relied on the same erroneous
justifications to deny parole"; arbitrarily failed "to assess [his] suitability for
parole to a residential community program"; and failed "to properly consider
[his] age at the time of the crime." Cordero also argues he was "denied due
process in violation of the New Jersey and United States constitutions." These
arguments are without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited.
See Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018)
(citing Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J.
1, 9 (2009)). "Our review of the Parole Board's determination[s] is deferential
A-1387-20 4 in light of its expertise in the specialized area of parole supervis ion . . . ." J.I.
v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). We recognize that "[t]o
a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole
Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary
appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 200 (2001)
(Trantino V) (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59
(1973)). Such appraisals are presumed valid. McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at
563. Accordingly, "[w]e will reverse a decision of the Board only if the offender
shows that the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable, lacked credible support
in the record, or violated legislative policies." K.G. v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
458 N.J. Super. 1, 30 (App. Div. 2019).
Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal principles,
including the materials contained in the confidential appendix, we affirm the
denial of parole substantially for the reasons expressed in the Board's well -
reasoned decision. We add the following.
Cordero is serving a sentence for offenses committed before August 18,
1997. Thus, "the issue before us is governed by the standards in N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.53(a) and 30:4-123.56(c) prior to the amendment of those statutes on that
A-1387-20 5 date." Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000)
(citing N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10).
For offenses committed before August 18, 1997, "the Parole Board may
deny parole release if it appears from a preponderance of the evidence that 'there
is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of
this State if released on parole at such time.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.53(a), L. 1979, c. 441, § 9). Under this standard, the Board must consider
a non-exhaustive list of twenty-four factors outlined under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11(b)2 to determine whether an inmate should be released on parole and in
analyzing these factors, "the Board [must] focus its attention squarely on the
likelihood of recidivism." McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 565.
The record reflects the Board fulfilled its obligation in this regard when it
established a forty-eight-month FET. In fact, it based its decision on a multitude
of aggravating factors, most notably the substantial likelihood Cordero would
commit a new crime if released on parole, given his lack of satisfactory progress
while incarcerated in reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior. But
2 Effective February 16, 2021, N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11 was amended to include a twenty-fourth factor, i.e., "[s]ubsequent growth and increased maturity of the inmate during incarceration." Cordero does not argue this factor should be applied retroactively. A-1387-20 6 the Board also recognized some mitigating factors, including Cordero's
participation in programs specific to behavior. Thus, it acted well within its
authority in denying Cordero parole, based on a finding by a preponderance of
the evidence he would likely commit a new crime if paroled.
Regarding the Board's imposition of a forty-eight-month FET, we
recognize an inmate serving a sentence for aggravated manslaughter is
ordinarily assigned a twenty-seven-month FET after a denial of parole. N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.21(a)(1). However, a three-member panel may impose an FET
exceeding administrative guidelines in cases where an ordinary FET is "clearly
inappropriate due to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the
likelihood of future criminal behavior." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d). Here, given
the Board's finding Cordero failed to make satisfactory progress in reducing his
likelihood of future criminal behavior, we perceive no basis to disturb its
imposition of a forty-eight-month FET.
Finally, because Cordero has been incarcerated for over twenty years for
crimes committed when he was a juvenile, he is entitled to seek a hearing to
"assess factors [that the sentencing court] could not evaluate fully decades
before – namely, whether the juvenile offender still fails to appreciate risks and
A-1387-20 7 consequences, and whether he has matured or been rehabilitated." State v.
Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 370 (2022). At such a hearing,
[t]he court may also consider the juvenile offender's behavior in prison since the time of the offense[s], among other relevant evidence.
After evaluating all the evidence, the trial court would have discretion to affirm or reduce the original base sentence within the statutory range, and to reduce the parole bar to no less than [twenty] years.
[Ibid.]
We express no opinion on the results of such a hearing should Cordero avail
himself of the opportunity to have his sentence reviewed.
To the extent we have not addressed Cordero's remaining arguments, we
conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1387-20 8