Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin

248 F.R.D. 331, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17407, 2008 WL 615528
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 7, 2008
DocketCivil Action 07-2033 (RCL/JMF)
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 248 F.R.D. 331 (Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17407, 2008 WL 615528 (D.D.C. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN M. FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

In this suit, Equity Analytics, LLC (“Equity”) claims that its former employee, Timo[332]*332thy Lundin (“Lundin”), gained illegal access to electronically stored information after he was fired.

Equity employee, Melissa Kirk (“Kirk”), is assistant vice president of operations and, in that capacity, assists in the oversight of the security of Equity’s computer system. Plaintiff Equity Analytics, LLC’s Motion for Order Authorizing Examination of Defendant’s Computer [# 25], Exhibit 8 (“Doc. 25-8”) at ¶ 1. She explains that Lundin was fired in December, 2006. Id. at ¶ 6. On October 30, 2007, the senior system administrator told Kirk that one of the members of the Equity staff had reported an unauthorized user accessing Equity’s Salesforce.com, account. Kirk then ascertained that two Equity employees had logged into this account using a Macintosh operating system and a Firefox browser on several days between May 28, 2007, and October 28, 2007, although Equity employees were only issued PC’s with a Windows 2003 Professional operating system and Internet Explorer and were not permitted to change either the operating system or web browsing software. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12.

For his part, Lundin explains that Eric Aguirre, another employee at Equity, granted Lundin permission to use Aguirre’s user-name and password to access Equity’s Sales-force.com account. Defendant Timothy D. Lundin’s Memorandum in Support of its Response and Opposition, in part, to Plaintiff Equity Analytics, LLC’s Motion for Order Authorizing Examination of Defendant’s Computer [# 26], Exhibit 2 (“Doc. 26-2”) at ¶ 44. Lundin then states: “Over the next 90 days between June 21, 2007 and September 18, 2007, I used the access that Aguirre provided me with his username and password to [access] Salesforce.com some eighteen times.” Id. at ¶45. Lundin indicates that he used his Macintosh computer to access Salesforce.com. Doc. # 26-2, passim.

DISCUSSION

I. The Contents of Lundin’s Computer

On November 8, 2007, Judge Lamberth issued a temporary restraining order against Lundin that, inter alia, prohibited him from “accessing or attempting to access Equity Analytics, LLC’s data on Salesforce.com for any purpose.” Order of November 8, 2007[# 4] (“Doc. 4”) at ¶ 2(b).

Initially, Judge Lamberth struck from the order that Equity had proposed a requirement that Lundin permit Equity to have a computer forensic expert examine Lundin’s computer to ascertain: (1) whether Lundin accessed Equity’s confidential customer data and/or trade secrets; (2) whether the data has been forwarded to Lundin’s new employer an Equity competitor; and (3) whether the data was purged or overwritten. Doc. 4 at ¶ 4.

Although Judge Lamberth struck this provision, the parties are now agreed that a computer forensic specialist should be permitted to examine Lundin’s Macintosh computer. Unfortunately, even though they have been trying diligently with my encouragement to arrive at a protocol for the search, they have reached an impasse that I must now resolve.

II. The Use of Keywords to Search

Lundin now works out of his home and uses the Macintosh computer and portable hard drives to store data and for many other purposes. As a result, the computer and the hard drives contain: (1) attorney-client communications; (2) business records; (3) medical records; (4) tax and banking records; and (5) data (including images) created for his professional photography business. Doc. 26-2 at ¶¶ 74-75. Since there is data on the computer and the hard drives that is personal, private, and privileged, plaintiffs counsel has proposed that the forensic computer examiner (hereafter “the examiner”) use search terms to restrict the search to data that is relevant to this case. Doc. 26 at 2.

Equity argues that search terms are inadequate because Lundin indicates that he loaded a new operating system (“Leopard”) onto the Macintosh on October 31, 2007 (Doc. 26-2 at ¶¶ 67-69), and doing so could have compromised the integrity of the files that were previously on the computer. Doc. 25 at 4.

Lundin also proposes that the search first be limited to certain file types, i.e., MS Word [333]*333(.doc, .txt, .rtf),1 MS Excel (.csv, .xml), MS Powerpoint (.ppt), MS Entourage2 and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)- Doc. 25-6 at 1. Once those files are found, the search would then be limited to files that contain certain key words. Id.

Equity protests that files can be converted easily from one format to another to “disguise their identity.” Doc. 25 at 4. Thus, Equity argues that confidential files could have been downloaded and saved in a phony format, i.e., a document stolen from Equity could have been saved as a .jpg file, used to save an image, rather than as a .doe file that is used to save a Word document. Id. at 4-5. Additionally, if there are less than complete files, in the form of fragments of information, a file extension and keyword search will not capture them. Id. at 5.

III. Resolution of the Controversy

I recently commented that lawyers express as facts what are actually highly debatable propositions as to efficacy of various methods used to search electronically stored information. United States v. O’Keefe, No. 06-CR-249, 2008 WL 44972, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2008).

As I explained in that case, determining whether a particular search methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) and requires expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Obviously, determining the significance of the loading of a new operating system upon file structure and retention and why the contemplated forensic search will yield information that will not be yielded by a search limited by file types or keywords are beyond any experience or knowledge I can claim.

Accordingly, I am going to require Equity to submit an affidavit from its examiner explaining why the limitations proposed by plaintiff are unlikely to capture all the information Equity seeks and the impact, if any, of the loading of the new operating system upon Lundin’s computer and the data that was on it before the new operating system was loaded. The expert shall also describe in detail how the search will be conducted. Armed with that information, supplemented if necessary by a hearing at which the expert will be cross examined, I can make the best possible judgment as to how to balance Equity’s need for information against Lundin’s privacy.

IV. E-Mails

In its deposition request, Equity asked for information concerning some eight companies. Doc. 25-6 at 2. In a portion of his proposed Protocol, Lundin describes some of the information that he believes will be in the computer and the hard drives and makes reference to these eight companies.

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Bluebook (online)
248 F.R.D. 331, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17407, 2008 WL 615528, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equity-analytics-llc-v-lundin-dcd-2008.