Epley v. Strong

District Court, S.D. Texas·Decided September 20, 2023·No. 4:19-cv-03036·Unknown

Opinion

□ Southern District of Texas ENTERED September 21, 202° IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION CHARLES E. EPLEY, a/k/a § PIERRYCK CASTELLAZZI, § § Plaintiff, § § Vv. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-3036 § KELLY STRONG, et al., § § Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the Court is Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) defendants Joel Looney and Jacklyn Fisher’s motion to dismiss this pro se civil lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for plaintiffs failure to prosecute. (Docket Entry No. 52.) In the interest of justice, the Court will also consider plaintiff's improperly-filed response in opposition to the motion. (Docket Entry No. 54.) Having considered the motion, the response, the record, matters of public record, and

the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES this lawsuit for the

reasons explained below. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a former TDCJ prisoner who was deported to France following his release from prison in 2018. Plaintiff filed this pro se civil lawsuit against eleven or more prison

employees over four years ago in August 2019, complaining of events that occurred during a prison hurricane evacuation in August and September 2017. He paid the filing fee. Significant to the defendants’ pending motion, plaintiff states that he sustained a traumatic (closed head) brain injury approximately thirty years ago following a physical attack and was diagnosed in prison with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and recurrent depression. According to plaintiff, this has left him unable to go to the post office at times and has interfered with his ability to file documents with the Court in a timely manner. (Docket Entry No. 39.) He states that he relies on “helpers” to help him complete and file his pleadings, but that the helpers do not understand “American law” and are not always available when needed. He further states that mental impairments related to the head injury have intermittently and unpredictably thwarted his efforts to respond fully to pleadings and court orders in this case. Plaintiff was represented by retained counsel in this lawsuit during a brief period of time between October 2019 and May 2020. While represented by counsel, plaintiff served two of the defendants — Joel Looney and Jacklyn Fisher — and the Court ultimately dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants in February 2020 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Defendants Looney and Fisher filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) in February 2020. (Docket Entry No. 15.) Plaintiff filed a response in April 2020

opposing the motion, arguing that his claims against Looney and Fisher were meritorious.’ (Docket Entry No. 20.) On March 25, 2021, the Court granted the motion in relevant part and dismissed plaintiff s claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official and supervisory capacities. The Court further dismissed plaintiffs individual capacity claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6) for deliberate indifference, conspiracy, retaliation, medical malpractice, and negligence. Plaintiff was given leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days to cure the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading deficiencies. The Court ordered plaintiff not

to raise any new claims against Looney or Fisher or raise claims against any entity or individual other than Looney and Fisher. (Docket Entry No. 33, pp. 5—7.) The Court granted plaintiffs subsequent motion for an extension of time, and ordered him to file his amended complaint by May 23, 2021. The Court expressly advised plaintiff that the amended complaint must conform to the requirements set forth in the Court’s order of March 25, 2021, and warned him that any non-compliant amended complaint would be stricken from the record. (Docket Entry No. 38.) The Court denied plaintiffs two ensuing motions for leave to file amended complaints, as they did not include proposed amended complaints and appeared to seek leave to replead expired claims that had been dismissed in

2020 against unserved defendants and/or add new expired claims and unnamed defendants.

In his response, plaintiff reiterated his factual allegations against Looney and Fisher, but also intertwined claims against defendants who were dismissed in 2020. Thus, his response did not clarify his claims against Looney and Fisher but rather, confounded them.

Tl. PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff filed an amended complaint with a motion for leave to file the complaint on May 21,2021. (Docket Entry No. 41.) The amended complaint was largely a repleading of his claims against a number of defendants who had been dismissed in 2020, with additional claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Plaintiff also added as defendants “John & Jane Does” and “all the security officers with whom plaintiff interacted during his incarceration at Wynne.” The latter officers would arguably include security officers who had been dismissed under Rule 4(m) in 2020, and the Doe defendants were never identified prior to expiration of limitations. Notably, the amended complaint did not name Joel Looney and Jacklyn Fisher as defendants.” (Docket Entry No. 41-2.) In short, plaintiff proposed to abandon his claims against Looney and Fisher and instead replead expired claims — or bring new but expired claims — against defendants who had been dismissed under Rule 4(m) in 2020, and to add expired claims against new unnamed defendants.

"Inexplicably, plaintiff asked in the alternative that he be granted leave to file the amended complaint as a new lawsuit, stating that he had funds to pay the filing fee. The Court denied the request, informing plaintiff that he did not need leave in order to file a new lawsuit. To the extent plaintiff believed that obtaining leave of court to file the new lawsuit would have prevented his claims from being barred by limitations (Docket Entry No. 41-1, p. 23), he was incorrect. See Millan v. USAA Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 325-26 (Sth Cir. 2008) (holding that a dismissal under Rule 4(m) is a dismissal with prejudice if the claims would be time-barred by the statute of limitations upon refiling).

Defendants Looney and Fisher moved to strike the amended complaint, arguing that it violated the Court’s order of March 25, 2021. (Docket Entry No. 45.) Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that defendants’ motion stood as an implicit or tacit admission that plaintiffs claims were meritorious and that defendants were attempting to block his rightful pursuit of redress. Plaintiff made no effort to file a compliant amended complaint, and on February 22, 2022, the Court granted defendants’ motion and struck plaintiff s non-compliant amended complaint. (Docket Entry No. 49.) To-date, plaintiffhas not filed or sought leave to file an amended complaint compliant with the Court’s order of March 25, 2021. Il. DEFENDANTS’ RULE 41(b) MOTION TO DISMISS On April 5, 2023, defendants Looney and Fisher filed the pending Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss this lawsuit for want of prosecution. As grounds, defendants point out that plaintiff has yet to file a compliant amended complaint pursuant to the Court’s order of March 25, 2021, that there are no active claims pending against them, and that no further activity in the case has taken place beyond defendants’ filing of a motion to substitute counsel.

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