Energy Savings Products, Inc. v. Milici

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Energy Savings Products, Inc. v. Milici

168 A.D.2d 415, 563 N.Y.S.2d 628, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15010

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 3, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 168 A.D.2d 415 (Energy Savings Products, Inc. v. Milici) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Energy Savings Products, Inc. v. Milici, 168 A.D.2d 415, 563 N.Y.S.2d 628, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15010 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

In an action to enforce a guarantee of a debt, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Di Noto, J.), dated May 24, 1989, which denied his motion to vacate a judgment of the same court, entered September 19, 1988, upon his default in answering.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion to vacate the judgment is granted, and the judgment is vacated.

In support of the defendant’s motion to vacate his default, sufficient facts were set forth to make out a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense (see, Tat Sang Kwong v Budge-Wood Laundry Serv., 97 AD2d 691). The defendant also established a reasonable excuse for his default and therefore it was error for the Supreme Court not to have granted the [416]*416defendant’s motion to vacate his default (see, CPLR 5015 [a]). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.

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In an action to enforce a guarantee of a debt, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Di Noto, J.), dated May 24, 1989, which denied his motion to vacate a judgment of the same court, entered September 19, 1988, upon his default in answering.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion to vacate the judgment is granted, and the judgment is vacated.

In support of the defendant’s motion to vacate his default, sufficient facts were set forth to make out a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense (see, Tat Sang Kwong v Budge-Wood Laundry Serv., 97 AD2d 691). The defendant also established a reasonable excuse for his default and therefore it was error for the Supreme Court not to have granted the [416]*416defendant’s motion to vacate his default (see, CPLR 5015 [a]). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

168 A.D.2d 415, 563 N.Y.S.2d 628, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15010, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/energy-savings-products-inc-v-milici-nyappdiv-1990.

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