England v. Wilmington Plastic Surgery, P.A.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedApril 30, 2020
Docket7:18-cv-00179
StatusUnknown

This text of England v. Wilmington Plastic Surgery, P.A. (England v. Wilmington Plastic Surgery, P.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
England v. Wilmington Plastic Surgery, P.A., (E.D.N.C. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA SOUTHERN DIVISION No. 7:18-CV-00179-BO

Donna England,

Plaintiff,

v. Certification of Contempt Wilmington Plastic Surgery, P.A. f/k/a Wilmington Plastic Surgery Specialists, P.A.,

Defendant.

Federal law sets out the authority of magistrate judges to address contempt by the parties and attorneys who appear before them. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). Although magistrate judges can address some contempt directly, much of the time a magistrate judge must refer the conduct at issue to a district judge. In a civil action when the parties have not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the magistrate judge must certify the underlying facts to a district judge if the act at issue “constitutes a criminal contempt [that] occurs outside the presence of the magistrate judge” or “the act constitutes a civil contempt[.]” Id. § 636(e)(6)(B)(ii) & (iii). After certification, the magistrate judge must cause the order to be served on “any person whose behavior is brought into question” and order that the person “appear before a district judge upon a day certain to show cause why that person should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of the facts so certified.” Id. § 636(e)(6)(B). The district judge must then “hear the evidence as to the act or conduct complained of and, if it is such as to warrant punishment, punish such person in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt committed before a district judge.” Id. Whether the court holds a person in criminal or civil contempt depends on the purpose behind the sanction the court imposes. Holding an individual in civil contempt seeks to “coerce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages caused by noncompliance.” Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 517 F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir.

1975) (quoting S. Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1969)). But criminal contempt “is intended to vindicate the authority of the court, and cannot be purged by any act of the contemnor.” Id. (citing Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 43 (1941)). Given that the parties have not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction here, the undersigned must proceed by certifying the underlying facts to the presiding district judge. Thus, the undersigned magistrate judge certifies these facts to Chief United States District Judge Terrance W. Boyle: 1. In September 2019, Defendant Wilmington Plastic Surgery moved to compel responses from Plaintiff Donna England after her counsel, Gregory A. Buscemi, failed to respond to interrogatories and requests for production of documents. D.E. 30. England told

Wilmington Plastic Surgery at her deposition that she gave responsive documents to Buscemi, but Buscemi did not turn them over to the Defendant. D.E. 31 ¶¶9, 13, 15. 2. Buscemi asked the court for an extension of time to respond, citing health concerns that led him to spend most of September “seeking medical treatment for an ongoing and persistent condition that had increasingly impaired [his] ability to work.” D.E. 32 ¶2. 3. United States Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II granted Buscemi’s motion for an extension of time. D.E. 33. But Buscemi did not respond to the motion to compel. 4. In October 2019, the court entered a notice that it would hold a hearing on Wilmington Plastic Surgery’s Motion to Compel on November 7, 2019, at 10:30 a.m. in Wilmington, North Carolina. D.E. 34. 5. Buscemi did not appear in person at the November 7, 2019 hearing. The court reached

Buscemi by phone and Buscemi said he had written down the wrong time for the hearing. The court conducted the hearing telephonically. During this hearing, Buscemi disclosed to the court a medical condition that made it difficult for him to practice law and informed the court he was searching for other counsel to take England’s case. 6. On November 8, 2019, the court stayed the case deadlines and continued the hearing for two weeks to allow Buscemi to arrange for substitute counsel to appear. D.E. 36. The court ordered that: “Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit a letter from a medical provider that verifies his representations to the court about his medical condition and its general effects for in camera review.” Id. ¶3. The court required that Buscemi submit the letter before the November 22, 2019 hearing. Id.

7. Buscemi did not submit the letter required by the court’s November 8, 2019 Order before the November 22, 2019 hearing. When asked about this, Buscemi told the court he would submit the letter by the following Monday, November 25. He did not do so. 8. On November 27, 2019, the court entered an Order to Show Cause. D.E. 38. The court stated its serious concerns about Buscemi’s ability to effectively practice law and adequately represent his client. Id. at 4. It noted Buscemi’s failures to attend the November 7, 2019 hearing and comply with the November 8 Order. Id. The court also expressed concern about Buscemi’s candor to the court, because while suffering from a medical condition that hampered his ability to practice law Buscemi also ran for mayor, conducted interviews with media outlets, and posted on social media. Id. at 4–5. These concerns potentially implicated several of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 5. 9. In the Order to Show Cause, the court ordered: “Before the telephonic hearing currently

scheduled for 4:00 p.m. on December 6, 2019, Gregory A. Buscemi must file a memorandum showing cause for his failure to comply with the requirement in the November 8, 2019 Order that he submit documentation from a medical provider verifying his health claims. The submission must include the required documentation.” Id. at 6. The court reminded Buscemi that failure to comply “may lead to imposition of sanctions including, but not limited to, a certification of contempt, referral for disciplinary action under the court’s local rules, or referral to the North Carolina State Bar.” Id. 10. Shortly before 4:00 p.m. on December 6, Buscemi moved to continue the December 6 hearing and for an extension of time to respond to the show cause order. D.E. 39. That same day, Buscemi submitted a letter from his primary care doctor and multiple medical

documents by email to chambers. 11. The court granted Buscemi’s motion to continue and motion for extension of time and reset the telephonic hearing for the following Monday, December 9, 2019, at 4:30 p.m. D.E. 40. 12. Buscemi did not submit his memorandum in response to the court’s Order to Show Cause before the December 9, 2019 hearing. He also joined the December 9, 2019 hearing late. The court directed Buscemi to respond by noon on December 10. D.E. 41. 13. Buscemi responded to the court’s Order to Show Cause at 11:59 a.m. on December 10. D.E. 42. He explained to the court that he has a sleep disorder that has worsened in recent years and he is trying to obtain a new treatment, but the disorder is affecting his ability to manage his work. He acknowledged that his medical condition was “impair[ing] his ability to timely comply with Court orders[.]” Id. at 2. 14. On January 6, 2020, the court entered a series of orders. 15. First, the court entered an order regarding the appearance of a new attorney for England.

D.E. 46. Buscemi had repeatedly told the court that alternate counsel would be appearing in the case for England, but he had not appeared.

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Related

Cooke v. United States
267 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1925)
Nye v. United States
313 U.S. 33 (Supreme Court, 1941)
Bloom v. Illinois
391 U.S. 194 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Southern Railway Company v. Carl Talmadge Lanham
403 F.2d 119 (Fifth Circuit, 1969)

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England v. Wilmington Plastic Surgery, P.A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/england-v-wilmington-plastic-surgery-pa-nced-2020.