Ennis v. R. B. Little & Co.

55 A. 884, 25 R.I. 342, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 82
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedJuly 14, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 55 A. 884 (Ennis v. R. B. Little & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ennis v. R. B. Little & Co., 55 A. 884, 25 R.I. 342, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 82 (R.I. 1903).

Opinion

Douglas, J.

The defendants are coal dealers in the city of Providence, and occupy a building adjacent to the river for the storage of coal. To facilitate the unloading of coal from vessels lying alongside the wharf and building, a sliding staging or platform forty-one feet long and twelve feet wide had been attached to the building at the height of thirty or forty feet, adapted to be pushed out about half its length and suspended over the hatch of a coal vessel, and when not in use to be partly retracted within th,e walls of the building. This staging ran upon four rollers and two small wheels, and was drawn in by the power of an electric engine applied by means of the boom and rope which were provided for hoisting coal. This boom was set near the side of the staging and extended out from the building over the water. As used for hoisting, the rope from the drum of the engine passed through a block near the foot of the boom, thence over a block at the outer end, and thence to the bucket to be raised. When it was desiréd to haul in the staging the rope from the block at the end of the boom was passed almost vertically down and over a snatch-block hooked into an eyebolt at the northeast corner of the staging, thence back over a stationary block attached to a beam inside the building over the runway some fifteen feet from the outer wall, thence to a block hooked into an eyebolt at the southeast corner of the staging. At each outer corner of the staging were upright beams, and the eyebolts referred to were inserted from behind through these uprights and secured by nuts screwed upon their front ends.

The plaintiff’s intestate was a dumper, whose duty was to stand near the end of the platform and guide the hods of *344 coal as they were lifted up, and to empty them into barrows which other men wheeled into the building. When a vessel had been emptied and the use of the platform was temporarily over, it was his duty to fix the tackle and blocks in their places and give a signal to the engineer to start the engine. When the platform had been drawn in as far as was desired, it was his duty to give a signal to the engineer to stop, and then to unhook the blocks and restore the tackle to its place.

December 27, 1899, the plaintiff’s intestate was in his place upon the staging directing the movement of drawing it in. He had adjusted the tackle and blocks and given the signal to the engineer to apply the power. When the staging had nearly or quite reached its inner position, the eyebolt in the northeasterly post broke, the block flew upwards, struck the plaintiff in the body, throwing him into the air and inflicting such injuries as caused his death within a few hours. This action was brought to recover on the ground that the eyebolt was improperly adjusted to the upright post, and that the injury to the deceased was caused by this improper adjustment. The defendants denied that the bolt was adjusted as the plaintiff says it was, that it was in any way insufficient for the service it was designed to perform, or that any improper adjustment caused the accident. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $9,500, and the defendants have petitioned for a new trial, alleging that certain rulings by the court were erroneous; that the verdict is against the evidence; and that the damages are excessive.

The first question raised upon the rulings of the court is upon the rejection of the defendants’ question to one of their experts, p. 318, Q. 366: “Now, Mr. Bullock, in the original construction of such a "structure at this, and the insertion of eyebolts by ordinary mechanics and men engaged in such construction, is it or not usual to estimate the exact amount of weight that that bolt will endure?”

The discussion about this question seems to have been out of proportion to its importance. We see-no reason why the question should have been objected to. It seems rather to be *345 introductory to something further than to be calculated to elicit anything important by itself.

It was a proper defence to the action to show that the arrangement and strength of the apparatus were like those employed usually by persons in a similar line of business; but how such persons procured their apparatus, and on what principles they selected it, seems remote from a description of what it was.

The form of the question is unfortunate in not indicating any direct application to the issue, and we think the court exercised a reasonable discretion in ruling it out.

(1) The next class of objections now insisted upon were made to the ruling of the court that certain witnesses produced by the plaintiff were qualified to testify as experts as to the sufficiency of the eyebolt as it was supposed to have been adjusted with reference to the post.. The competency of persons offered as experts is generally a question to be decided by the trial court. If error is committed in admitting an incompetent person, the cross examination to which he is subjected may generally be relied upon to show his ignorance and neutralize the force of his opinions. Unless the ruling of the court is palpably and grossly wrong, it will not be reversed by the reviewing tribunal. Rogers on Expert Testimony, §§ 22, 23; Lawson on Expert Evidence, 276, 468; Gillett on Indirect Evidence, § 209; Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 514; Sarle v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 586.

The first of these witnesses, Mr. Meehan, was a contractor and builder of many years’ experience in the use of eyebolts. His opinion might have been useful if the elements of the problem had been given him.

The objection seems more appropriate to the testimony he gave than to his admission as an expert generally. The fact was developed, in the course of his examination, that, while he knew that an eyebolt of a certain size would carry a certain strain, he did not know how much more it would carry before breaking; and that, while an eyebolt projecting part way from a beam, leaving drift or leverage, would offer less resistance to a transverse strain than one which was *346 driven in till the eye touched the wood, he ha¿ no accurate knowledge of the comparative strength of the bolt in these different adjustments. Inasmuch as the defendants’ experts also said that drift or leverage would diminish the power of a bolt to resist transverse strain, and inasmuch as the mechanical principle involved is commonly known to intelligent people, it does not seem that the evidence of this witness ought to have seriously harmed the defendants.

The next witness was Joseph McAlpin, who had charge of a department in a bolt manufactory. This employment would seem to be sufficient qualification to admit him to testify as to the capacity of eyebolts.

The court could not anticipate the insufficiency of his knowledge in a preliminary examination. It appeared after-wards that he had no accurate knowledge of the tensile strength of iron; and, consequently, the opinions which he gave should have had little weight with the jury.

Edward McCormick had been a rigger of derricks a number of years, and Thomas D. Wallace had had long experience in the use of eyebolts. The observations made in regard to Joseph McAlpin apply to these witnesses also.

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Related

State v. Douglas
78 A.2d 850 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1951)

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Bluebook (online)
55 A. 884, 25 R.I. 342, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 82, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ennis-v-r-b-little-co-ri-1903.