Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mid-American Specialties, Inc.

774 F. Supp. 2d 892, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36253
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedMarch 24, 2011
Docket2:09-cv-02203
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 774 F. Supp. 2d 892 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mid-American Specialties, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mid-American Specialties, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 892, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36253 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MIOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION

JON P. McCALLA, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) Motion for Permanent Injunction (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 94), filed March 4, 2011. Defendant Mid-American Specialties, Inc. (“Mid-American”) responded in opposition on March 11, 2011. (D.E. 96.) For the following reasons, the EEOC’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

This case arises from the sexual harassment of Jennifer Looney (“Looney”), Karen Wingate (“Wingate”), and Sandra Williamson (“Williamson”) by male supervisors at Mid-American, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (See Compl. (D.E. 1) ¶ 7.) A jury trial was held in this case from February 22 to March 2, 2011. The jury found, inter alia, that Looney, Wingate, and Williamson were subjected to a hostile work environment based on their sex. (Jury Verdict Form (D.E. 90).) It also found that Mid-American unlawfully retaliated against Wingate and Williamson for reporting the harassment. (Id.) The jury awarded $350,000.00 in compensatory damages, $54,967.59 in back pay, and $1,100,000.00 in punitive damages. (Id.; Punitive Damages Verdict Form (D.E. 91).) The EEOC now moves for injunc-tive relief. (PI. EEOC’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Permanent Inj. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (D.E. 94-1) 2.)

II. Standard of Review

Forty-two U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) provides that “the [trial] court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in ... unlawful employment practice^], and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (emphasis added). The district court has broad discretion in granting post-trial injunctive relief in Title VII cases. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 467 (6th Cir.1999); see also Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 660 (4th Cir.1990) (“[A] district court must ... exercise its discretion ... to ensure that discrimination does not recur.”). Permanent injunctive relief is available even where the EEOC has not alleged a pattern or policy of discrimination. Frank’s Nursery, at 468. Once an employer has been held liable under Title VII, it is the employer’s burden to offer evidence that the unlawful conduct will not *895 recur. Spencer, 894 F.2d at 660 n. 13. The ultimate burden of showing that injunctive relief is appropriate, however, lies with the EEOC. Id.; see also Prentice v. Am. Standard, Inc., No. 91-6126, 972 F.2d 348, 1992 WL 172662, at *2 (6th Cir. July 23, 1992) (same).

III. Analysis

Mid-American generally opposes the EEOC’s request for injunctive relief and also objects to certain paragraphs of the proposed injunction. 1 (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Permanent Injunction (“Def.’s Resp.”) (D.E. 96).) Mid-American asserts that it has already undertaken a “bona fide committed effort” to eliminate sexual harassment. (Id. at 5) (quoting Spencer, 894 F.2d at 660.) Having taken such steps, Mid-American argues that injunctive relief is unnecessary. The Court addresses the EEOC’s requests (and Mid-American’s objections) seriatim.

a. Injunction (Paragraphs One and Two)

The EEOC seeks the following injunc-tive language:

1. Defendant and its managers and supervisory employees, agents, officers, successors and assigns are enjoined from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates against employees because of their sex. This includes subjecting female employees to a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.
2. Defendant and its managers and supervisory employees, agents, officers, successors and assigns are enjoined from engaging in retaliation against any individual for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. Defendant and its managers and supervisory employees, agents, officers, successors and assigns are further enjoined from taking any retaliatory action against any individual for participating in this matter in any way or giving testimony in this matter.

(Pl.’s Mem. 3-4.)

Mid-American argues that the above paragraphs do nothing more than command Mid-American to follow the law. It contends that such “obey the law” language is insufficiently specific to form part of any injunctive relief. (Def.’s Resp. 6.) The Court agrees, for the reasons discussed below.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) provides that an order granting injunctive relief must “state its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(l)(B)-(C). Title VII prohibits, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of sex, a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, and retaliation for engaging in Title VH-protected activity. Paragraphs one and two of the EEOC’s proposed injunction essentially order Mid-American to comply with Title *896 VII. Such provisions are overbroad. See EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 576 (6th Cir.1984) (“Such ‘obey the law’ injunctions cannot be sustained.”); see also United States v. Matusoff Rental Co., 494 F.Supp.2d 740, 757 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (concluding, in an FHA case, that “obey the law” injunctions violate Rule 65(d)). Accordingly, the EEOC’s requests for paragraphs one and two are DENIED.

b. Distribution of Policies and Procedures Prohibiting Retaliation (Paragraph Three)

3. Within fourteen days after the entry of Judgment for Injunctive [Rjelief, Defendant must send a letter to all of its employees at [Mid-American], advising them of the verdict against Defendant in this case on the claims of sexual harassment and retaliation, enclosing a copy of Defendant’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation against individuals who engage in protected activity under Title VII, stating that Defendant will not tolerate sexual harassment or retaliation!,] and that Defendant will take appropriate disciplinary action against any manager, supervisor or employee who engages in sexual harassment or retaliation. The letter must be printed on Defendant’s letterhead and must be signed by Defendant’s Chief Executive Officer. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”

(PL’s Mem. 4.)

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774 F. Supp. 2d 892, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-mid-american-specialties-inc-tnwd-2011.