Enrique Eugenio Garcia v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 22, 2006
• Docket: 13-02-00635-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

                              NUMBER 13-02-635-CR

                         COURT OF APPEALS

                     THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                         CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

ENRIQUE EUGENIO GARCIA,                                                       Appellant,

                                                             v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                  Appellee.

    On appeal from the 138th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

                         Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and Garza

                            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

In a single issue, appellant, Enrique Eugenio Garcia, appeals the trial court=s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.  Appellant contends the warrant and probable cause affidavit were defective.  Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellant=s motion and appellant pleaded nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams.^[1]  The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years= imprisonment.  We affirm.

As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court=s decision and the basic reasons for it.^[2]  The record contains the trial court=s certification that Athis is not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right of appeal.@^[3]            

                                      I.  Standard of Review and Applicable Law

According to the standard of review applied to questions of affidavit adequacy, the decision of the magistrate is to be accorded deference by reviewing courts, and is only to be overruled if the decision extends beyond the bounds of reasonable disagreement.^[4]  Furthermore, the decision of the trial court at the suppression hearing regarding the adequacy of the warrant is to be accorded deference by the appellate court.^[5]          

The task of the magistrate issuing a search warrant is to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.^[6]  An affiant must present the magistrate with sufficient information to allow him to determine probable cause; a mere conclusory statement will not do.^[7]  Although sufficiency should be determined from the Afour corners@ of the affidavit, the magistrate can make reasonable inferences from the facts presented.^[8]  Our after-the-fact scrutiny of the sufficiency of an affidavit does not take the form of a de novo review; instead, we determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.^[9]

In viewing affidavits by the Atotality of the circumstances,@ courts no longer require that credibility, reliability, and basis of knowledge be established by separate and independent facts; however, they remain highly relevant factors in determining whether probable cause exists.^[10]  Probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant's own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily.^[11]  An unnamed informant=s reliability may be established by the affiant=s general assertions stated in the affidavit concerning the informant=s prior reliability.^[12] 

Article one, section nine, of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establish the right against warrantless searches and seizures.^[13]  In reviewing a magistrate=s determination to issue a warrant, Texas courts have adopted the deferential standard of review articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gates.^[14]      

                                                        II.  Analysis      

Chapter eighteen of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the State=s specific search warrant requirements.^[15]  Appellant contends that the search warrant did not meet chapter eighteen requirements because it did not specify the county of the place to be searched, did not sufficiently identify the place to be searched, and the officer=s probable cause statement was merely conclusory and insufficient to establish probable cause to issue the warrant.  Appellant further contends that the affidavit did not meet chapter eighteen requirements because it did not provide enough information to establish that the informant was a reliable source.

A.  Specificity of Warrant and Affidavit

The state and federal constitutions prohibit the issuance of search warrants without a description of the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.  Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, these requirements must be Aparticularly@ described.^[16]  Article one, section nine of the Texas Constitution sets a similar standard; the description must be Aas near as may be.@^[17]

As a general rule, an affidavit given to secure a search warrant controls over the search warrant.^[18]  When the affidavit is attached to the warrant, a court may look to the accompanying affidavit to resolve ambiguities in the warrant.^[19]  In this case, the county was specified in the affidavit and in one of the two areas designated on the warrant. Considering the two documents together, we conclude the trial court reasonably found the warrant sufficiently identified the county in which the residence was located.

Appellant contends the affidavit and search warrant do not sufficiently describe the property to be searched.  The search warrant, together with the affidavit, must describe the place to be searched with sufficient definiteness to enable an officer to locate the property and distinguish it from other places in the community.^[20]  Here, the affidavit identifies the mobile home park in which the suspect mobile home was located and provides a physical description of both the mobile home and the vehicle parked in front of it.  We conclude that although the description lacks a physical address, it is specific enough to enable an officer to locate the property and distinguish it from others in the community.  Thus, we hold that the magistrate and the trial court reasonably found that the warrant, together with the affidavit, sufficiently described the place to be searched.

                                  B.  Probable Cause and Reliability of Informant

Appellant contends the officer=s probable cause statement was merely conclusory and insufficient to convince the issuing magistrate that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.  The affidavit, executed by an experienced peace officer, states that the information regarding the search was provided by a confidential informant Aproven to be credible and reliable in the past.@  According to the affidavit, the confidential informant told the officer that he had seen cocaine at the residence within the last twenty-four hours.

While probable cause may be based on hearsay, the hearsay must be credited at each level in order to meet constitutional requirements.^[21]  Informant hearsay may be credited by showing that the informant has given reliable, credible information in the past, or by police corroboration.^[22]  We conclude the trial court reasonably found that the recitations in the affidavit demonstrate the reliability of the informant and establish probable cause for the search warrant.

                                                                III.  Conclusion   

We conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.^[23]  We hold the trial court did not err in denying appellant=s motion to suppress.  Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s sole issue and affirm the trial court=s conviction.           

                                                                                                                                                                                                                LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed

this the 22nd day of June, 2006.

---

^[1] See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. ' 481.115(d) (Vernon 2003).

^[2] Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

^[3] See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).

^[4] See Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

^[5] See Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

^[6] Trevino v. State, 875 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1994, no pet.) (citing  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id. at 376.

^[9] Id.; Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 811.

^[10] Ashcraft v. State, 934 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, pet. ref=d) .

^[11] Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Ashcraft, 934 S.W.2d at 733. 

^[12] Cerda v. State, 846 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1993, no pet.).

^[13] See U.S. Const. amend. IV.; Tex. Const. art. I, _ 9.

^[14] See Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 811 (noting standard for reviewing an issuing magistrate=s probable cause determination adopted in Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-37). 

^[15] Article 18.04 provides:

A search warrant issued under this chapter shall be sufficient if it contains the following requisites:

(1) that it run in the name of AThe State of Texas@;

(2) that it identify, as near as may be, that which is to be seized and name or describe, as near as may be, the person, place, or thing to be searched;

(3) that it command any peace officer of the proper county to search forthwith the person, place, or thing named; and

(4) that it be dated and signed by the magistrate.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.04 (Vernon 2005).

^[16]  U.S. Const. amend. IV.

^[17] Tex. Const. art. I, _ 9.

^[18] State v. Saldivar, 798 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. App.BAustin 1990, pet. ref=d). 

^[19] See id.

^[20] Etchieson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

^[21] Ashcraft, 934 S.W. 2d at 733. 

^[22] Id.

^[23] See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 810-11.