Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Container Corp.

548 F. Supp. 1098, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15814, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,301, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 134
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedOctober 1, 1982
DocketNo. 81-0477-CV-W-1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 548 F. Supp. 1098 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Container Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Container Corp., 548 F. Supp. 1098, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15814, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,301, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 134 (W.D. Mo. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

JOHN W. OLIVER, Senior District Judge.

This is a Title VII case. At the pretrial conference convened July 2, 1982 the parties presented a standard pretrial order in which they stipulated only 14 facts which both sides admitted and required no proof. Proceedings at the pretrial conference established that many more facts were undisputed and that, given appropriate time, the parties could increase the number of facts subject to agreement.

Thereafter, in a most commendable manner, the number of stipulated facts was increased to 92 and the parties agreed that five other facts, although not admitted, would not be contested at trial by any evidence to the contrary.

In addition, both sides complied with the requirements of Standard Pretrial Order No. 4 in the same commendable manner, with the result that the vast majority of proposed findings of fact were based upon particular paragraphs of the expanded stipulation of facts included in Standard Pretrial Order No. 2.

The Court requested counsel to indicate on a copy of opposing counsel’s proposed findings of fact a notation which would indicate whether particular paragraphs in opposing counsel’s proposed findings of fact were admitted in whole or in part or denied. Counsel complied with the Court’s direction in exemplary manner with the result that defendant denied only 12 of the 134 findings of fact proposed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied only nine of 38 findings proposed by the defendant.

The parties agreed in part VI of Standard Pretrial Order No. 2, under which the case was tried, that the principal issues of fact which remain to be litigated at trial related to (A) whether the Company failed to hire Ms. McBroom because of her sex (female) and (B) whether the Company had as its basis for refusing to hire Ms. McBroom a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that was not a pretext for discriminating against Ms. McBroom because of her sex (female).” All of the findings proposed by both sides focus on those disputed questions.

Defendant’s position on the facts is revealed by defendant’s proposed findings of fact No. 37 and No. 38 which proposed that the Court find the following:

37. The primary reason for Stone Container Corp.’s refusal to hire Ms. McBroom was her termination from Southwest Forest Industries for excessive absenteeism and her failure to fully reveal that on her application form.
38. Additional reasons for Stone Container Corp.’s refusal to hire Ms. McBroom were her willingness to quit her present employment without notice, her close relationship to a current employee, her indication of willingness to work only the second shift, and her lack of significant relevant experience.

Defendant seeks to support those two ultimate findings of fact by proposing that the Court also find that it was the policy of defendant to make telephone reference checks on prospective General Help employees to verify dates of employment and reasons for termination of employment (Defendant’s proposed finding of fact No. 17); that after a second telephone call from plaintiff, Mrs. Graham, defendant’s personnel clerk, did in fact check Ms. McBroom’s previous employment by making a telephone call to Ms. McBroom’s former employer, Southwest Forest Industries, and that Mrs. Graham was advised by Southwest Forest Industries that although Ms. McBroom had listed her reason for leaving [1100]*1100Southwest Forest Industries employment as “foreman problems,” Ms. McBroom had actually been terminated for absenteeism (Defendant’s proposed finding of fact No. 27).

Mrs. Graham also testified that she would not have hired Ms. McBroom at the time of her application regardless of her sex because Ms. McBroom’s application showed on its face that she was willing to quit her present employment without notice, that she had indicated a willingness only to work the shifts checked on her application, and because she lacked significant relevant experience.

The detailed findings of fact made in the next part of this memorandum opinion will reflect our acceptance of the testimony of persons employed at Southwest Forest Industries at the relevant times involved in this case and that defendant did not carry the burden of establishing that Ms. McBroom had been discharged by Southwest Forest' Industries for absenteeism, rather than because of “foreman problems,” as her application stated. Our detailed findings also reflect our specific findings that the other reasons assigned by the defendant for its refusal to hire Ms. McBroom were pretextual and untrue.

Application of the controlling case law cited in Part III of our memorandum opinion requires that judgment be rendered for plaintiff and that it include an award in favor of Ms. McBroom in accordance with the amounts which the parties stipulated would be due in the event it was adjudged that the plaintiff should prevail on the issue of liability.

In Part II to follow we shall make additional findings of fact based upon the stipulation of the parties and our determination of the few remaining disputed questions of fact which were litigated.

II. Findings of Fact

1.Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1343 and 1345. This is an action authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

2. The practices alleged in the complaint to be unlawful employment practices were committed within the State of Missouri and the Western District of Missouri, Western Division.

3. Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

4. Defendant Stone Container Corporation (hereinafter “the Company”) is a Missouri corporation with a manufacturing plant in Liberty, Missouri, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of corrugated containers which are sold and shipped in interstate commerce.

5. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, the Company has employed more than fifteen employees and has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g), and (h). •

6. Cindy McBroom, whose sex is female, applied for a position as General Help with the Company on October 29, 1979.

7. The Company did not hire Ms. McBroom for any position.

8. On December 6, 1979 Ms.

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548 F. Supp. 1098, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15814, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,301, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-stone-container-corp-mowd-1982.