MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Enrique Torres sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court to correct alleged sentencing errors. The district court denied the petition as untimely, without reaching the merits. Torres’s underlying conviction became final in 1994. Absent tolling, Torres had one year as of April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), to file his federal habeas petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.2007). Torres did not file the federal petition, however, until April 24, 2008, twelve years later.
Torres contends he was entitled to equitable tolling until March of 2005, based on his alleged inability to comprehend English and the lack of Spanish-language materials in the prison law libraries. Although the district court expressed reservations as to whether Torres’s abilities to understand English were as limited as he claimed and whether he had exercised due diligence in any event, it did not hold an evidentiary hearing on those issues. Instead, the court held that even if Torres’s language challenges might support application of equitable tolling up to the point he filed his first habeas petition in state court in 2003, he had not demonstrated an entitlement to “gap tolling” sufficient to excuse the numerous lengthy delays during a series of eleven habeas petitions he filed in state court before finally bringing the current federal petition.
Even assuming that under Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.2006), it would have been an abuse of discretion to find Torres’ claimed language deficiencies did not support tolling without an eviden-tiary hearing, the district court did not rest its decision on any such finding. Rather, the court assumed for purposes of analysis that Torres would be entitled to tolling based on his purported limitations in English, and found the petition time-barred nonetheless.
We take a similar course and give Torres the further benefit of the doubt that he might be entitled to equitable tolling for language deficiencies until as late as March 23, 2005, the date he admits his English skills had become adequate. We nevertheless affirm the judgment, because even assuming Torres is or might be entitled to “gap” tolling for certain of the time periods in which he had no state habeas petition pending, the record shows that the limitations period necessarily expired prior to the filing of this petition.
I.
A district court’s denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo, and denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United [654]*654States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)). Findings of fact made by the district court are reviewed for clear error. Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir.1996).
We need not decide whether Torres made a sufficient showing under Mendoza to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the extent and effect of his English language deficiencies, were equitable tolling on such basis potentially sufficient to render his petition timely. See Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069 (“So long as there are some circumstances ‘consistent with petitioner’s petition and declaration’ that would entitle the petitioner to equitable tolling, remand is appropriate.” (quoting Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146,1148 (9th Cir.2000))). We can presume that Torres was entitled to equitable tolling until March 23, 2005, which, as noted, is the time by which he admittedly had gained sufficient English language skills.1
II.
The question then becomes whether more than one year of non-tolled time elapsed between March 23, 2005, the latest possible time Torres became sufficiently proficient in English, and the filing of his federal petition. Statutory tolling applies during “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In California, so called “gap-tolling” applies to exclude the time between the denial of relief by a lower state court and the filing of another petition in a higher state court, if the time delay is reasonable. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191-92, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006). Although there is no hard rule for what constitutes a reasonable time delay in California, this Court has found an upper limit of approximately sixty days to be appropriate, unless an adequate explanation for additional delay has been provided. See Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2011); Noble v. Adams, 676 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.2012). A petitioner may also be entitled to gap tolling even where later petitions are not filed in a court of greater jurisdiction, if (1) “subsequent petitions are limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition,” and (2) the petitions were timely filed. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968-69 (9th Cir.2010). On the other hand, if the subsequent petition is not limited to an elaboration of facts in the first petition, “the subsequent petition constitutes a new round of collateral attack, and the time between them is not tolled.” Id.
Here, construing every doubtful question in Torres’s favor, the statute still expired prior to the filing of this petition. At [655]*655least 92 days elapsed between the time Torres admits his English skills became adequate and the filing of his third state court petition. Because the third petition was summarily denied and no explanation for its filing outside the timeliness window appears, those days cannot be tolled. No basis for tolling of the 62 day gap between the sixth and seventh petitions exists as the seventh petition was denied as duplica-tive and was commenced in a lower court, thereby starting a “new round.” Similarly the 61 day gap between the 7th and 8th petitions cannot be tolled as the latter petition was not brought in a higher court and did not represent an effort to address the deficiencies of the former. No basis to toll the 98 day gap between the 8th and 9th petition appears as the latter added new claims and started a “new round.” Finally, there can be no dispute that the statute was running during the 56 days between the denial of Torres’s final state petition and his bringing of the present petition in the district court.
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MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Enrique Torres sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court to correct alleged sentencing errors. The district court denied the petition as untimely, without reaching the merits. Torres’s underlying conviction became final in 1994. Absent tolling, Torres had one year as of April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), to file his federal habeas petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.2007). Torres did not file the federal petition, however, until April 24, 2008, twelve years later.
Torres contends he was entitled to equitable tolling until March of 2005, based on his alleged inability to comprehend English and the lack of Spanish-language materials in the prison law libraries. Although the district court expressed reservations as to whether Torres’s abilities to understand English were as limited as he claimed and whether he had exercised due diligence in any event, it did not hold an evidentiary hearing on those issues. Instead, the court held that even if Torres’s language challenges might support application of equitable tolling up to the point he filed his first habeas petition in state court in 2003, he had not demonstrated an entitlement to “gap tolling” sufficient to excuse the numerous lengthy delays during a series of eleven habeas petitions he filed in state court before finally bringing the current federal petition.
Even assuming that under Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.2006), it would have been an abuse of discretion to find Torres’ claimed language deficiencies did not support tolling without an eviden-tiary hearing, the district court did not rest its decision on any such finding. Rather, the court assumed for purposes of analysis that Torres would be entitled to tolling based on his purported limitations in English, and found the petition time-barred nonetheless.
We take a similar course and give Torres the further benefit of the doubt that he might be entitled to equitable tolling for language deficiencies until as late as March 23, 2005, the date he admits his English skills had become adequate. We nevertheless affirm the judgment, because even assuming Torres is or might be entitled to “gap” tolling for certain of the time periods in which he had no state habeas petition pending, the record shows that the limitations period necessarily expired prior to the filing of this petition.
I.
A district court’s denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo, and denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United [654]*654States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)). Findings of fact made by the district court are reviewed for clear error. Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir.1996).
We need not decide whether Torres made a sufficient showing under Mendoza to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the extent and effect of his English language deficiencies, were equitable tolling on such basis potentially sufficient to render his petition timely. See Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069 (“So long as there are some circumstances ‘consistent with petitioner’s petition and declaration’ that would entitle the petitioner to equitable tolling, remand is appropriate.” (quoting Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146,1148 (9th Cir.2000))). We can presume that Torres was entitled to equitable tolling until March 23, 2005, which, as noted, is the time by which he admittedly had gained sufficient English language skills.1
II.
The question then becomes whether more than one year of non-tolled time elapsed between March 23, 2005, the latest possible time Torres became sufficiently proficient in English, and the filing of his federal petition. Statutory tolling applies during “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In California, so called “gap-tolling” applies to exclude the time between the denial of relief by a lower state court and the filing of another petition in a higher state court, if the time delay is reasonable. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191-92, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006). Although there is no hard rule for what constitutes a reasonable time delay in California, this Court has found an upper limit of approximately sixty days to be appropriate, unless an adequate explanation for additional delay has been provided. See Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2011); Noble v. Adams, 676 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.2012). A petitioner may also be entitled to gap tolling even where later petitions are not filed in a court of greater jurisdiction, if (1) “subsequent petitions are limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition,” and (2) the petitions were timely filed. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968-69 (9th Cir.2010). On the other hand, if the subsequent petition is not limited to an elaboration of facts in the first petition, “the subsequent petition constitutes a new round of collateral attack, and the time between them is not tolled.” Id.
Here, construing every doubtful question in Torres’s favor, the statute still expired prior to the filing of this petition. At [655]*655least 92 days elapsed between the time Torres admits his English skills became adequate and the filing of his third state court petition. Because the third petition was summarily denied and no explanation for its filing outside the timeliness window appears, those days cannot be tolled. No basis for tolling of the 62 day gap between the sixth and seventh petitions exists as the seventh petition was denied as duplica-tive and was commenced in a lower court, thereby starting a “new round.” Similarly the 61 day gap between the 7th and 8th petitions cannot be tolled as the latter petition was not brought in a higher court and did not represent an effort to address the deficiencies of the former. No basis to toll the 98 day gap between the 8th and 9th petition appears as the latter added new claims and started a “new round.” Finally, there can be no dispute that the statute was running during the 56 days between the denial of Torres’s final state petition and his bringing of the present petition in the district court.
Thus, at an absolute minimum 369 non-tolled days elapsed, putting Torres outside the limitations period, even assuming he has shown, or could possibly show on remand, an entitlement to tolling of the other gap periods.2 If, as noted above, the time period was calculated from December of 2004 when Torres undisputedly had translation assistance, his petition was untimely by an additional 47 days. Furthermore, there was a 123 day gap between the 4th and 5th petitions, well in excess of what is presumptively reasonable, for which no explanation has been provided. While the absence of the fourth petition from the record creates an ambiguity, it is at best doubtful that a basis for tolling of that gap could be established.3
Accordingly, under any reasonable set of assumptions, the total non-tolled elapsed days exceed the one year window during which Torres could bring his federal habe-as petition. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding the petition untimely, and no evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling prior to March of 2005 was necessary.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.