Equity Solar Illinois v. County of Grundy

2026 IL App (3d) 250289

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 3-25-0289
• Status: Published

Opinion

2026 IL App (3d) 250289

Opinion filed March 10, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

EQUITY SOLAR ILLINOIS, an Illinois ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Corporation; USS MIDDLE SOLAR LLC, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, a Delaware Corporation; and USS ) Grundy County, Illinois. SARATOGA SOLAR, LLC, a Delaware ) Corporation, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0289 Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) Circuit No. 24-CH-10 ) v. ) The Honorable ) Sheldon R. Sobol, THE COUNTY OF GRUNDY, a Body Politic, ) Judge, Presiding. ) Defendant-Appellant, ) ________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Holdridge and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 This heated dispute involves special use permits to build commercial solar energy facilities

(CSEFs). Grundy County rejected the special use permit requests, and the plaintiffs filed a

mandamus action. The circuit court granted the mandamus request and entered an order directing

Grundy County to issue the permits. Grundy County appeals, and we affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 In January 2023, the legislature amended the Counties Code to implement a series of

requirements for siting and permitting CSEFs. See 55 ILCS 5/5-12020 (West 2024). Discussed in

greater detail below, these amendments (Solar Amendments) authorized counties to issue rules

regarding solar farms—just not more rules than the legislature had already written. Id. § 5-

12020(g). In May 2023, defendant Grundy County adopted an amendment (Ordinance) (Grundy

County Ordinance No. 2023-005 (approved May 9, 2023)) to amend the Grundy County Code

section 8-2-5-30 (Grundy County Code § 8-2-5-30 (adopted Jan. 9, 2018)) by incorporating the

requirements of section 5-12020. See Grundy County Code § 8-2-5-30 (amended May 9, 2023).

¶4 In September 2023, USS Middle Solar, LLC, and USS Saratoga Solar, LLC (together,

plaintiffs), submitted applications for special use permits to construct two CSEFs (Projects) in

unincorporated Grundy County. The Projects were proposed on agricultural land leased from

private property owners, with each CSEF anticipated to occupy more than 30 acres. Under

amended Grundy County Code section 8-2-5-30 (id.), CSEFs are not permitted uses as of right and

require approval of a special use permit by the Grundy County Board following public hearings

before the Grundy County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and the Land Use Committee (LUC).

¶5 Plaintiffs’ applications included the materials required by section 5-12020 and the

Ordinance, including project descriptions, site plans, agricultural impact mitigation agreements,

environmental inventories and assessments, vegetation and weed control plans, decommissioning

plans, and documentation of compliance with applicable environmental, aviation, noise, electrical,

safety, and landscaping regulations. There is no dispute that the CSEF applications satisfied the

enumerated filing and technical requirements.

¶6 The ZBA conducted a public hearing in December 2023, at which it received testimony

and evidence regarding the Projects. Following the hearing, the ZBA recommended denial, finding

2 the Projects incompatible with surrounding properties, not beneficial to Grundy County’s needs,

present safety concerns, and unsuitable for the areas’ future development. Weeks later, the LUC

likewise recommended denial, finding that the Projects were unsuitable for development in the

proposed areas.

¶7 In February 2024, the Grundy County Board considered the applications. The Board

unanimously voted to deny the special use permits, citing concerns that included objections from

the City of Morris—though the Projects were located outside the City’s jurisdiction—relating to

potential impacts on future airport expansion, possible commercial development, and generalized

concerns regarding battery storage. The Grundy County Board’s stated reasons were not tied to

any claimed failure of the Projects to meet the specific requirements of section 5-12020 nor the

Ordinance.

¶8 On May 13, 2024, plaintiffs filed a one-count complaint for mandamus in the circuit court

of Grundy County, alleging that the Grundy County Board’s denial was contrary to the Counties

Code and that, under section 5-12020, Grundy County lacked discretion to deny compliant

applications based on considerations outside the statutory criteria. Grundy County, in turn,

maintained that traditional zoning considerations—including those described in La Salle National

Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40 (1957), and Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of

Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370 (1960)—remained relevant to its legislative zoning authority.

¶9 On March 3, 2025, the parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, agreeing

that no genuine factual disputes existed and that the case presented purely legal issues. On May

14, 2025, following oral argument, the circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings, denied Grundy County’s motion, and ordered the County to green light the special use

3 permits for the Projects. This appeal followed. This court also allowed the Village of Channahon,

the City of Morris, and the Village of Shorewood to file an amicus curiae brief.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The issue before this court is the propriety of the trial court’s order granting judgment on

the pleadings to the Plaintiffs, which granted their request for mandamus. That question requires

us to construe the authority possessed by Grundy County as well as the applicable statutes and

ordinances. Our analysis begins with the recognition that Grundy County is not a home-rule unit

of government. Therefore, Grundy County “has only those powers expressly granted by law,

powers incidental to those provided by law, and powers which are considered indispensable to the

accomplishment of the purposes of the municipal corporation.” Scadron v. City of Des Plaines,

153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992); see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 7 (“[c]ounties and municipalities which

are not home rule units shall have only powers granted to them by law”). Division 5-12 of the

Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-12001 to 5-12021 (West 2024)) authorizes counties to zone and

regulate construction and buildings. However, a non-home-rule unit “cannot adopt ordinances

under a general grant of power that infringe upon the spirit of state law or are repugnant to the

general policy of the state.” Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 204 Ill. 2d 243, 258-59

(2003).

¶ 12 A. The Solar Amendments

¶ 13 The Solar Amendments expressly identify things Grundy County may do relative to

CSEFs. For example, section 5-12020(b) provides that a county may establish standards for CSEFs

that “include all of the requirements specified in [the Solar Amendments] but may not include

requirements *** that are more restrictive than specified in this Section.” 55 ILCS 5/5-12020(b)

(West 2024). The “requirements specified” in section 5-12020 are very sparse and mainly relate

4 to siting restrictions on things like setbacks, fencing, and panel height. Id. § 5-12020(e). Counties

are also permitted to adopt regulations concerning such subjects as vegetative screening (id. § 5-

12020(l)); consultation with the Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) and United

States Fish and Wildlife Service recommendations (id. § 5-12020(n)); compliance with IDNR

recommendations (id. § 5-12020(o)); consultation with the Illinois State Historic Preservation

Office (id. § 5-12020(q)); and vegetative management plans and pollinator-friendly ground cover

(id. § 5-12020(r)).

¶ 14 However, the Solar Amendments also expressly identify things Grundy County cannot do.

For example, it is prohibited from placing restrictions on the installation or use of a CSEF unless

it adopts an ordinance that complies with section 5-12020, and it “may not establish siting

standards for supporting facilities that preclude development” of CSEFs. Id. § 5-12020(g). Grundy

County is prohibited from adopting zoning regulations that disallow, permanently or temporarily,

CSEFs from being developed or operated in any district zoned to allow agricultural or industrial

uses. Id. § 5-12020(h).

¶ 15 Finally, the Solar Amendments expressly state what Grundy County must do. Section 5-

12020(g) states that a request for siting approval or a special use permit for a CSEF “shall be

approved if the request is in compliance with the standards and conditions imposed in this

[Counties Code], the zoning ordinance adopted consistent with this Code, and the conditions

imposed under State and federal statutes and regulations.” Id. § 5-12020(g).

¶ 16 The Solar Amendments stand against a public policy backdrop declaring that “it is the

policy of this State to rapidly transition to 100% clean energy by 2050,” in order “[t]o provide the

highest quality of life for the residents of Illinois and to provide for a clean and healthy

environment.” 20 ILCS 3855/1-5(1.5) (West 2024). The legislature has further stated that “[i]t is

5 necessary to improve the process of procuring electricity to serve Illinois residents, to promote

investment in energy efficiency and demand-response measures, and to maintain and support ***

zero emission facilities, and renewable resources.” Id. § 1-5(4). Moreover, the legislature has

concluded that “[p]rocuring a diverse electricity supply portfolio will ensure the lowest total cost

over time for adequate, reliable, efficient, and environmentally sustainable electric service.” Id.

§ 1-5(5). Finally, the Illinois General Assembly has found that “[d]eveloping community solar

projects in Illinois will help to expand access to renewable energy resources to more Illinois

residents.” Id. § 1-5(7).

¶ 17 B. Discretionary or Ministerial

¶ 18 Many of the parties’ arguments in this case turn on whether Grundy County had

discretionary authority, and if so, how much, to issue the special use permits. Generally, if a

governmental body has no discretion and is obligated to simply issue a permit, then mandamus

would likely be the appropriate procedural vehicle because a writ of mandamus entails a clear legal

right to the relief requested. Kramer v. City of Chicago, 58 Ill. App. 3d 592, 598-99 (1978). On

the other hand, where performance of an official duty or act involves the exercise of discretion,

mandamus is not an appropriate remedy. Id. Instead, other remedies, such as declaratory judgment,

might be appropriate. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 965 v. Office of the

Comptroller, 2014 IL App (4th) 131079, ¶ 19 (“ ‘[T]he appropriateness of the [Declaratory

Judgment] Act as a vehicle for relief is a question for the trial court’s discretion, and *** review

is deferential.’ ” (quoting In re Marriage of Rife, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1059 (2007))).

¶ 19 The statute expressly references the zoning classification at issue as a “special use permit”

rather than an ordinary permitted use. In general, a “ ‘special use’ is a type of property use that is

expressly permitted within a zoning district by the controlling zoning ordinance so long as the use

6 meets certain criteria or conditions.” City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel

Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2001). “The purpose of special uses is to provide for

those uses that are either necessary or generally appropriate for a community but may require

special regulation because of unique or unusual impacts associated with them.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. In other words, it allows a landowner to use their land in a manner that is not

automatically permitted as-of-right in a zoning district, often premised on the satisfaction of certain

conditions. Traditionally, a decision to issue a special use permit is a discretionary act. See Herren

v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Kendall County, 4 Ill. App. 3d 342, 351 (1972).

¶ 20 However, Plaintiffs point to section 5-12020’s directive that a

“request for siting approval or a special use permit for a *** [CSEF] *** shall be approved

if the request is in compliance with the standards and conditions imposed in this [Counties

Code], the [county’s] zoning ordinance adopted consistent with this Code, and the

conditions imposed under State and federal statutes and regulations.” 55 ILCS 5/5-

12020(g) (West 2024).

On the strength of that statutory language, they contend that Grundy County had no discretion and

that the act of issuing special use permits was purely ministerial. Because issuance of the permits

was ministerial, plaintiffs assert that mandamus was an appropriate remedy.

¶ 21 Despite the Solar Amendments, Grundy County spends considerable energy arguing that

its authority to make legislative, discretionary zoning changes is well settled. Grundy County is

correct that counties are generally empowered to regulate and restrict the location and use of

structures, buildings, and land uses “[f]or the purpose of promoting the public health, safety,

morals, comfort and general welfare.” Id. § 5-12001. Special use permits typically involve a

county’s discretionary decision-making authority. Likewise, “[z]oning is primarily a legislative

7 function, and it is within the province of local governmental bodies to determine the use of land

and to establish zoning classifications.” Gurba v. Community High School District No. 155, 2015

IL 118332, ¶ 11 (citing La Grange State Bank v. County of Cook, 75 Ill. 2d 301, 307 (1979)); see

55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 (West 2024). And, historically, when a county’s zoning and permitting

decisions were challenged in court, they were reviewed in accordance with the considerations

enumerated in La Salle National Bank, 12 Ill. 2d at 46-47, and Sinclair Pipe Line, 19 Ill. 2d at 378.

¶ 22 But, this case does not involve traditional land-use decisions by a county. Rather, it turns

on the recently-enacted Solar Amendments and whether they represent a loss of power for non-

home-rule counties when it comes to a proposed CSEF project. The circuit judge concluded that it

did. He stated:

“the statute [section 5-12020] is one that permits the County a very limited ability

to set rules which [are] different than what is provided for in the County’s code. So

this is much more limiting in nature in what the County has the right to say for the

special-use permit when it comes to these solar facilities. And in this case, *** those

limited requirements that are satisfied, once those are all satisfied, if the applicant

has satisfied them, then it is required that the County issue the special-use permit.

That’s the ‘shall be issued’ language that is in the statute. And that’s where *** the

legislative is taken away and [it] becomes a [ministerial 1] decision. And once

everything is satisfied, in this instance, that’s what’s been pled, that’s what’s been

admitted to, then the County has to issue the [permit]. So *** that[ is] the way that

I read the statute.”

1 The trial judge actually said, “the legislative is taken away and [it] becomes a discretionary decision.” From the context and his ultimate ruling, however, he seemingly misspoke and meant to say that it becomes a ministerial decision. 8 ¶ 23 Nonetheless, Grundy County argues that “nothing in the plain language of the Solar

Amendments suggests an intent to eliminate local discretion.” We agree; we see no intent to

eliminate discretion. However, there is a lot in the plain language that points to the conclusion that

discretion is minimized on the front end and eliminated on the back end of the process. The

discretion preserved by the Solar Amendments is limited to condition-setting as permitted within

the statute, bypassing traditional compatibility analysis. Thus, a La Salle National Bank or Sinclair

Pipe Line type of hearing is inapplicable here. In short, the Solar Amendments restrict the county’s

discretion to only a few enumerated items, and then so long as those conditions are satisfied (along

with compliance of other applicable laws) that discretion is effectively eliminated by the directive

that a permit “shall be approved.” (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/5-12020(g) (West 2024).

¶ 24 In its briefs, Grundy County cites State Bank of Waterloo v. City of Waterloo, 339 Ill. App.

3d 767 (2003), which involved a question of whether the State’s regulatory scheme precluded local

discretion. In that case, the court stated:

“Whether municipal regulation is preempted by state authority is a question

of legislative intent. A comprehensive scheme of state regulation implies that the

legislature intended to leave no room for local regulation. [Citation.] An express

legislative intent that an act achieve statewide uniformity is similarly indicative that

the legislature intended for state regulation to preempt local control. [Citation.] By

contrast, where authority is expressly delegated to local governments to regulate in

an area, the legislature did not intend the state’s regulatory authority to preempt the

field entirely.” Id. at 771-72.

Grundy County relies on the final sentence of that passage to buttress its position that, because the

Solar Amendments permit ongoing regulatory authority, the legislature demonstrated its

9 determination that local control is still necessary. The problem with this argument is that, while

the county retains some regulatory authority, its remaining authority is quite minimal.

¶ 25 Even so, Grundy County argues that a CSEF applicant must comply with all other aspects

of the Counties Code, given that the “shall be approved” language is conditioned upon

“compliance with the standards and conditions imposed in this [Counties Code].” 55 ILCS 5/5-

12020(g) (West 2024). In other words, Grundy County contends that the use of the phrase

“imposed in this [Counties Code],” rather than, say, “imposed in this section,” indicates a

legislative intent that CSEFs remain regulated by various other provisions of the Counties Code.

That may be true, but even those standards cannot, under the plain language of the statute, be more

restrictive than those adopted in the Solar Amendments.

¶ 26 C. Harmonizing Local Discretion With a Statutory Approval Mandate

¶ 27 In construing section 5-12020, our task is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s

intent, beginning with the statute’s plain language. Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324,

332 (2008). When that language is clear, we must apply it as written while also reading the statute

as a whole and in harmony with all related provisions. Id. Section 5-12020 authorizes counties to

regulate the siting of commercial solar energy facilities through the adoption of zoning standards

and the issuance of special use permits, provided that such standards are consistent with—and not

more restrictive than—the limitations imposed by the Counties Code. 55 ILCS 5/5-12020(b), (g)

(West 2024). At the same time, subsection (g) directs that a request for a special use permit “shall

be approved” if the application complies with the standards and conditions imposed under the

Counties Code and the county’s zoning ordinance is consistent with the Counties Code and the

applicable state and federal law. Id. § 5-12020(g). The statute thus reflects a legislative effort to

10 balance continued local involvement in siting decisions with a clear directive favoring approval of

compliant projects.

¶ 28 We do not read the Solar Amendments as eliminating all local discretion when reviewing

applications for special use permits. The term “special use permit” has a specific meaning, and the

legislature’s retention of that framework signals its intent to preserve a measure of local

discretionary judgment, particularly with respect to the imposition of site-specific conditions

addressing impacts expressly contemplated by the statute. See Living Word Outreach, 196 Ill. 2d

at 16. However, the discretion preserved by section 5-12020 is both defined and limited by the

legislature. That discretion concerns only the identification and application of permissible

conditions authorized by the Counties Code, not a broader reevaluation of whether a compliant

CSEF should be allowed at all, under any set of conditions. Where a county has imposed lawful

conditions, it retains authority to ensure compliance with those conditions before approval is

granted.

¶ 29 Here, however, Grundy County did not deny the applications based on a failure to meet

any condition authorized by section 5-12020, nor did it impose additional statutorily permissible

conditions requiring further compliance. Instead, the county relied on considerations outside the

scope of the standards identified in the Counties Code. Because the parties agree that plaintiffs’

applications satisfied all applicable statutory and ordinance-based requirements, and because no

additional lawful conditions remained to be met, the county’s role at that stage was limited to

implementing the approval directive set forth in section 5-12020(g). Under those circumstances,

the duty to issue the special use permits was sufficiently definite to support mandamus, and the

circuit court did not err in granting that relief.

11 ¶ 30 In reaching this conclusion, we reject Grundy County’s arguments that the Solar

Amendments’ legislative history demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to narrow its

discretion. We resort to a legislative history analysis only when the plain meaning of the statutory

language is ambiguous. Town of Serena v. Kelly, 311 Ill. App. 3d 344, 346 (2000). No ambiguity

exists here.

¶ 31 Even if we did engage in a legislative history analysis, both sides in this case present

statements from legislators to support their respective positions. We would have to cherry pick the

legislative history to reach an interpretive result. Judge Harold Leventhal described this as being

tantamount to going to a cocktail party and looking for one’s friends. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507

U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (crediting Judge Leventhal for the metaphor). There

are situations where a legislative history analysis may be helpful and appropriate, but this is not

one of them.

¶ 32 We allowed the Village of Channahon, the City of Morris, and the Village of Shorewood

to file an amicus curiae brief because they are located near the proposed CSEFs. But we cannot

accept their contentions that section 5-12020 should be interpreted in a way that allows Grundy

County to retain broad discretion to consider (beyond the statutorily permissible conditions)

whether a CSEF might interfere with those municipalities’ plans for future border expansion.

Interpreting the plain language “shall be approved” to mean something other than, or less than, it

clearly and unambiguously says arcs the statutory language past its breaking point. We cannot

ignore a very plain legislative directive merely because it might infringe on municipalities’

speculative future growth strategies. Regulation without representation goes only so far.

¶ 33 Based on the foregoing, we hold that plaintiffs USS Middle Solar, LLC, and USS Saratoga

Solar, LLC, demonstrated their clear rights to receipt of the requested special use permits and

12 Grundy County had a nondiscretionary, statutory duty to issue those permits. Accordingly,

issuance of a mandamus was an appropriate remedy.

¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35 We conclude that the Illinois General Assembly’s amendments to section 5-12020 of the

Counties Code demonstrated a clear legislative intent to substantially restrict Grundy County’s

traditional discretionary and regulatory land-use powers in the context of CSEFs. The Grundy

County circuit court properly found that, because plaintiffs complied with the requirements of the

Solar Amendments and the Grundy County Code, the county was statutorily obligated to issue the

requested special use permits. We affirm that court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus.

¶ 36 Affirmed.

13 Equity Solar Illinois v. County of Grundy, 2026 IL App (3d) 250289

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Grundy County, No. 24-CH- 10; the Hon. Sheldon R. Sobol, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Kurt S. Asprooth, Erin M. Monforti, David S. Silverman, and for Jaime C. Such, of Ancel Glink, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Robert Middleton and Meera Gorjala, of Arentfox Schiff LLP, for of Chicago, for appellees. Appellee:

Amici Curiae: James A. Murphy, of Mahoney, Silverman & Cross, LLC, of Joliet, for amici curiae Village of Channahon et al.