1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 ENID Y. ANGLERÓ
5 Plaintiff,
6 v. CIVIL NO. 25-1446 (MAJ)(HRV) 7 METRO PONCE, INC., d/b/a HOSPITAL 8 METROPOLITANO DR. PILA; et al.,
9 Defendants. 10
11 OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1
12 Pending before the Court are several motions to compel discovery filed by Plaintiff 13 Enid Angleró (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Angleró”). (Docket Nos. 17, 20, 21 and 24). 14 These motions have been duly opposed by Defendant Metro Ponce, Inc. (hereinafter 15 “Defendant” or “Metro Ponce”). (Docket Nos. 19, 29, and 32). Metro Ponce also moves 16 17 the Court for the issuance of protective orders with respect to some of the discovery 18 sought by Plaintiff. (Docket Nos. 19 and 32). The presiding District Judge referred these 19 motions to me for disposition. (Docket Nos. 23 and 25). 20 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 21 Angleró initiated this diversity jurisdiction wrongful death suit on August 22, 22 23 2025, against Defendant Metro Ponce. The operative complaint is the “Second Amended 24
26 1 José Font-Bula, a third-year law student at the University of Puerto Rico School of Law, provided 27 significant assistance in the research and drafting of this Order.
28 1 1 Complaint” filed by Plaintiff on December 19, 2025. (Docket No. 14). Defendant is a 2 private hospital located in the Municipality of Ponce, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff generally 3 alleges that the actions and omissions of Defendant’s healthcare professionals breached 4 the standard of care required by the medical community, and that such negligent conduct 5 was the proximate cause of the untimely death of her brother, Dr. Alfonso Angleró (“Dr. 6 7 Angleró”), on January 6, 2024. The Second Amended Complaint specifically avers that 8 Metro Ponce’s healthcare professionals negligently failed to drain liquid out of Dr. 9 Angleró’s chest (Id., ¶ 27); that, as a consequence, Dr. Angleró suffered a cardiac arrest 10 (Id., ¶ 33); and that Dr. Angleró’s death was a direct result of these healthcare 11 professionals’ negligent actions and omissions. (Id., ¶ 43). Based on these allegations, 12 13 Angleró brings two causes of action: hospital and medical malpractice (First Cause of 14 Action) and hospital and commercial liability (Second Cause of Action), both under the 15 Puerto Rico Civil Code. 16 The discovery phase of the case was originally set to conclude by July 17, 2026.2 17 Between May 28 and June 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed four motions to compel (Docket Nos. 18 19 17, 20, 21, 24, respectively), two of which (Docket Nos. 20, 24) requested urgent relief in 20 light of the fact that depositions were scheduled for June 18 and 19, 2026. (Docket Nos. 21 20 at 10).3 The motions seek orders from the court compelling Defendant to produce 22 certain documents, as well as answer specific interrogatories. Metro Ponce opposed the 23
25 2 The conclusion of discovery deadline was recently extended by the Presiding District Judge and is 26 set to conclude by September 30, 2026. (Docket No. 39).
27 3 The extension of the discovery deadline has mooted the urgent nature of the relief requested.
28 2 1 motions to compel, (Docket Nos. 19, 29, and 32) and has moved the court for the issuance 2 of protective orders. (Docket Nos. 19 and 29). Plaintiff, in turn, filed an opposition to 3 Defendant’s request for protective orders (Docket Nos. 33 and 44), and a reply to Metro 4 Ponce’s opposition to her third motion to compel (Docket No. 38). The parties have 5 submitted their respective replies and sur-replies. (Docket Nos. 42, 47, and 49). The 6 7 presiding District Judge referred these matters to me for disposition on June 12 and June 8 15, 2026, respectively. (Docket Nos. 23 and 25). 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery 11 regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 12 13 proportional to the needs of the case” and that information “need not be admissible in 14 evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). While “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil 15 Procedure permit broad discovery, … ‘discovery, like all matters of procedure, has 16 ultimate and necessary boundaries.’” Bonner v. Triple-S Management Corp., 68 F.4th 17 677, 684 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 18 19 (1947)). Within the scope of Rule 26, a party may conduct discovery by serving another 20 party with interrogatories or a request for documents pursuant to Rules 33 and 34, 21 respectively. Interrogatories and requests for production of documents are directed to 22 the parties and must be answered by the parties to whom they are directed. Fed. R. Civ. 23 P. 33(b)(1)(A); Fed R. Civ. P. 34 (b)(2)(A). 24 The response to an interrogatory under Rule 33 is either: (1) an answer in writing 25 26 and signed under oath by the party to whom it is directed, or (2) an objection signed by 27 the attorney who made the objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1)(3) & (5). If a party objects
28 3 1 to an interrogatory request, “[t]he grounds for objecting ... must be stated with 2 specificity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). And where a response shows that “the answers as a 3 whole disclose a conscientious endeavor to understand the questions and to answer fully 4 those questions as are proper, the rule has been satisfied.” Sánchez-Medina, v. UNICCO 5 Service Co., et al., 265 F.R.D. 24, 27 (D.P.R. 2009) (cleaned up). 6 7 In turn, under Rule 34, the responding party must produce documents that are 8 within the party’s “possession, custody or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). Once properly 9 served, the response to a request for production of documents is generally either (1) 10 actual production of the documents, or (2) an objection stating with specificity the 11 grounds for objecting to the request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B); see also Vázquez- 12 13 Fernández v. Cambridge College, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 150, 154 (D.P.R. 2010). Legal 14 ownership or actual physical possession of a document is not required to deem a 15 document within the possession, custody, or control of a party; “documents are 16 considered to be under a party’s ‘control’ when that party has the right, authority or 17 ability to obtain those documents upon demand.” Id. at 164, n. 10 (quoting Green v. 18 19 Fulton, 157 F.R.D. 136, 142 (D. Me. 1994)). 20 If a party fails to “answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33” or “produce 21 documents . . . as requested under Rule 34,” the affected party may move for an order 22 compelling disclosure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii) & (iv). “Conversely, the court may 23 issue a protective order on motion and for good cause ‘to protect a party or person from 24 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” Smith v. Brown 25 26 Univ., 695 F. Supp. 3d 246, 249 (D.R.I. 2023) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). The party 27 filing a motion to compel discovery has the initial burden of showing that the requested
28 4 1 discovery is relevant. Maggi v. Grafton Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-cv-59-LM, 2021 WL 2 12147799, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269964 at *5 (D.N.H., Nov. 9, 2021). This initial burden 3 is not onerous. Phillips Med. Sys. P.R., Inc. v. Alpha Biomedical & Diagnostic Corp., 4 Civil No. 19-1488 (BJM), 2021 WL 150411, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8739 at *12 (D.P.R., 5 Jan. 15, 2021). “Once this burden is met, the party resisting production bears the burden 6 7 to show that the discovery is improper.” Id. (citing Autoridad de Carreteras y 8 Transportación v. Tanscore Atl., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 422, 427 (D.P.R. 2016)). A “mere 9 statement by a party that the interrogatory [or request for production] ... was ‘overly 10 broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant’ is not adequate to voice a successful 11 objection. On the contrary, the party resisting discovery must show specifically how 12 13 each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or 14 oppressive.” Aponte-Navedo, et al. v. Nalco Chemical Co., et al., 268 F.R.D. 31, 36–38 15 (D.P.R. 2010) (quoting Sánchez-Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 265 F.R.D. at 27) 16 (cleaned up). “[A] trial court has broad discretion in ruling on pre-trial management 17 matters[.]” Bonner v. Triple-S Management Corp., 68 F.4th at 684. 18 19 With the above-outlined principles in mind, I turn to the pending motions to 20 compel, which I address separately. 22 A. Docket Nos. 17 and 19 - Plaintiff’s First Motion to Compel and 23 Defendant’s Request for protective order
24 Angleró moves the court to compel a response to her request for production of 25 documents (“RFP”) No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an order directed at Metro Ponce 26 to produce certified, complete, and numbered copies of audited financial statements for 27
28 5 1 the years 2023, 2024, and 2025 which are necessary for the jury to decide whether to 2 award punitive damages, and the amount, if any. Metro Ponce opposes (Docket No. 19), 3 arguing that, at this stage, the financial information is not relevant under Article 1538 of 4 the Puerto Rico Civil Code,4 which caps any additional compensation at the amount of 5 damages caused, and does not make the defendant’s wealth, solvency or ability to pay a 6 7 factor in the determination of the award. (Id. at 2). Metro Ponce further contends that 8 this request is merely a fishing expedition to probe its ability to satisfy a judgement. (Id. 9 at 4). Metro Ponce also argues that Plaintiff’s request is overbroad and disproportionate, 10 as it covers years outside of the timeframe alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. 11 (Id. at 9). Finally, Metro Ponce moves the court for a protective order prohibiting 12 13 Plaintiff from prematurely seeking its financial information without making a prima 14 facie showing that the punitive damages claim is viable. (Id. at 8-10). In the alternative, 15 Defendant maintains that if any production is ultimately ordered, it should be temporally 16 limited and confidential. (Id.) In a subsequent reply, Defendant reiterated that if the 17 production of its financial information is to be ordered, it should be limited to the year 18 19 of the incident. (Docket 42 at 10). 20
22 4 Article 1538 provides:
23 Repair of damages is made in money, through specific reintegration or a combination of the above remedies, at the choice of the injured party, as 24 long as there is no duplication of compensation. However, when the act or omission constitutes a crime, is carried out 25 intentionally or with serious disregard for the life, safety and property of others, the judge may impose additional compensation that is not greater 26 than the amount of damage caused.
27 P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31, § 10803 (2020).
28 6 1 In her reply and opposition to the request for protective order (Docket No. 33), 2 Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s request for a protective order should be denied as 3 the financial statements requested are relevant. (Docket No. 33 at 7). Angleró also says 4 that the request for three years of financial information is reasonable, as the 2023–2025 5 window brackets the conduct by capturing pre-incident baseline capacity (2023), the 6 7 incident year itself (2024), and the Hospital’s post-incident condition (2025), thus 8 allowing the jury to determine Defendant’s financial capacity. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff states 9 that she is willing to proceed under a protective order restricting use and dissemination 10 within this litigation, further addressing any confidentiality concerns without 11 undermining access to proportionate discovery relevant to her punitive damages prayer. 12 13 (Id. at 14-15). 14 At the outset, it should be noted that discovery is a procedural matter governed 15 by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CEH v. FV “Seafarer”, 153 F.R.D. 491, 497-98 16 (D.R.I. 1994). But federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state, 17 in this case, Puerto Rico. See Suero-Algarin v. CMT Hosp. HIMA San Pablo Caguas, 957 18 19 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 20 427 (1996); see also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 (1938). “Generally, district 21 courts do not allow prejudgment discovery regarding a defendant’s ability to satisfy a 22 judgment, aside from the initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).” In re New 23 England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 13-cv-02419, 2014 U.S. 24 Dist. LEXIS 205683, 2014 WL 12814933, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2014). When punitive 25 26 damages are sought, however, courts have followed two approaches in deciding whether 27 disclosure of financial information should be compelled. The majority view is that when
28 7 1 a plaintiff has raised a claim of punitive damages, a defendant’s financial information, 2 including its net worth, is relevant and, thus, discoverable. See Scheinberg v. Story 3 Terrace Inc., No. 24-cv-1567 (SCC), 2025 WL 3563978, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257906, 4 at *3 (D.P.R. Dec. 12, 2025) (collecting cases); EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 5 F.R.D. 391, 394-95 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that majority approach is that “a plaintiff 6 7 seeking punitive damages is entitled to discover information relating to the defendant’s 8 financial condition in advance of trial without making a prima facie showing that he is 9 entitled to recover such damages.”). A minority of jurisdictions subscribe to the view that 10 said discovery should only be allowed when Plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that 11 the claim of punitive damages is not spurious. Ward v. Nesibo, No. 22-cv-054-DN-PK, 12 13 2023 WL 3391145, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83846, at *10 (D. Utah May 11, 2023); see also 14 Scheinberg v. Story Terrace Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257906, at *4 (discussing the 15 approach followed by a minority of courts requiring that Plaintiff either demonstrate at 16 least a “real possibility” that punitive damages will be at issue or make a prima facie 17 showing that punitive damages are called for.). 18 19 After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, 20 I find no reason to deviate from the majority approach. Thus, the motion to compel at 21 Docket No. 17 is GRANTED. In light of the claim for punitive damages included in the 22 Second Amended Complaint, I find that the financial information requested is relevant 23 and should be disclosed in advance of trial. My ruling aligns with the view of the pressing 24 District Judge in Colón v. Hospital Doctor’s Center Bayamón, Inc., Civil No. 24-1355 25 26 (MAJ), Docket No. 56, where she followed the position of the majority of federal courts 27
28 8 1 that permit pretrial discovery of financial information when punitive damages are 2 claimed. 3 Furthermore, I find that the temporal scope of the request (three years), is not 4 disproportionate. To be sure, it has been held that “[a] request for non-current financial 5 information is irrelevant to a punitive damages determination . . . [and] discovery related 6 7 to financial status should be limited to net worth and the production of an annual or 8 period balance sheet under an appropriate protective order.” EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric 9 Transitions, 258 F.R.D. at 394. But here, a three-year disclosure, one year prior to the 10 incident, the year of the incident, and one year post-incident, is reasonable and not overly 11 broad. Most courts addressing the proper scope of financial discovery have limited such 12 13 discovery to the period providing a picture of the defendant’s current financial condition 14 and net worth, usually the most recent year or two.5 15 Given my determination above, the request for a protective order at Docket No. 16 19 is DENIED to the extent it sought to block production altogether. However, the 17 18 19
21 5 See, e.g., Vieste, LLC v. Hill Redwood Dev., No. C-09-04024-JSW (DMR), 2011 WL 855831, 2011 22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29137, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011) (limiting discovery to a temporal scope of two years); Zielke v. Vision Hosp. Group, Inc., 1:14-CV-362-SKL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175446, 2015 WL 9876950, 23 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2015) (“The temporal scope of the discovery appears to be proper as it is limited to Defendant’s ‘most recent’ financial information”); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest 24 Div., Inc., No. 05-2164, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22090, 2007 WL 950282, *14 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2007) (limiting discovery on financial information on issue of punitive damages to most recent reports and 25 current financial statement); Learjet, Inc. v. MPC Prods. Corp., No. 05-1074, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58451, 2007 WL 2287836, *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2007) (limiting discovery to most recent year); S. Cal. Hous. Rights 26 Ctr. v. Krug, No. 06-1420, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65330, 2006 WL 4122148, *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006) (limiting discovery to two-year period); Lane v. Capital Acquisitions, 242 F.R.D. 667, 670 (S.D.Fla.2005) 27 (same); Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 654 (D.Kan.2004) (same).
28 9 1 parties are directed to enter into a confidentiality agreement governing the disclosure of 2 the financial information at issue. 6 3 B. Docket Nos. 20 and 24 - Second and Fourth Urgent Motions to Compel 4 As both motions rely on similar arguments, and Defendant discusses them 5 together in its opposition (Docket No. 29), I address both together in this section. 6 7 Angleró seeks to compel the production of personnel files of the following nurses 8 and respiratory therapists in charge of Dr. Angleró at the Intensive Care Unit: 9 Marivelisse Pagán; Juan C. Soto, José Hernández, Nidia Velasco, and Gerardo Colón 10 (Docket No. 20 at 1); and disclosure of all documents contained in its [physician] 11 privileges files for the following physicians: Elizabeth Dallmayr, Jorge Martínez, Cosme 12 13 Santos, Eugenio Rivera, Rafael Rodríguez, Juan Vélez, Reinaldo Rodríguez, and Marcia 14 Alayón. (Docket No. 24 at. 1). She contends that these files are relevant to her medical 15 malpractice claim and that there is no privilege that protects the personnel files. Plaintiff 16 also argues that Metro Ponce has waived any privilege claim by issuing a blanket and 17 non-specific objection, and by not providing necessary substantiation when withholding 18 19 documents. (Id. at 5). 20 In opposing these motions, Metro Ponce claims that the request is too broad and 21 that there are serious privacy and confidentiality concerns. (Docket No. 29). In the 22 alternative, Defendant requests the court to issue a protective order 23 24
26 6 The undersigned hopes that a standard confidentiality agreement will not be a controversial 27 matter that will generate the need for court intervention.
28 10 1 [l]imiting discovery to the least burdensome and intrusive means available, subject to in camera or other means of 2 controlled inspection of the specific personnel and/or 3 privileges files, limiting production of documents strictly to those that are subject to discovery, allowing redactions to 4 remove any personal, confidential, sensitive and/or health related information, and all [sic] dictating that all procedures 5 be governed by a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement, and limiting the use of all information and/or 6 documents obtained to this litigation only. 7 (Id. at 9-10). 8 Considering the medical malpractice claims brought by Plaintiff, I find that the 9 10 personnel files requested likely contain relevant information subject to discovery under 11 Rule 26. However, the undersigned is mindful that personnel files often contain sensitive 12 personal information as well as information that is completely unrelated and irrelevant 13 to the claims or defenses asserted. Indeed, while personnel files are not categorically out 14 of bounds, courts must balance the right to relevant discovery against the privacy interest 15 16 of nonparties, being cautious not to disclose their entire contents willy-nilly. Holton v. 17 United States, No. 22-CV-00487, 2024 WL 4893643, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223989, at 18 *9 (M.D. Pa., Nov. 14, 2025) (cleaned up). Thus, in weighing the relevance of the 19 materials requested against important privacy interests, I will order disclosure of the 20 requested information but under most of the conditions proposed by Defendant’s 21 counsel in the June 15, 2026, email to Plaintiff. 22 23 With modifications, the conditions are as follows: 24 (1) Prior to the inspection, the parties will enter into a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement regarding the files and documents inspected, 25 26 27
28 11 1 information obtained, and those documents that are eventually produced by Metro Ponce.7 2 3 (2) The documents and information eventually obtained can only be used for this case and must be decommissioned (shredded/destroyed) upon the 4 conclusion of litigation.
5 (3) Plaintiff’s counsel will be able to view or inspect the entire file of each of the listed employees or physicians but will not be able to photograph any 6 document or portion thereof. (Counsel will be able to take notes). 7 (4) Plaintiff’s counsel may request copies of specific documents or sets of 8 documents included in each file but cannot request and will not be provided with copies of documents which contain personal and/or 9 confidential information and/or health information of each employee 10 and/or physician.
11 (5) Copies of the specific documents or sets of documents requested, which do not contain personal, confidential and/or health information will be 12 prepared and subsequently produced to plaintiff’s counsel. Documents 13 that contain both relevant and irrelevant private information may be redacted. 14 With respect to any quality assessment and/or peer review information Defendant 15 16 deems privileged under Regulation 9184 of the Puerto Rico Department of Health, the 17 Health Care Quality Improvement Act, and/or any other applicable local and/or federal 18 law, rule or regulation, the undersigned finds that Defendant shall only withhold 19 documents or information that truly falls under the recognized privilege. Relevantly, 20 Regulation 9184 is a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Puerto Rico 21 Department of Health as authorized by Puerto Rico Act No. 101 of June 26, 1965. Article 22 23 14.06 of the regulation specifically addresses the confidentiality, privacy, and security of 24
26 7 The parties are encouraged to have the confidentiality agreement that they were directed to enter 27 into in the previous section include provisions also governing the instant disclosure.
28 12 1 information gathered during evaluative processes, and designates as confidential all 2 information collected in quality reviews, peer evaluations, risk management, and 3 infection control. The purpose of this privilege is to protect internal processes essential 4 to improving institutional quality. See Pérez v. Caribbean Electrophysiology Servs. Inc., 5 Civil No. 24-1531, 2025 WL 3301192, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233167, at *27 (D.P.R. Nov. 6 7 26, 2025). But I agree with Plaintiff that the privilege only shields from disclosure the 8 “mental impression, conclusions, opinions or theories of the members of [any] quality 9 control [or peer review] committees that arise as part of the committees’ function.” 10 Álvarez-Torres v. Ryder Mem. Hosp. Inc., Civil No. 03-1041 (DRD), 2006 WL 8437222, 11 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114182, at *16 (D.P.R. Feb. 7, 2006). It should not be invoked to 12 13 block disclosure of the existence, number and nature of disciplinary actions taken. Id. at 14 *17. 15 The motions to compel at Docket Nos. 20 and 24, are GRANTED in part and 16 DENIED in part. They are granted subject to the conditions set forth above. They are 17 denied to the extent they requested unrestricted wholesale production of the personnel 18 19 files. 20 C. Docket No. 21 - Third Motion to Compel 21 Lastly, Angleró requests that the court order Metro Ponce to provide complete, 22 substantive responses to several interrogatories and produce documents responsive to 23 one of its RFPs. Plaintiff generally argues that the relief she seeks is warranted because 24 Defendant has responded to these interrogatories with boilerplate objections and 25 26 claiming an inapplicable work product privilege. 27
28 13 1 Metro Ponce responds that they have already complied in good faith with the 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (Docket No. 32 at 2), and argues that what Plaintiff 3 requests is not supplementation, but expansion of discovery beyond what Rules 26, 33, 4 and 34 require. (Id.). Defendant also claims that Plaintiff’s request is unduly burdensome 5 and disproportionate as it seeks thirty-seven narratives that are already contained in the 6 7 records they have had in their possession since 2024. (Id.). 8 Angleró replies that Metro Ponce’s supplementation after she filed her motion to 9 compel shows that the answers were inadequate and that, for that reason, an award of 10 expenses including attorneys’ fees is warranted. (Docket No. 38). She also argues that 11 answers to Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 11, and to RFP 5 remain deficient. (Id.). 12 13 After carefully considering the extensive arguments of the parties, the 14 undersigned rules as follows: 15 Interrogatory No. 1:8 Denied. The supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 1 16 and the person named therein (Maria Torres-Cintrón) is responsive and sufficient.9 17 Interrogatory No. 5:10 Denied. Requesting a detailed narrative of case-related 18 19 facts known by 37 individuals without regard to relevance is disproportionate to the 20
22 8 Interrogatory # 1 - Please provide the name, address, position within or outside the Hospital, and telephone number of every person, other than your attorneys, who has assisted or helped you in any 23 way to answer this interrogatory and identify the questions in which each person has provided assistance or help. 24
9 In her reply, Plaintiff did not address further this interrogatory. To the extent that Defendant’s 25 supplemental answer has been deemed by Plaintiff sufficient and adequate, then the motion to compel has become moot as to this issue. 26 10 Interrogatory # 5 – Please provide a detailed narrative of the specific facts related to the case 27 known by each person listed in HMDP, Inc.’s Rule 26 letter dated November 26, 2025.
28 14 1 needs of the case, overly broad and burdensome. See, e.g., Audibert v. Lowe’s Home 2 Centers, Inc., 152 F. App’x 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district court order 3 denying a motion to compel “all things, all documents, all statements, all knowledge 4 of facts, sworn or unsworn, relating to this case”) (emphasis added); see also Batts v. 5 County of Santa Clara, No. 08-00286 JW, 2010 WL 545847, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6 7 19327, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2010) (overruling objection to magistrate judge’s order 8 denying motion to compel answer to an interrogatory that required Defendants to state 9 all facts of the knowledge of at least fifteen individuals characterizing the inquiry as 10 broad and unfocused). Given my conclusion, I need not decide whether Defendant 11 properly invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). I would only note that it is questionable that Metro 12 13 Ponce’s reference to entries in the medical record satisfies the requirements of Rule 33(d). 14 That is so because 15 [a] party seeking to rely on Rule 33(d) must satisfy four 16 criteria: (1) it must affirm that the information sought by the requesting party is in fact in the specified records; (2) it must 17 specify the actual documents where information will be found; (3) it must show that answering the interrogatory in 18 the conventional manner would impose a burden on it; and 19 (4) it must show that the burden of deriving the answer from the specified records will be substantially the same for both 20 parties.
21 United States ex rel. Martino-Fleming v. S. Bay Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 332 F.R.D. 1, 22 6 (D. Mass. 2019). Metro Ponce’s answer to this interrogatory fails to meet many, if not 23 all, of these criteria. 24 25 26 27
28 15 1 Interrogatory No. 11:11 Granted. Metro Ponce must answer the interrogatory 2 categorically either in the affirmative or in the negative. A non-committal “not that we 3 know of” does not suffice. Metro Ponce has the duty and ability to conduct a reasonable 4 inquiry to learn the information that will allow it to answer the interrogatory. See 5 Braham v. Perelmuter, No. 15CV1094(JCH), 2016 WL 1305118, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6 7 44476, at *6 (D. Conn. Apr. 1, 2016) (explaining that while Rule 33 does require a party 8 to provide information that is unknown or unknowable, a responding party has a duty to 9 inquire or find the answer and failure to describe efforts to obtain the information render 10 the response insufficient). Defendant either has investigated or plans to investigate 11 Plaintiff and/or the people listed in her initial disclosures through third parties or it 12 13 has/does not. Moreover, an interrogatory that seeks information solely about the 14 existence of an investigation conducted by a third-party, excluding Metro Ponce’s 15 attorneys, does not call for attorney work product. In any event, Defendant has not 16 followed the proper procedure to assert a privilege under the rules. 17 RFP No. 5:12 Denied as overly broad and speculative. I agree with Metro 18 19 Ponce that as drafted, the request forces it as responding party to speculate what is being 20 requested and goes beyond the timeframe of this case. The RFP requests all documents 21 22
24 11 Interrogatory # 11 – Please state whether Mr. Anglero, Ms. Anglero and any of the people listed in her Rule 26 initial disclosure letter has been investigated, or will be investigated, by a private 25 investigator or a third-party other than HMDP, Inc.’s attorneys.
26 12 Request for Production # 5 - Please provide a certified, numbered, and complete copy of all documents under your possession or control mentioning directly or indirectly Mr. Anglero, excluding the 27 documents contained in his medical records as disclosed to us by you.
28 16 1 where Mr. Angleró is mentioned “directly or indirectly” and does not limit the 2 production to the hospital admission at issue. See Goal Zero LLC v. LCG Holdings LLC, 3 No. Civil No. 23-1488 (SCC) (HRV), 2026 WL 1948689, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150016, 4 at *32-33 (D.P.R. July 6, 2026) (denying motion to compel response to a RFP as outside 5 the period relevant to the litigation, vague, ambiguous, and speculative.). 6 7 In any event, Metro Ponce has represented that “in an effort to being 8 responsive, . . . [it] referred plaintiff to the documents attached as exhibits to the 9 discovery requests, some of which mention Mr. Angleró” and that “the answer was 10 supplemented to reflect the specific documents produced by the Hospital which mention 11 Mr. Angleró, including his medical records, billing and payment information, and census 12 13 of patients regarding his hospital admission from January 2, 2024, to January 6, 2024.” 14 (Docket No. 32 at 9). I find this supplementation to be responsive and adequate. 15 Nevertheless, if it has not done so already, the undersigned directs Defendant to certify 16 under the penalty of perjury that no additional responsive documents exist. 17 D. Docket No. 38 - Plaintiff’s Request for an Award of Expenses and 18 Attorneys’ Fees 19 I separately address Angleró’s request for an award of expenses including 20 attorneys’ fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(A)(5)(A). (Docket No.38). Plaintiff contends that 21 Metro Ponce only supplemented their answers on June 22, 2026, ten days after Plaintiff 22 23 filed her motion to compel. (Id.). In opposition, Metro Ponce posits that Angleró’s 24 request for an award of expenses and attorneys’ fees is an attempt to transform a 25 discovery dispute that it tried to resolve in good faith through clarification and 26 supplementation into a basis for sanctions. (Docket No. 49). According to Metro Ponce, 27
28 17 1 its position anent discovery was substantially justified and under the circumstances, an 2 award of expenses and fees would be unfair. 3 Whenever a court grants a motion to compel discovery, the Court may award the 4 moving party reasonable expenses associated with filing the motion, including attorney’s 5 fees, unless it can be shown that (1) the moving party filed the motion before attempting 6 7 in good faith to obtain the discovery without court intervention, (2) the opposing party’s 8 failure to disclose was substantially justified, or (3) other circumstances make an award 9 of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A); Colón v. Blades, 268 F.R.D. 129, 134 10 (D.P.R. 2010). On the other hand, if the motion to compel is granted in part and denied 11 in part, the Court may, “after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the 12 13 reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added). 14 Here, since I have granted in part and denied in part the motions to compel, 15 apportioning reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, is discretionary. See Bay 16 Club members, LLC v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239876, at *12, 17 2023 WL 11868238 (D. Mass. Jan. 31, 2023) (citing Shea v. Millett, Civil No. 17-cv- 18 19 12233-ADB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150990, 2019 WL 4218477, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 20 2019)). My rulings reflect that both parties raised, at least as to some of the disputed 21 discovery items, arguments and/or objections that were substantially justified. I also find 22 that under the circumstances, ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff expenses and 23 attorneys’ fees would be unfair. As such, each party shall bear their own expenses and 24 fees. 25 26 27
28 18 2 In view of the foregoing, and as outlined in detail above, the pending motions to 3 compel are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Each side shall bear their own 4 expenses and attorneys’ fees. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 21st day of July, 2026. 8 S/Héctor L. Ramos-Vega 9 HÉCTOR L. RAMOS-VEGA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
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