Engram v. Manera (In re Engram)

Ninth Circuit

Engram v. Manera (In re Engram)

348 F. App'x 305

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 13, 2009

DocketNo. 08-60025

StatusPublished

This text of 348 F. App'x 305 (Engram v. Manera (In re Engram)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Engram v. Manera (In re Engram), 348 F. App'x 305 (9th Cir. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

Chapter 7 debtor Wayne Engram, his sister Madeline Engram, and his daughter Susie Engram appeal pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order approving the trustee’s settlement of the estate’s interest in a state court quiet title action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision, United States v. Battley (In re Kimura), 969 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir.1992), and we affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not err by concluding that Madeline and Susie Engram lacked standing to object to the trustee’s settlement of the estate’s interest in the state court action. See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir.1999) (explaining that a party has standing only if the bankruptcy court order diminishes its property, increases its burdens, or detrimentally affects its rights).

Contrary to Wayne Engram’s contention, as debtor, his interest in the state court action was property of the estate. See Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir.2004) (stating that property of estate includes all “legal or equitable interests,” including debtor’s causes of actions (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1))). Therefore, his contention that he was pressured into signing the settlement agreement is unavailing.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by approving the [307]*307agreement. See Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Props.), 784 F.2d 1377, 1380, 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1986) (explaining that the approval of a compromise is not an abuse of discretion where the record contains a factual foundation establishing the compromise was fair, reasonable, and adequate).

The remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM

**

Chapter 7 debtor Wayne Engram, his sister Madeline Engram, and his daughter Susie Engram appeal pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order approving the trustee’s settlement of the estate’s interest in a state court quiet title action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision, United States v. Battley (In re Kimura), 969 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir.1992), and we affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not err by concluding that Madeline and Susie Engram lacked standing to object to the trustee’s settlement of the estate’s interest in the state court action. See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir.1999) (explaining that a party has standing only if the bankruptcy court order diminishes its property, increases its burdens, or detrimentally affects its rights).

Contrary to Wayne Engram’s contention, as debtor, his interest in the state court action was property of the estate. See Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir.2004) (stating that property of estate includes all “legal or equitable interests,” including debtor’s causes of actions (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1))). Therefore, his contention that he was pressured into signing the settlement agreement is unavailing.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by approving the [307]*307agreement. See Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Props.), 784 F.2d 1377, 1380, 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1986) (explaining that the approval of a compromise is not an abuse of discretion where the record contains a factual foundation establishing the compromise was fair, reasonable, and adequate).

The remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

In Re a & C Properties, Debtors. William W. Martin, Superseded by Gilbert Robinson, in Intervention v. William E. Kane, Barbara Kelly, K & K Properties, Inc., and Investors Replacement, Inc., William W. Martin, Objectors-Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Gilbert Robinson, Trustee in Bankruptcy, in Intervention

784 F.2d 1377 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)

In Re P.R.T.C., Inc., Debtor. Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust

177 F.3d 774 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)

Turner v. Cook

362 F.3d 1219 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

United States v. Battley (In re Kimura)

969 F.2d 806 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

348 F. App'x 305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/engram-v-manera-in-re-engram-ca9-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack