This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0940
Enamidem Celestine Okon, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed December 5, 2016 Affirmed Muehlberg, Judge
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-12-6911
Enamidem Celestine Okon, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Muehlberg, Judge.
Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MUEHLBERG, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing he
was convicted twice of the same offense, and his constitutional rights were violated by the
exclusion of evidence at trial. Because appellant was not convicted twice, and his
constitutional challenge is Knaffla barred, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2012, a woman, C.M.J., reported that she had been sexually assaulted by
appellant Enamidem Celestine Okon and another man, Chukwudi Gregory Jideofor. Okon
was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Prior to trial, Okon moved to admit evidence of C.M.J.’s prior sexual conduct:
seminal fluid from five or more sources found on C.M.J.’s underwear. Okon and Jideofor
were excluded as potential sources of that semen. The district court allowed Okon to
present evidence that his DNA was not found on C.M.J.’s underwear, but precluded Okon
from introducing evidence as to the number of sources of semen. The district court based
its conclusion on applicable rape-shield laws, relevance, and the risk of unfair prejudice.
A jury found Okon guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced Okon on
count two. The warrant of commitment shows Okon was only convicted of count two, and
there was no adjudication on count one. But, at sentencing, the district court appeared to
agree with the prosecutor’s assertion that count one “should remain adjudicated.”
In October 2013, Okon appealed his conviction to this court arguing, in part, that
his right to confront C.M.J. was denied when the district court excluded evidence on the
2 number of sources of semen found on C.M.J.’s underwear. State v. Okon, No. A13-2018,
2014 WL 3800324, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2014), review denied (Minn. Oct. 14, 2014).
This court affirmed Okon’s conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
exclusion of the semen evidence. Id. at *3, 9. We acknowledged that Okon had presented
an argument based on his constitutional right to confront C.M.J., and we noted a “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as appropriate if any error implicated a constitutional
right, but we did not expressly address the constitutional component of Okon’s argument
in its analysis of the issue. Id. at *2-3. Instead, this court relied on Minnesota caselaw and
Minn. R. Evid. 403 to conclude that the evidence was properly excluded. Id.
In March 2016, Okon filed for postconviction relief in the district court. He raised
two arguments: First, he argued that count one should be vacated because allowing it to
stand would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; and second, he
argued that his constitutional rights were violated by the exclusion of DNA evidence.
In May 2016, the district court filed an order denying Okon’s request for
postconviction relief without a hearing. The district court found that proper procedures
had been followed in sentencing, and Okon’s claim regarding the exclusion of DNA
evidence was Knaffla barred. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Following a summary denial of a postconviction petition, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). Ultimately, a district court’s denial of
a postconviction petition will not be disturbed unless there was an abuse of discretion. Id.
3 I.
Okon argues that he was convicted twice of the same offense in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Okon’s argument has no merit
because he was subject to only one prosecution, and he received a single adjudication,
conviction, and sentence.
Contrary to Okon’s assertion that he was convicted twice, guilty verdicts do not
become convictions under Minnesota law until a conviction is recorded. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 5 (2014); State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002). Here, only
one conviction was recorded.
There is a specific procedure a district court should follow under circumstances like
the present, the district court should formally adjudicate and impose a sentence on only one
count. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984). Here, the district court
properly adhered to the procedure set forth in LaTourelle. See id.
Lastly, according to the sentencing transcript, in discussing how to sentence Okon
for count one, the prosecutor asserted it “should remain adjudicated but unsentenced,” and
the district court agreed. Arguably, this indicated an intent to adjudicate Okon on count
one. However, according to the warrant of commitment there was no adjudication on count
one. If there is a conflict between an orally pronounced sentence and a warrant of
commitment, the orally pronounced sentence controls. State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329,
331 (Minn. App. 2002). Here, there is no genuine conflict between the orally pronounced
sentence and the warrant of commitment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court never
formally or expressly entered an adjudication on count one, and the warrant of commitment
4 indicates that count one was not adjudicated. See Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573
(Minn. 2007) (noting that appellate courts may look to the judgment of conviction to
determine if an offense has been formally adjudicated). It appears that there was simply
some language imprecision at the sentencing hearing or in the transcript. According to the
transcript, the prosecutor asserted count one should “remain adjudicated,” which was an
impossibility, as count one had not been adjudicated and could not therefore remain
adjudicated.
In sum, Okon’s argument has no merit because he was subject to only one
prosecution and received a single adjudication, conviction, and sentence. See Ganpat v.
State, 746 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. 2008).
II.
Okon next argues that his constitutional-rights claim based upon the exclusion of
the semen evidence should not be Knaffla barred because the interests of justice require
that this court analyze the issue.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0940
Enamidem Celestine Okon, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed December 5, 2016 Affirmed Muehlberg, Judge
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-12-6911
Enamidem Celestine Okon, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Muehlberg, Judge.
Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MUEHLBERG, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing he
was convicted twice of the same offense, and his constitutional rights were violated by the
exclusion of evidence at trial. Because appellant was not convicted twice, and his
constitutional challenge is Knaffla barred, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2012, a woman, C.M.J., reported that she had been sexually assaulted by
appellant Enamidem Celestine Okon and another man, Chukwudi Gregory Jideofor. Okon
was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Prior to trial, Okon moved to admit evidence of C.M.J.’s prior sexual conduct:
seminal fluid from five or more sources found on C.M.J.’s underwear. Okon and Jideofor
were excluded as potential sources of that semen. The district court allowed Okon to
present evidence that his DNA was not found on C.M.J.’s underwear, but precluded Okon
from introducing evidence as to the number of sources of semen. The district court based
its conclusion on applicable rape-shield laws, relevance, and the risk of unfair prejudice.
A jury found Okon guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced Okon on
count two. The warrant of commitment shows Okon was only convicted of count two, and
there was no adjudication on count one. But, at sentencing, the district court appeared to
agree with the prosecutor’s assertion that count one “should remain adjudicated.”
In October 2013, Okon appealed his conviction to this court arguing, in part, that
his right to confront C.M.J. was denied when the district court excluded evidence on the
2 number of sources of semen found on C.M.J.’s underwear. State v. Okon, No. A13-2018,
2014 WL 3800324, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2014), review denied (Minn. Oct. 14, 2014).
This court affirmed Okon’s conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
exclusion of the semen evidence. Id. at *3, 9. We acknowledged that Okon had presented
an argument based on his constitutional right to confront C.M.J., and we noted a “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as appropriate if any error implicated a constitutional
right, but we did not expressly address the constitutional component of Okon’s argument
in its analysis of the issue. Id. at *2-3. Instead, this court relied on Minnesota caselaw and
Minn. R. Evid. 403 to conclude that the evidence was properly excluded. Id.
In March 2016, Okon filed for postconviction relief in the district court. He raised
two arguments: First, he argued that count one should be vacated because allowing it to
stand would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; and second, he
argued that his constitutional rights were violated by the exclusion of DNA evidence.
In May 2016, the district court filed an order denying Okon’s request for
postconviction relief without a hearing. The district court found that proper procedures
had been followed in sentencing, and Okon’s claim regarding the exclusion of DNA
evidence was Knaffla barred. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Following a summary denial of a postconviction petition, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). Ultimately, a district court’s denial of
a postconviction petition will not be disturbed unless there was an abuse of discretion. Id.
3 I.
Okon argues that he was convicted twice of the same offense in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Okon’s argument has no merit
because he was subject to only one prosecution, and he received a single adjudication,
conviction, and sentence.
Contrary to Okon’s assertion that he was convicted twice, guilty verdicts do not
become convictions under Minnesota law until a conviction is recorded. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 5 (2014); State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002). Here, only
one conviction was recorded.
There is a specific procedure a district court should follow under circumstances like
the present, the district court should formally adjudicate and impose a sentence on only one
count. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984). Here, the district court
properly adhered to the procedure set forth in LaTourelle. See id.
Lastly, according to the sentencing transcript, in discussing how to sentence Okon
for count one, the prosecutor asserted it “should remain adjudicated but unsentenced,” and
the district court agreed. Arguably, this indicated an intent to adjudicate Okon on count
one. However, according to the warrant of commitment there was no adjudication on count
one. If there is a conflict between an orally pronounced sentence and a warrant of
commitment, the orally pronounced sentence controls. State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329,
331 (Minn. App. 2002). Here, there is no genuine conflict between the orally pronounced
sentence and the warrant of commitment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court never
formally or expressly entered an adjudication on count one, and the warrant of commitment
4 indicates that count one was not adjudicated. See Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573
(Minn. 2007) (noting that appellate courts may look to the judgment of conviction to
determine if an offense has been formally adjudicated). It appears that there was simply
some language imprecision at the sentencing hearing or in the transcript. According to the
transcript, the prosecutor asserted count one should “remain adjudicated,” which was an
impossibility, as count one had not been adjudicated and could not therefore remain
adjudicated.
In sum, Okon’s argument has no merit because he was subject to only one
prosecution and received a single adjudication, conviction, and sentence. See Ganpat v.
State, 746 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. 2008).
II.
Okon next argues that his constitutional-rights claim based upon the exclusion of
the semen evidence should not be Knaffla barred because the interests of justice require
that this court analyze the issue. Because Okon’s constitutional claim was raised or could
have been raised on direct appeal, Okon’s claim is barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn.
246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
In his claim, Okon argues that he was denied the right of confrontation and the right
to due process because he was unable to introduce the semen evidence found on C.M.J.’s
underwear. He argues that the evidence was relevant because it rebutted the injury and
force or coercion components of the charged crimes, and it spoke to her credibility. Okon
also argues that exclusion of the evidence denied him an opportunity to meaningfully cross-
examine C.M.J. While Okon correctly points out that this exact constitutional issue was
5 not expressly analyzed by this court on direct appeal, this court did recognize the
constitutional component of Okon’s argument, concluding that Okon was challenging the
exclusion of the semen evidence as violating “[his] constitutional right to confront his
victim.” Okon, 2014 WL 3800324, at *1-3.
Once a direct appeal has been taken, all matters raised and all claims known but not
raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014); Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
Here, Okon’s right-to-confrontation argument was raised on direct appeal. Okon,
2014 WL 3800324, at *1. Okon also argues that his due-process rights were violated by
the exclusion of the semen evidence. But, this is simply a recharacterization of the previous
argument made on direct appeal that the semen evidence should not have been excluded,
and simply recharacterizing an argument will not permit the argument to escape the Knaffla
limitation. Black v. State, 560 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. 1997). Further, the entirety of Okon’s
present claim could have been raised on direct appeal as a factual basis to support the
present claims because the claim existed in the district court record at the time of direct
appeal. Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2006). Therefore, because
Okon’s claims were previously raised or could have been raised on direct appeal, the claims
are Knaffla barred. 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
There are two recognized exceptions to the Knaffla bar, and a claim should be
considered if (1) a novel issue has been raised or (2) the interests of justice require review.
Carridine v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Minn. 2015). A novel issues is “an issue so
novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct appeal.” Id.
6 (quotation omitted). Here, a novel issue has not been raised because a legal basis for the
present claims was available at the time of direct appeal. As such, Okon’s only available
Knaffla exception is the interests-of-justice exception.
To meet the requirements of the interests-of-justice exception, a claim must have
substantive merit and be made without deliberate or inexcusable delay. Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2013). Here, Okon’s claim has no merit. The constitutional right
to present a defense is limited by the defendant’s responsibility to comply with procedural
and evidentiary rules. State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn. 2003). We
already conducted a detailed analysis of the underlying evidentiary ruling, recognized the
constitutional component inherent in that ruling, and concluded that the semen evidence
was properly excluded because it was highly prejudicial and had little relevance. Okon,
2014 WL 3800324, at *2-4. In sum, Okon’s claim that his constitutional rights were
violated by the exclusion of evidence is Knaffla barred.
Affirmed.