Enriquisinger Garcia v. State
This text of Enriquisinger Garcia v. State (Enriquisinger Garcia v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed December 4, 2020
In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01378-CR
ENRIQUISINGER GARCIA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80082-2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Carlyle A jury convicted appellant Enriquisinger Garcia of two counts of indecency
with a child by contact and assessed punishment at eighteen years’ imprisonment for
each conviction. On appeal, Mr. Garcia contends the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering that his sentences run consecutively. We affirm in this memorandum
opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
A trial judge generally has discretion to order sentences to run consecutively
or concurrently. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.08(a); see Revels v. State, 334
S.W.3d 46, 54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)). “A trial court abuses
its discretion when it applies an erroneous legal standard or when no reasonable view
of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion under the correct law and facts
viewed in the light most favorable to its legal conclusion.” Nicholas, 56 S.W.3d at
764. “As a practical matter, however, an abuse of discretion [regarding sentence
cumulation] generally will be found only if the trial court imposes consecutive
sentences where the law requires concurrent sentences, where the court imposes
concurrent sentences but the law requires consecutive ones, or where the court
otherwise fails to observe the statutory requirements pertaining to sentencing.” Id.
at 765. “In short, so long as the law authorizes the imposition of cumulative
sentences, a trial judge has absolute discretion to stack sentences.” Id.; accord Byrd
v. State, 499 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Barrow v. State, 207
S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“The Legislature has charged the trial
court with the determination of whether to cumulate, and the trial court is free to
make this determination so long as the individual sentences are not elevated beyond
their respective statutory maximums.”).
Here, both sentences were within the allowed statutory punishment range of
two to twenty years. Mr. Garcia appropriately acknowledges in his appellate brief
that “[t]he law does not require concurrent sentences” in this case. In his single issue
on appeal, he asserts the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by ordering his
sentences to run consecutively because “the court offered no reason nor referred to
–2– any principle of law” in rejecting his trial counsel’s objection that cumulating his
sentences violated “the US Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment” and constituted an inadequate “gauging” of “proportionality.”
According to Mr. Garcia, the trial court’s decision to run the sentences consecutively
was “arbitrary” in that it was “without explanation or justification” and left his
arguments “unaddressed.”
Mr. Garcia cites no authority requiring a trial court to provide an explanation
or justification for cumulating sentences and we have found none. See Gomez v.
State, No. 05-10-00574-CR, 2011 WL 209303, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 25,
2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting contention that
trial court abused discretion by not articulating reasons for cumulating sentences);
see also Barrow, 207 S.W.3d at 382 (“We do not believe that the legislatively
endowed, normative decision whether to cumulate sentences exceeds that level of
discretion that the Supreme Court has always recognized as consistent with due
process.”). We decide Mr. Garcia’s issue against him and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/Cory L. Carlyle/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 191378F.U05
–3– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
ENRIQUISINGER GARCIA, On Appeal from the 296th Judicial Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80082- No. 05-19-01378-CR V. 2018. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Myers and Osborne participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2020.
–4–
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