Ennis v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

12 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44495, 2014 WL 1338142
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedMarch 31, 2014
DocketNo. 2:11-cv-03502-JHH
StatusPublished

This text of 12 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (Ennis v. Tyson Foods, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ennis v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44495, 2014 WL 1338142 (N.D. Ala. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES H. HANCOCK, Senior District Judge.

The court has before it the Motion (Doc. # 29) for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) on July 5, -2013. Pursuant to the court’s orders of July 9, 2013 (Doc. # 33), July 15, 2013 (Doc. # 35), and September 6, 2013 (Doc. # 40), the motion for summary judgment is now under submission and is considered herein without oral argument.

Having considered the briefs and evi-dentiary submissions, the court finds that Tyson’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted for the reasons outlined below.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Wonda Ennis commenced this action on September 28, 2011 by filing a two count complaint in this court alleging: (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, and the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) (Count One) and (2) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) (Count Two). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts in her complaint that she was subjected to discrimination and that her employment was terminated because of her age and/or disability.

Defendant’s July 5, 2013 Motion (Doc. # 29) for Summary Judgment asserts that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that Tyson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all claims asserted against it.

The parties have each filed briefs and submitted evidence in support of their respective positions concerning the pending motion for summary judgment. On July 5, 2013, Tyson submitted evidence1 (Doc. # 30, Exhs. 1-11; Doc. # 31, Exhs. 12-22) in support of the motion and also filed a supporting memorandum brief (Doc. # 32). [1366]*1366Plaintiff submitted evidence2 (Doc. #36, Exhs. 1-28) in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 20, 2013 and on the same date filed an opposing brief (Doc. #37). On August 28, 2013, Tyson filed a reply (Doc. # 38) to Plaintiffs response in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

On September 6, 2013, the court granted Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a sur-reply brief. (Doc. # 40). That sur-reply brief (Doc. #41) was filed on September 11, 2013 and Tyson’s response (Doc. # 42) to the sur-reply was filed on September 16, 2013.3

II. Legal Standards for Evaluating a Summary Judgment Motion4

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 66(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met her burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ad[1367]*1367missions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324,106 S.Ct. 2548.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The method used by the party moving for summary judgment to discharge her initial burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the issue at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-17 (citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir.l991)(en banc)). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, then it can only meet its initial burden on summary judgment by coming forward with positive evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; i.e. facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.

If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, she can satisfy her initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the non-moving party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for directed verdict at trial. The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record to support a judgment for the non-moving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a simple statement that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial but does not require evidence negating the non-movant’s claim; it simply requires that the movant point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-16. If the movant meets her initial burden by using this second method, the non-moving party may either point out to the court record evidence, overlooked or ignored by the movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the non-moving party may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when responding, the non-movant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). The court is aware that the summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. Chapman v. Ad Transport,

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Bluebook (online)
12 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44495, 2014 WL 1338142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ennis-v-tyson-foods-inc-alnd-2014.