T. C. Memo. 2014-221
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ENGSTROM, LIPSCOMB & LACK, APC, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 27364-12 Filed October 20, 2014.
Kevin M. Bagley, for petitioner.
Monica D. Polo, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GOEKE, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in Engstrom,
Lipscomb & Lack, APC’s (petitioner or EL&L) Federal income tax for 2008
through 2010 and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662,1 as follows:
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal 1
Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedures. -2-
[*2] Penalty Year Deficiency sec. 6662(a)
2008 $903,979 $180,796 2009 36,096 7,219 2010 306,126 61,255
Part of the 2008 deficiency resulted from respondent’s partial disallowance of a
net operating loss petitioner carried forward from 2007. Respondent disallowed
travel expense deductions that contributed to the 2007 net operating loss. The
Court has no jurisdiction over tax year 2007; however, we can determine the
correct amount of the 2007 net operating loss in order to determine the 2008 issue.
See, e.g., Jordan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-223, slip op. at 9 n.9, aff’d,
469 Fed. Appx. 460 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the period from 2008 to 2010
is referred to as the years at issue. The issues presented for our decision are:
(1) whether petitioner is entitled to deductions for travel expenses for the
years at issue. We hold that it is entitled to deduct some of the expenses;
(2) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct for 2008 a net operating loss
carryforward from 2007 of $1,425,000 that resulted from travel expense
deductions. We hold that it is entitled to a portion of that deduction; and -3-
[*3] (3) whether petitioner is liable for accuracy-related penalties under section
6662 for the years at issue. We hold that it is, but the penalties must be adjusted
for consistency with this opinion.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The parties’
stipulations of facts are incorporated herein by this reference. When petitioner
filed its petition, its principal place of business was in Los Angeles, California.
Petitioner timely filed a petition with this Court requesting a
redetermination of the deficiencies and accuracy-related penalties for the years at
issue. In his initial answer respondent defended his adjustments on the basis of
petitioner’s failure to comply with the substantiation requirements in section
274(d). Respondent amended his answer to clarify that he also believes petitioner
failed to demonstrate that the claimed deductions were for ordinary and necessary
business expenses as required by section 162. Petitioner filed an amended petition
asserting its entitlement to additional deductions for travel expenses of $487,000
and $285,000 for tax years 2009 and 2010, respectively, that it had not claimed on
its returns.
Petitioner is a tort and commercial litigation law firm that represents
individuals, governmental entities, and corporate plaintiffs for incidents occurring -4-
[*4] throughout the United States and internationally. During the years at issue
Walter J. Lack owned 50% of petitioner’s shares and served as its president.
Thomas V. Girardi, a close friend of Mr. Lack, is the managing partner and 100%
owner of Girardi | Keese (GK), a law firm with a tort practice similar to
petitioner’s. Mr. Lack and Mr. Girardi have worked as co-counsel on numerous
legal cases.
During the years at issue, Mr. Lack and Mr. Girardi had ownership interests
in Bicycle Casino, LP; Girardi Financial, LLC; and Oceans 11 Casino, Inc. Mr.
Girardi was a director of Boyd Gaming Corp. and was compensated for his
services. Mr. Lack and Mr. Girardi were also directors of Supergen, a
pharmaceutical company, and were compensated for their services. Petitioner had
no ownership interest or involvement in any of the aforementioned activities.
In 1995 Mr. Lack and Mr. Girardi formed G&L Aviation (G&L), a
California general partnership that owns aircraft. Mr. Lack and Mr. Girardi each
hold a 50% interest in G&L. Under G&L’s partnership agreement Mr. Lack and
Mr. Girardi share equally all the expenses related to the operation of the aircraft.
G&L’s principal place of business was the same as petitioner’s.
During the years at issue G&L owned an American Gulfstream GIV long-
range jet aircraft (GIV) and a Raytheon B350 Super King Air turboprop aircraft -5-
[*5] (King Air). Mr. Lack and Mr. Girardi used the aircraft for extensive travel
during the years at issue. The GIV was managed by third-party management
companies that provided crew, maintenance, repairs, fuel, regulatory compliance,
and other services. The third-party management companies were also authorized
to charter the GIV when it was not in use by Mr. Lack or Mr. Girardi. Rebekah
Herbert, vice president of flight operations and logistics for one of the third-party
management companies, determined that the GIV and the King Air would be
charged out at approximately $5,500 and $2,500 per hour, respectively. G&L also
rented a luxury suite at the Staples Center, a sports arena in downtown Los
Angeles. Petitioner was never a partner of G&L, and held no ownership interest in
any of G&L’s aircraft.
Petitioner claimed travel expense deductions of $1,425,000, $1,157,797,
$687,310, and $1,062,469 for tax years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively
related to its use of the GIV, the King Air, and the Staples Center luxury suite.2
Petitioner made payments to G&L totaling $530,000, $347,797, $200,310, and
$777,468 for tax years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. Mr. Lack also
2 The parties agreed, pursuant to the stipulation of facts, that petitioner is not entitled to travel expense deductions for its use of the Staples Center luxury suite. These expenses totaled $22,797, $25,310, and $24,698 in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. -6-
[*6] made payments to G&L from his personal account totaling $895,000,
$810,000, $487,500, and $285,000 for tax years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010,
respectively.
There were no written agreements in effect between petitioner and G&L or
between petitioner and the third-party management companies regarding the use of
the King Air and the GIV. Petitioner maintains, however, that there was an
“implied in fact G&L agreement” to make the aircraft available and flight ready
for petitioner’s business use. Petitioner did not receive invoices for the expenses it
and Mr. Lack paid during the years at issue. There were no written shareholder
loan agreements between petitioner and Mr. Lack relating to the amounts paid
from Mr. Lack’s personal account to G&L. Petitioner paid no interest to Mr. Lack
on the amounts Mr. Lack paid to G&L from his personal account.
During the years at issue Pamela Carter was employed by petitioner
as Mr. Lack’s secretary; however, she also performed duties for G&L such as
recordkeeping and depositing payments into G&L’s bank account. Mrs. Carter
prepared revenue schedules that reflected payments G&L received for the use of
the GIV and the King Air. The revenue schedules included the date of the
payment and the amount paid but did not include details such as flight
information, passengers, or the purposes of flights. Mrs. Carter also prepared -7-
[*7] G&L monthly calendars on which she recorded King Air scheduled flights,
GIV scheduled flights, plane maintenance, and pilot vacations. The monthly
calendars did not include the business purposes of the flights or detailed passenger
information.
G&L kept flight logs for both aircraft. Steven Cornell, the King Air’s lead
pilot, prepared the logs for the King Air, while the GIV pilots prepared logs for the
GIV. The logs do not provide the business purposes of the flights or detailed
passenger information. Neither Mrs. Carter nor Mr. Cornell had personal
knowledge of the purpose of the King Air or GIV flights. During the years at
issue Mr. Lack maintained an executive calendar on which he recorded personal
appointments, personal business, and EL&L business. The executive calendar did
not reflect the amounts of travel expenditures or detailed information regarding the
business purpose of the expenditures.
At trial petitioner offered two noncontemporaneous documents to
substantiate the business purposes for the travel expenses at issue. The documents
were introduced as reconstructions of petitioner’s trips and included each trip’s
date, destination, file number, and passengers. The first document was a log of
petitioner’s use of the King Air and the GIV, which Mrs. Carter prepared by
referencing the flight logs and monthly calendars and speaking with Mr. Lack. -8-
[*8] The second document was a similar log that Mr. Lack prepared in anticipation
of trial by using his memory, executive calendars, and recollections from
petitioner’s employees.
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Commissioner’s determinations are incorrect. Rule 142(a);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,115 (1933). Under section 7491(a), if the
taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to
ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for tax and meets other requirements, the
burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner as to that factual
issue. The notice of deficiency contains an explanation of adjustments which
states: “To be allowed a deduction for any traveling expense, you must furnish
information to prove: (a) the amount of the expense, (b) the time and place of the
travel, (c) the business purpose of the travel, and (d) the time the expense was paid
or incurred. Because you have not established all of the above, we have
disallowed your deduction.” We find that petitioner has failed to meet the
requirements to cause the burden to shift to respondent. However, respondent’s
amended answer raises as an alternative argument whether the expenses were -9-
[*9] ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. We determined
that respondent would carry the burden of proof to establish that the travel
expenses were not ordinary and necessary business expenses for petitioner to the
extent that petitioner meets the substantiation requirements of section 274(d) and
the allegation in the amended answer differs from the substantiation issue raised in
the notice of deficiency. Because of the relationship of Mr. Lack to G&L and
petitioner, the question of whether payments to G&L by petitioner were ordinary
and necessary business expenses is more complex than the question of whether the
substantiation requirements have been met. In addition, Mr. Lack personally paid
amounts that petitioner deducted. Nevertheless, the evidence which is
contemporaneous to the events readily establishes that some of the travel expenses
were for petitioner’s business and have been substantiated in accordance with
section 274(d). Respondent failed to produce any evidence that travel expenses
directly involving petitioner’s employees other than Mr. Lack were not ordinary
and necessary. Respondent also failed to produce evidence that Mr. Lack’s
expenses for travel to various law conferences and petitioner-related legal
proceedings were not ordinary and necessary. Expenses for this travel are
therefore allowable as deductions. The remaining reported travel expenses in -10-
[*10] dispute have not been substantiated in accordance with section 274(d) and
are not allowable.
II. Travel Expense Deductions
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers must maintain
sufficient records to substantiate the amounts of their income and entitlement to
any deductions or credits claimed. Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292
U.S. 435, 440 (1934). A taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. Sec.
162. Whether an expense is ordinary is determined by time, place, and
circumstance. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113-114. Where a taxpayer reports
a business expense but cannot fully substantiate it, the Court generally may
approximate the allowable amount. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540,
543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). However, we may do so only when the taxpayer provides
evidence sufficient to establish a rational basis upon which an estimate can be
made. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985).
For certain kinds of expenses otherwise deductible under section 162(a), a
taxpayer must satisfy the strict substantiation requirements set forth in section
274(d) before such expenses will be allowed as deductions. The section 274(d) -11-
[*11] substantiation requirements supersede the Cohan doctrine that we may
estimate deductions where evidence is inadequate. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39
F.2d at 543-544; Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968) (strict
substantiation provision takes precedence over Cohan rule), aff’d, 412 F.2d 201
(2d Cir. 1969).
The heightened substantiation requirements of section 274(d) apply to travel
expenses and are thus implicated here. To prove its entitlement to the travel
expense deductions at issue, petitioner must present sufficient evidence
supporting: (1) the amount of the expense; (2) the time and place of the travel;
and (3) the business purpose of the expense. The degree of substantiation
necessary to establish business purpose depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case, but contemporaneous documentation is deemed more credible than
after-the-fact reconstructions. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), (2)(ii)(B), Temporary Income
Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016, 46018 (Nov. 6, 1985). However, where the
business purpose is evident from the surrounding facts and circumstances, a
written explanation of the business purpose will not be required. Sec. 1.274-
5T(c)(2)(ii)(B), Income Tax Regs., supra. -12-
[*12] A. Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses
Petitioner contends that we should presume there was a business purpose for
all of the travel expenses it reported. Petitioner argues that respondent bears the
burden of proving they had no business purpose. Petitioner’s position is incorrect
regarding the substantiation requirements of section 274(d). Respondent argues
that the travel expenses were not ordinary and necessary because petitioner was
paying the obligations of Mr. Lack and the travel expenses were not reasonable in
amount in relation to their purpose. On the basis of the record we believe
petitioner met the requirements of the regulations under section 274(d) for some of
the expenses it deducted. However petitioner also failed to substantiate portions
of its deductions. On many of the flights that generated the deductions, Mr.
Girardi was the sole passenger. Petitioner is not entitled to deduct expenses
related to these flights as they were not clearly for petitioner’s business and the
contemporaneous records do not show the business purpose of the flights. On
other flights Mr. Lack and his family used the aircraft for non-EL&L business.
Petitioner also is not entitled to deduct expenses that it did not actually pay.
Petitioner admits that some of the expenses at issue were paid by Mr. Lack out of
his personal funds. Nevertheless, petitioner argues that it should be allowed to
deduct those expenses because Mr. Lack paid them on petitioner’s behalf as either -13-
[*13] loans or capital contributions. We disagree. Petitioner has not presented
any evidence demonstrating that it observed the formalities necessary for such a
characterization contemporaneously or at any time before trial. See Sollberger v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-78 (explaining that courts define a loan as an
express or implied agreement where one person advances money to the other and
the other agrees “to repay it upon such terms as time and rate of interest” and
where there is “an unconditional obligation on the part of the transferee to repay
the money, and an unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to secure
repayment”), aff’d, 691 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Welch v.
Commissioner, 204 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that factors relevant
in assessing whether a transaction is a true loan are: “(1) whether the promise to
repay is evidenced by a note or other instrument; (2) whether interest was charged;
(3) whether a fixed schedule for repayments was established; (4) whether
collateral was given to secure payment; (5) whether repayments were made; (6)
whether the borrower had a reasonable prospect of repaying the loan and whether
the lender had sufficient funds to advance the loan; and (7) whether the parties
conducted themselves as if the transaction were a loan”), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1998-
121. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that the amounts forwarded by
Mr. Lack were recorded as capital contributions when expended. We are -14-
[*14] disinclined to embrace after-the-fact, self-serving testimony as a substitute
for actual contemporaneous evidence and documentation. Therefore, we reject
petitioner’s position regarding the deductibility of the payments which the firm did
not actually make, specifically Mr. Lack’s personal expenditures in accord with
the obligations he himself undertook regarding G&L.
B. Substantiation of Travel Expenses
To substantiate its reported travel expenses, petitioner provided revenue
schedules, monthly calendars, flight logs, and reconstructed analysis introduced
through testimony. Additionally, petitioner attached schedules to its briefs which
purport to summarize the evidence in the record. However, the schedules include
flights that were not part of the reconstructed analysis and business purpose details
that were not part of any evidence submitted at trial. Therefore, we will not
consider these schedules as part of the record.
The relevant evidence reflects three categories of flights: (1) flights on
which Mr. Lack and another EL&L employee were passengers; (2) flights on
which Mr. Lack was the only EL&L employee passenger; and (3) flights on which
neither Mr. Lack nor another EL&L employee was a passenger. We hold that
petitioner is entitled to deductions for the expenses related to category (1) flights
when the expenses were properly substantiated. We hold that petitioner is entitled -15-
[*15] to deduct the expenses related to category (2) flights only when it is readily
apparent that the flights were for EL&L business. We hold that petitioner is not
entitled to deductions for any expenses related to category (3) flights because
neither Mr. Lack nor another EL&L employee was a passenger and the flights had
no discernable business purpose according to the contemporaneous records.
For many of the flights in categories (1) and (2), petitioner failed to meet the
heightened expense substantiation requirements of section 274(d). Where the
business purpose of a flight has not been established, the deductions are
disallowed. Where a flight lacks supporting contemporaneous documents such as
flight logs to substantiate the amounts of the expenses, the deductions are also
disallowed.
In the appendix to this opinion we have summarized our holdings for all
category (1) and category (2) flights. All expense deductions related to category
(3) flights were disallowed, and therefore these flights were not included in the
appendix. The appendix includes the date, destination, business purpose, aircraft,
and flight hours for each properly substantiated flight. Where petitioner failed to
properly substantiate the flight, it is noted accordingly. The GIV flights that were
properly substantiated totaled 78.6 flight hours. The King Air flights that were
properly substantiated totaled 191.1 flight hours. The GIV and the King Air are -16-
[*16] charged out at approximately $5,500 and $2,500 per hour, respectively.
Therefore, the appropriate deduction for petitioner’s properly substantiated travel
expenses during the years at issue is $910,050 ($286,500, $315,050, $206,250,
and $102,250 for tax years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively).
C. Petitioner’s Additional Arguments
Petitioner contends that this case arises under section 274(d)(4) relating to
use of listed property and therefore the substantiation requirements for the use of
listed property under section 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50
Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985), apply. Petitioner explains that the aircraft should
be considered listed property because of the phrase “payments under a lease for a
period of 30 days or more” used in section 280F(c)(2). Petitioner suggests that
applying the travel expense regulations is more problematic because of their use of
“separate expenditures”, “business days”, and lack of guidance on Mr. Lack’s
“dual use” of the aircraft. We reject this position because petitioner has not
produced any evidence demonstrating that it met the requirements to characterize
its use of the aircraft as a lease or rental of property.
III. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662(a). Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes a -17-
[*17] 20% penalty on an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return if
the underpayment is attributable to a taxpayer’s negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations or substantial understatement of income tax.
Section 6662(c) defines negligence as including any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the internal revenue laws.
Negligence has also been defined as the failure to exercise due care or the failure
to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do under the circumstances.
Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). Negligence also includes any
failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items
properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Section 6662(c) determines that
“disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard.
Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the accuracy-related penalty if
it is shown that the taxpayer had reasonable cause and acted in good faith. Sec.
1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The decision as to whether the taxpayer acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith depends upon all the pertinent facts and
circumstances. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 448 (2001); see sec.
1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
The Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to a
taxpayer’s liability for accuracy-related penalties. See sec. 7491(c). To meet that -18-
[*18] burden, the Commissioner must produce sufficient evidence indicating that
it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at
446-447. Once the Commissioner meets his burden of production, the taxpayer
must come forward with persuasive evidence that the Commissioner’s
determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at
446-447. The taxpayer may meet this burden by proving that he or she acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith. See sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(a), Income
Tax Regs.
Petitioner failed to establish reasonable cause for not keeping sufficient
contemporaneous records showing important flight details and the business
purpose of the travel. Petitioner also reported expense deductions for travel
unrelated to its business. Therefore, we find petitioner’s underpayments negligent
and lacking reasonable cause or good faith. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s
imposition of accuracy-related penalties under section 6662 for the years at issue.
In reaching our holdings herein, we have considered all arguments the
parties made, and to the extent we did not mention them above, we conclude they
are moot, irrelevant, or without merit. -19-
[*19] To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under
Rule 155. -20-
[*20] APPENDIX
Date Destination Business purpose Flight hours
1/7/07 Cabo San Lucas, Mex. EL&L litigation 6.4 (KA) 1/30/07 Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. EL&L litigation 9.9 (GIV) 2/15/07 Las Vegas, Nev. Failure to substantiate 3/11/07 Thermal, Cal. Failure to substantiate 3/15/07 Oakland, Cal. Failure to substantiate 3/23/07 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.4 (KA) 3/29/07 Las Vegas, Nev. EL&L litigation 1.8 (KA) 4/10/07 Chicago, Ill. IATL conference 3.3 (GIV) 4/14/07 Chicago, Ill. IATL conference 5.6 (GIV) 4/23/07 Las Vegas, Nev. Failure to substantiate 4/26/07 Puerto Vallarta, Mex. EL&L litigation 8.0 (KA) 5/10/07 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.1 (KA) 5/24/07 Thermal, Cal. Failure to substantiate 6/6/07 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 4.7 (KA) 6/12/07 Managua, Nicar. Failure to substantiate 7/1/07 La Paz, Mex. Failure to substantiate 8/9/07 Minden, Nev. Failure to substantiate 8/24/07 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.5 (KA) 8/29/07 Puerto Vallarta, Mex. EL&L litigation 8.5 (KA) 9/4/07 Puerto Vallarta, Mex. EL&L litigation 8.8 (KA) 9/7/07 Las Vegas, Nev. IATL conference 3.5 (KA) 9/14/07 Thermal, Cal. Failure to substantiate 9/20/07 Oakland, Cal. Failure to substantiate 9/21/07 La Paz, Mex. Failure to substantiate 10/17/07 Scottsdale, Ariz./D.C. EL&L litigation 4.9 (GIV) 10/25/07 Oakland, Cal. Failure to substantiate 10/26/07 Las Vegas, Nev. Failure to substantiate 11/21/07 Thermal, Cal. Failure to substantiate 11/25/07 Thermal, Cal. Failure to substantiate 12/16/07 Teterboro, N.J. IATL conference 4.8 (GIV) 12/27/07 Cabo San Lucas, Mex. EL&L litigation 4.2 (KA) 1/2/08 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.4 (KA) 1/6/08 Cabo San Lucas, Mex. EL&L litigation 6.6 (KA) -21-
[*21] 1/15/08 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.1 (KA) 1/18/08 Las Vegas, Nev. Conference speaker 1.9 (KA) 1/20/08 Las Vegas, Nev. Conference speaker 2.0 (KA) 2/2/08 Phoenix, Ariz. Conference speaker 3.1 (KA) 2/10/08 Phoenix, Ariz. EL&L litigation 2.1 (GIV) 2/17/08 Minden, Nev. Failure to substantiate 2/19/08 Minden, Nev. Failure to substantiate 3/12/08 Carlsbad, Cal. EL&L litigation 0.9 (KA) 3/13/08 Oakland, Cal. Failure to substantiate 3/20/08 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.2 (KA) 3/22/08 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.4 (KA) 4/10/08 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.7 (KA) 4/18/08 San Diego, Cal. Conference speaker 1.1 (KA) 4/20/08 Las Vegas, Nev. Failure to substantiate 5/29/08 Seattle, Wash. EL&L litigation 3.3 (KA) 6/4/08 Ketchikan, Alaska EL&L litigation 6.7 (GIV) 6/6/08 Reno, Nev. Failure to substantiate 6/12/08 Livermore, Cal. Failure to substantiate 6/18/08 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 4.9 (KA) 7/2/08 Sitka, Alaska EL&L litigation 3.6 (GIV) 7/5/08 Sitka, Alaska EL&L litigation 3.7 (GIV) 7/24/08 Portland, Or./Sitka, Alaska EL&L litigation 12.4 (KA) 7/30/08 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.2 (KA) 7/31/08 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.2 (KA) 8/14/08 Minden, Nev./Oakland, Cal. Failure to substantiate 8/20/08 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.4 (KA) 8/25/08 Denver, Colo. EL&L litigation 2.8 (KA) 8/26/08 Denver, Colo. EL&L litigation 2.8 (KA) 8/29/08 Las Vegas, Nev. CAALA conference 1.9 (KA) 8/31/08 Las Vegas, Nev. CAALA conference 1.9 (KA) 9/3/08 Seattle, Wash. EL&L litigation 4.6 (GIV) 9/21/08 Aspen, Colo. IATL conference 1.6 (GIV) 9/24/08 Aspen, Colo. IATL conference 1.8 (GIV) 9/29/08 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 10/9/08 Cabo San Lucas, Mex. EL&L litigation 6.3 (KA) 11/12/08 Cabo San Lucas, Mex. Failure to substantiate 11/26/08 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 0.7 (KA) -22-
[*22] 11/30/08 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.1 (KA) 12/5/08 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 12/30/08 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.1 (KA) 1/2/09 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.3 (KA) 1/13/09 Jackson, Miss./New Orl., La. EL&L litigation 3.1 (GIV) 3/12/09 Oakland, Cal./Minden, Nev. Failure to substantiate 3/12/09 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 3/21/09 Las Vegas, Nev. EL&L litigation 0.9 (KA) 3/23/09 Las Vegas, Nev. EL&L litigation 1.9 (KA) 4/6/09 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.0 (KA) 4/10/09 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 0.7 (KA) 4/13/09 Thermal, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.3 (KA) 4/21/09 Atlanta, Ga. IATL conference 3.8 (GIV) 4/24/09 Atlanta, Ga. IATL conference 4.4 (GIV) 5/21/09 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 5/25/09 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 0.4 (KA) 5/29/09 Bandon, Or. Failure to substantiate 6/11/09 Livermore, Cal. Failure to substantiate 6/16/09 Sacramento, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.4 (KA) 6/17/09 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 6/21/09 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.5 (KA) 6/22/09 Denver, Colo. EL&L litigation 3.7 (GIV) 6/24/09 Denver, Colo. EL&L litigation 5.6 (KA) 7/2/09 San Diego, Cal. Failure to substantiate 7/4/09 San Diego, Cal. Failure to substantiate 7/16/09 Minden, Nev. Failure to substantiate 7/22/09 Minden, Nev. Failure to substantiate 7/24/09 Oakland, Cal. AAJ speaker 2.4 (KA) 7/27/09 Oakland, Cal. AAJ speaker 2.1 (KA) 9/12/09 San Diego, Cal. State bar 1.2 (KA) 9/24/09 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.1 (KA) 9/25/09 San Diego, Cal. EL&L litigation 1.1 (KA) 10/2/09 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.2 (KA) 10/15/09 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 12/3/09 Los Cabos, Mex. EL&L litigation 6.4 (KA) 12/16/09 Oakland, Cal. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 12/17/09 Las Vegas, Nev. EL&L litigation 3.5 (KA) -23-
[*23] 3/11/10 Oakland, Cal. Failure to substantiate 3/31/10 Thermal, Cal. Failure to substantiate 4/8/10 Phoenix, Ariz. IATL conference 3.0 (KA) 6/9/10 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.5 (KA) 6/10/10 Livermore, Cal. Failure to substantiate 6/13/10 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.4 (KA) 7/1/10 Santa Rosa, Cal. Failure to substantiate 7/15/10 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.7 (KA) 7/21/10 Minden, Nev. EL&L litigation 2.3 (KA) 8/20/10 Monterey, Cal. IATL conference 3.8 (KA) 9/3/10 Las Vegas, Nev. Failure to substantiate 11/12/10 Liberia, Costa Rica IATL conference 11.0 (GIV)
GIV flight hours 78.6 KA flight hours 191.1