Enriquez v. State of Nevada Department of Corrections

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: April 22, 2024
• Docket: 3:21-cv-00085
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 ANTONIO ENRIQUEZ, Case No. 3:21-cv-00085-ART-CSD 4 Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v.

6 STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 I. SUMMARY 10 Pro se Plaintiff Antonio Enriquez brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Now 12 pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 62) to United States 13 Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney’s Order (ECF No. 61) denying Plaintiff’s Motion 14 for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 60). Because the Court finds Judge 15 Denney’s Order to be clearly erroneous, it will sustain Plaintiff’s objection and 16 overrule Judge Denney’s Order. 17 II. BACKGROUND 18 The Court incorporates by reference the recitation of the relevant factual 19 background and procedural history in its previous Order (ECF No. 59) and in 20 Judge Denney’s Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF 21 No 62), which the Court adopts for the purposes of this Order. 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 “A non-dispositive order entered by a magistrate must be deferred to unless 24 it is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Grimes v. City of San Francisco, 951 25 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)); 26 see also LR IB 3-1(a). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the reviewing 27 judge is “‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 28 2 v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). In reaching this decision, 3 “[a] reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgement for that of the 4 deciding court.” Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241. 5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 A litigant does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in 42 7 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claims. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th 8 Cir. 1981). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court may request an attorney 9 to represent any person unable to afford counsel. However, the Court will appoint 10 counsel for indigent civil litigants only in exceptional circumstances. Palmer v. 11 Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 action). When determining 12 whether exceptional circumstances exist, a court must consider the likelihood of 13 success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his 14 claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Id. Neither of 15 these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together. Id. 16 Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel on September 13, 2013. (ECF 17 No. 60.) Prior to Plaintiff’s motion, the case has gone through discovery and 18 motions for summary judgment from both parties. (ECF Nos. 37, 48.) Anticipating 19 that Plaintiff will now be required to articulate his claims at a jury trial, the Court 20 finds that exceptional circumstances exist which merit appointment of counsel 21 in this case. The Court therefore concludes that Judge Denney’s Order denying 22 counsel was clearly erroneous and sustains Plaintiff’s objection. 23 Finding that exceptional circumstances exist, the Court grants Plaintiff's 24 Motion for Appointment of Counsel and overrules Judge Denney’s Order. In 25 reaching its decision, in addition to the above circumstances, the Court considers 26 Plaintiff’s representation that until recently, all his documents were prepared by 27 a third-party “jailhouse lawyer” that is no longer available to assist with his case. 28 The Court also considers Plaintiff’s lack of trial experience and the difficulty he 2 is bringing are constitutional in nature and rather particular in their scope, 3 relating to religious liberties doctrines that are outside the knowledge of Plaintiff 4 and many jurors. Counsel who can help Plaintiff navigate the legal complexity of 5 his claims and articulate the claims to jurors in an understandable way will be 6 helpful in the administration of justice. 7 This case is referred to the Pro Bono Program adopted in Amended General 8 Order 2019-07 for the purpose of screening for financial eligibility (if necessary) 9 and identifying counsel willing to be appointed as pro bono counsel for Plaintiff. 10 The scope of appointment shall be for the remainder of his case, including trial if 11 necessary. If pro bono counsel cannot be timely located, the Court will inform 12 Plaintiff that he must proceed to trial pro se. 13 /// 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1} V. CONCLUSION 2 It is hereby ordered that Plaintiffs Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF 3 || No. 60) is granted. It is further ordered that Plaintiff's Objection to Judge 4 || Denney’s Order is sustained. (ECF No. 62.) Judge Denney’s Order is therefore 5 || vacated. (ECF No. 61.) 6 It is further ordered that this case is referred to the Pro Bono Program for 7 || appointment of counsel for the purposes identified herein. 8 It is further ordered that the Clerk shall also forward this order to the Pro 9 || Bono Liaison. 10 It is further ordered that all other deadlines related to this case are paused, 11 || pending the appointment of pro bono counsel. The parties’ stipulation for an 12 || extension of the joint pretrial order deadline (ECF No. 69) is therefore denied as 13 |} moot. 14 The Court will hold a status conference approximately 90 days from the 15 || date of this Order to get an update on the appointment of counsel. 16 17 DATED THIS 22"4 day of April 2024. 18 19 > vs jlosed 1m 20 ANNE R. TRAUM 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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