Engram v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Engram v. State

853 So. 2d 1123, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13772, 2003 WL 22103009

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 12, 2003

DocketNo. 5D02-3740

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 853 So. 2d 1123 (Engram v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Engram v. State, 853 So. 2d 1123, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13772, 2003 WL 22103009 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

PLEUS, J.

Engrain appeals his judgment and sentence for felony battery. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for mistrial after the jury heard two references to collateral crimes and one comment on his right to remain silent. He also argues that the trial court erred by increasing his sentence after he had begun [1124]*1124serving it. We affirm the judgment without discussion but vacate the sentence and remand with directions to impose the original sentence.

At the sentencing hearing on November 12, 2002, the state requested that Engram be sentenced both as a habitual offender (HO) and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), but the trial judge did not think both classifications were proper for a single offense. Consequently, the judge designated Engram a PRR and sentenced him to five years in prison.

Three days later, on November 15, 2002, Engram was brought back to court, where the trial judge stated that both designations should have been imposed. He also noted that under the current ease law, it was necessary to make the habitual offender sentence longer than the PRR sentence. Thus, he vacated the original sentence, imposed a new sentence of five years and one month and designated Engram a PRR and an HO.

Engram correctly argues that imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant has already begun serving his original sentence violates double jeopardy principles. Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla.2003); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000). The state concedes this point. The trial judge was under the mistaken impression that he was required to impose the HO sentence when, in fact, it was discretionary. See State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for imposition of the original sentence.

SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.

SAWAYA, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.

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PLEUS, J.

Engrain appeals his judgment and sentence for felony battery. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for mistrial after the jury heard two references to collateral crimes and one comment on his right to remain silent. He also argues that the trial court erred by increasing his sentence after he had begun [1124]*1124serving it. We affirm the judgment without discussion but vacate the sentence and remand with directions to impose the original sentence.

At the sentencing hearing on November 12, 2002, the state requested that Engram be sentenced both as a habitual offender (HO) and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), but the trial judge did not think both classifications were proper for a single offense. Consequently, the judge designated Engram a PRR and sentenced him to five years in prison.

Three days later, on November 15, 2002, Engram was brought back to court, where the trial judge stated that both designations should have been imposed. He also noted that under the current ease law, it was necessary to make the habitual offender sentence longer than the PRR sentence. Thus, he vacated the original sentence, imposed a new sentence of five years and one month and designated Engram a PRR and an HO.

Engram correctly argues that imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant has already begun serving his original sentence violates double jeopardy principles. Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla.2003); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000). The state concedes this point. The trial judge was under the mistaken impression that he was required to impose the HO sentence when, in fact, it was discretionary. See State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for imposition of the original sentence.

SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.

SAWAYA, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

853 So. 2d 1123, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13772, 2003 WL 22103009, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/engram-v-state-fladistctapp-2003.

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