Eng v. Eng

Opinion

Eng v Eng

2026 NY Slip Op 04840

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Lily Eng, etc., et al., respondents,

v

Catherine Eng, et al., appellants.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2023-10547, (Index No. 717210/18)

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson, J.P.

Lillian Wan

Laurence L. Love

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Aidala, Bertuna & Kamins, P.C., New York, NY (John M. Leventhal and Diana Fabi Samson of counsel), for appellants.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine claims to real property, the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Phillip Hom, J.), dated October 2, 2023. The judgment, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiffs and the defendant Catherine Eng (hereinafter the siblings) are the children of Gene Eng and Cheung Eng, who owned certain real property located in Queens (hereinafter the subject property). In 2003, Gene and Cheung executed a deed to the subject property (hereinafter the 2003 deed) wherein they retained a life estate in the subject property and transferred the remainder to the siblings. Pursuant to the 2003 deed, Gene and Cheung retained a special power of appointment permitting them to change the remaindermen. In July 2017, Cheung died, and in September 2017, Gene executed a new deed (hereinafter the 2017 deed) which removed the plaintiffs as remaindermen and substituted therefor Catherine and the defendant Patrick Eng, one of Gene's nine grandchildren. In May 2018, Gene died. In November 2018, the plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine claims to the subject property seeking, among other things, a declaration that the 2017 deed is null and void. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, upon a finding that the defendants failed to establish that Gene had made a valid transfer to the defendants in 2017. The defendants orally moved pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, and the Supreme Court denied the motion. The court thereafter entered a judgment dated October 2, 2023, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The defendants appeal.

"A jury verdict [should not] be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence [unless] the evidence so preponderate[s] in favor of the [moving party] that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Pen v Wheels, Inc., 231 AD3d 848, 848 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thomas v New York City Tr. Auth., 242 AD3d 1246, 1247). "When a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view" (Thomas v New York City Tr. Auth., 242 AD3d at 1247 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ditoro v Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr., 202 AD3d 912, 913). "A court must not interfere with a jury's fact-finding process merely because it disagrees with its findings or would have evaluated the witnesses' credibility differently [*2]and reached a contrary determination" (Reilly v Ninia, 81 AD3d 913, 915; see Mujica v Nassau County Corr. Facility, 231 AD3d 1046, 1049; TJG Realty of Rockland, LLC v Con Serv Constr., Inc., 218 AD3d 713, 715).

"The elements necessary for a valid inter vivos gift are (1) intent of the donor to make an irrevocable present transfer of ownership; (2) physical or constructive delivery, sufficient to divest the donor of dominion and control over the property; and (3) acceptance of the gift by the donee" (Lurie v Lurie, 200 AD3d 669, 670; see Gruen v Gruen, 68 NY2d 48, 53; Chiaro v Chiaro, 213 AD2d 369, 370). "[T]he proponent of a gift has the burden of proving each of these elements by clear and convincing evidence" (Matter of Katz, 154 AD3d 687, 689 [internal quotation marks omitted]; cf. Matter of Voyiatgis, 110 AD3d 911, 912).

Here, based upon the evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that Gene made a valid transfer of the subject property to them (see Thomas v New York City Tr. Auth., 242 AD3d at 1247; Matter of Katz, 154 AD3d 687; Juliano v Juliano, 145 AD3d 983, 985; Hom v Hom, 101 AD3d 816). At trial, evidence was presented that Gene did not intend to make a transfer to the defendants, Catherine and Patrick, in 2017, but that Gene's intent was to transfer the subject real property to all of his grandchildren after his death (see Juliano v Juliano, 145 AD3d 983; Hom v Hom, 101 AD3d 816). Accordingly, the jury's verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence and the Supreme Court properly entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants (see Galeano v Giambrone, 218 AD3d 745, 748-749; Cetoute v Sidney, 167 AD3d 565, 566-567).

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WAN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court