Emroski v. Sakiri

2026 IL App (3d) 250176-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 28, 2026
• Docket: 3-25-0176
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250176-U

Order filed January 28, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

AMIT EMROSKI, EMRULLAI EMROSKI ) Appeal from the Circuit Court and MEGAN AUTO WORKS, INC., ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois, Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0176 v. ) Circuit No. 23-LA-1107 ) ) Honorable ZAIM SAKIRI and ALBA CONSTRUCTION, ) David E. Schwartz, INC., ) Judge, Presiding. ) Defendants-Appellees. ) ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hettel and Justice Anderson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not act improperly when it dismissed the instant action after a different judge had already denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.

¶2 Plaintiffs, Amit Emroski, Emrullai Emroski, and Megan Auto Works, Inc. (collectively

plaintiffs), filed a law division action in the Du Page County circuit court against defendants Zaim

Sakiri and Alba Construction, Inc. (Alba) alleging fraud and misrepresentation. At the time they

filed this action, another matter was pending in the chancery division in which Alba was attempting to enforce a mechanic’s lien against plaintiffs. The chancery court denied Sakiri’s motion to

dismiss the law division case under section 2-619(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code),

severed the two matters, and returned the instant matter to the law division. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(3)

(West 2024). A law division judge later granted Sakiri’s motion. Plaintiffs appeal this decision,

arguing that the motion to dismiss was no longer pending and that the court acted improperly by

entering an order contrary to the original order denying the motion. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Alba filed an action in the chancery division against plaintiffs to enforce a mechanic’s lien

for construction work performed on the Emroskis’ property. Later, plaintiffs filed a law division

claim against Alba and Sakiri as its president alleging fraud and other misrepresentations related

to the contract for the construction of the same building that was the subject of the mechanic’s lien

matter. Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint removing Alba as a party, leaving Sakiri as the

sole defendant.

¶5 Sakiri’s attorney, who was also Alba’s attorney in the chancery case, filed a motion to

dismiss or to consolidate the law division case with the chancery division case on January 31,

2024. It alleged that the matter should be dismissed pursuant to section 5/2-619(a)(3) of the Code

because the chancery matter was already pending. Id. The caption of the motion contained several

errors. It named the parties of the chancery division case instead of the law division case and used

the chancery division caption. However, it included the law division case number and was filed in

the law division case. Sakiri filed an identical motion in the same case on March 1, 2024. The

judge in the chancery division denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2024. The court also

severed the two cases and ordered the law division case assigned to another judge.

2 ¶6 The parties appeared in front of a different judge in the law division, and Sakiri erroneously

indicated that his motion to dismiss was never decided, though plaintiffs correctly argued that it

had. At a subsequent hearing on the motion, Sakiri argued that the chancery court had tried and

entered a final judgment in the chancery case and that res judicata required that dismissal enter.

The court granted Sakiri’s motion and dismissed the case. It noted that plaintiffs’ complaint alleged

breach of contract, fraud, and that Sakiri filed and sued upon an inflated lien. Each count was

directed at Sakiri individually and related to his behavior regarding the same building project that

was the subject of the chancery division case. It also noted that plaintiffs’ attempt to file these

same counts in the form of a counterclaim in the chancery division case was denied by that court.

¶7 Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider arguing that no motion had been pending before the

court and that the motion had been previously denied. The court denied the motion to reconsider.

While recognizing that the motion had indeed been previously denied, it explained that the claims

involved the same parties and cause as the chancery matter, which had already concluded via trial.

It found that the matter arose from the same cause and included the same parties because “[t]he

controversy in Amit Emroski versus Alba and Sakiri involves the same contract and parties at issue

in this matter before this Court, with the exception that defendant Alba’s president, Zaim Sakiri,

has been named personally as defendant.” Further, the court stated, “In the Court’s view, it’s the

same case that was already tried, and Judge Gibson has already ruled on the issues in the case and,

in fact, entered judgment on the case.” It therefore found res judicata required that it grant the

motion to dismiss.

¶8 Plaintiffs now appeal this decision.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

3 ¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the circuit court incorrectly granted Sakiri’s motion to

dismiss. Specifically, they contend the court could not rule on the motion because it had already

been denied by a different judge and another motion was not pending before it. Alternatively, they

assert that granting the motion would still be improper even if it had been pending as these actions

were not between the same parties and/or did not arise from the same cause. Their argument here

is twofold: first, they contend that the chancery case was no longer a pending matter for which

section 2-619(a)(3) would allow dismissal of this matter; second, they argue that the cause of action

and parties in the chancery division case were not the same.

¶ 11 Sakiri’s motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to section 2-619(a)(3)of the Code. Id. Section

2-619(a)(3) provides that:

“Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the

action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds. If the

grounds do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked the motion shall be

supported by affidavit:

***

(3) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same

cause.” Id.

Dismissals under this section are meant to be “a procedural device designed to avoid duplicative

litigation.” Whittmanhart, Inc. v. CA, Inc., 402 Ill. App. 3d 848, 852 (2010). Accordingly, relief is

not mandatory. Crain v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 3d 486, 495 (2000). We thus

consider a circuit court’s dismissal pursuant to this section for an abuse of discretion and will only

reverse if the ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. Taylor v. Huntley, 2020 IL App (3d) 180195,

¶ 11.

4 ¶ 12 Plaintiffs primarily argue that the court acted improperly when it ignored the ruling of the

chancery division. Plaintiffs contend first that the court could not dismiss the case when no motion

was pending before it, and second that the court could not act contrary to another judge’s decision

to deny the motion to dismiss.

¶ 13 Turning to the issue at hand, we are mindful that, between the two matters, multiple judges

have made several rulings. When situations such as this arise, the circuit court has the power to

modify or vacate an interlocutory order any time prior to final judgment. Rowe v. State Bank of

Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 213-14 (1988). “In a variety of contexts, *** an interlocutory order may

be reviewed, modified or vacated at any time before final judgment, and it is of no consequence

that the original order was entered by another circuit judge.” Balciunas v. Duff, 94 Ill. 2d 176, 185

(1983); Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 121 (1978); Shaw v. Dorris, 290 Ill. 196, 204

(1919) (“At any time before the entering of *** final judgment the whole record is before the court,

and an erroneous ruling theretofore made may be set aside and the error corrected.”).

¶ 14 “[A] judge acts within the bounds of his or her authority when reconsidering a prior ruling

in the same case by a different judge, so long as the record lacks evidence of bad faith or ‘judge

shopping’ by the movant seeking reconsideration.” Swain v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st)

122769, ¶ 10. There is no evidence here that Sakiri acted in bad faith. While Sakiri incorrectly

represented that the motion to dismiss was never decided, we note that confusion may have arisen

given that Sakiri’s motion included a caption for the incorrect case and both cases were heard on

the same day. We therefore find no bad faith. Nor do we find that Sakiri acted in a way that could

be considered judge shopping. The court sua sponte severed this matter from the chancery case

and reassigned it to a different judge. Given the lack of evidence of bad faith or “judge shopping,”

the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint was not procedurally improper.

5 ¶ 15 While plaintiffs argue that the court may not entertain a motion to dismiss that was not

pending before it, they offer no authority for their assertion that the court is restricted in such a

manner. Indeed, courts have the inherent power to amend and revise interlocutory orders at any

time before final judgment. Towns, 73 Ill. 2d at 120. This inherent power is “governed not by rule

or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own dockets so as to

achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Nicholson v. Chicago Bar Ass’n, 233

Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1045 (1992); Rhodes v. Mill Race Inn, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1028 (1984)

(finding that it was not improper for the circuit court to dismiss an action on its own motion when

a fundamental defect is present in the pleadings). Accordingly, we find plaintiffs’ argument that

there was no motion pending to allow the court to dismiss the matter unpersuasive.

¶ 16 Although defense counsel erred in advising the court that the motion to dismiss had not

been previously ruled upon and denied, plaintiffs had ample notice that the motion would be

reheard. The November 17, 2024, order setting the hearing on the motion to dismiss granted

plaintiffs until December 6, 2024, to file a sur-response. The December 5, 2024, letter from

plaintiffs’ counsel to the court attached as Exhibit “E” to plaintiffs’ February 4, 2025, motion for

reconsideration of the court’s January 15, 2025, order pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code

establishes that plaintiffs opted to not file a sur-response. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2024).

Lastly, we note the circuit court acknowledged at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration

that the motion had been previously ruled upon and denied. It nonetheless granted the motion,

finding that the final judgment entered in the chancery case served as res judicata to bar the law

division case. As noted below, it was free to do so. While this case does not present a paradigm of

procedural precision, any departures do not dictate a contrary result.

6 ¶ 17 Likewise, we are unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ contention that the court could not dismiss the

case because the chancery division case was no longer pending. While plaintiffs are correct that a

motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(3) of the Code requires that the second cause of

action is still pending, Sakiri raised, and the court considered, the theory of res judicata, provided

under section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code, to support dismissal. Res judicata requires a final judgment

on the merits between the same parties regarding the same cause of action. Piagentini v. Ford

Motor Co., 387 Ill. App. 3d 887, 890 (2009). It is clear that the chancery division case concluded

with a final judgment order following a trial. We therefore turn to plaintiffs’ final argument that

the two causes do not involve the same claims or parties to determine whether res judicata applies.

¶ 18 The chancery division matter revolved around a dispute between Alba and Amit Emroski

regarding a mechanic’s lien; whereas, in the present case, the parties involved were the Emroskis,

their business, and Sakiri individually regarding his personal conduct that was allegedly fraudulent

and created a breach of contract. Although not the same claims, the causes may be considered the

same if grounded in the same facts or transaction. We consider whether the causes of action “arise

from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.”

River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311 (1998). “[T]he crucial inquiry is

whether the relief requested is on substantially the same set of facts, not whether the legal theory,

issues, burden of proof or relief sought differ between the two actions.” Bank of Northern Illinois

v. Nugent, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14 (1991). The circuit court found that the dispute arose out of the

same transaction as the mechanic’s lien claim, with the only difference being that Sakiri had been

named individually instead of naming his company, Alba, as a party. We agree.

¶ 19 Alba’s chancery division case was an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien for the work

performed on plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint in this case raised the

7 following allegations against Sakiri: (1) fraud for overstating his lien claim on the construction

project, (2) slander of title for filing the lien against plaintiffs’ property, and (3) consumer fraud

related to the representations as to the integrity of the building. All three counts of plaintiffs’

complaint clearly arise from the same contract and group of operative facts as Alba’s chancery

complaint. Plaintiffs challenge the sufficiency of the lien and Sakiri’s actions in recording the lien

against their property. There is no way to separate the facts leading to Alba filing the mechanic’s

lien with the facts causing plaintiffs to accuse Sakiri of overstating the lien. Each cause of action

arises from the same set of facts, evidence, and witnesses.

¶ 20 Last, we consider plaintiffs’ contention that the same parties are not included in each

action. There is no requirement that the same set of parties must be involved for res judicata to

apply. Rather, instead of identity of the parties, this element focuses on the interests of the parties.

People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 296 (1992) (“It is the

identity of interest that controls in determining privity, not the nominal identity of the parties.”).

For res judicata purposes, the party in any subsequent matter must be in privity with a party in the

initial lawsuit. Agolf, LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 409 Ill. App. 3d 211, 220 (2011). Privity

exists when the parties “adequately represent the same legal interests.” Progressive Land

Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d at 296. A party may be bound by the prior lawsuit if the interests “are

so closely aligned to those of a party” in the prior lawsuit that the party is essentially represented

by the party of the first lawsuit. Purmal v. Robert N. Wadington and Associates, 354 Ill. App. 3d

715, 723 (2004).

¶ 21 Plaintiffs claim that because Alba is not a party to the instant case which names only

Sakiri in an individual capacity, the same parties are not involved and res judicata would not

apply. However, we fail to see how Sakiri’s interests, as the president of Alba, can be different

8 than Alba’s interests in the chancery division case. Both Sakiri and Alba desire the same result in

both lawsuits because they stand to experience the same gain or loss from each suit, regardless of

whether they are actually named as a party in it. Alba’s and Sakiri’s interests in protecting and

enforcing the lien on plaintiffs’ property are the same; therefore the plaintiffs’ interests herein

were adequately represented by Amit in the chancery matter. We thus conclude that the parties

are in privity, and all elements of res judicata are met.

¶ 22 Moreover, the first amended complaint is fraught with imperfections not subject to

correction. Count I asserts a claim of “constructive fraud” against Sakiri in that he, as a lien

claimant, filed an overstated mechanic’s lien in violation of sections 60/17(c) and (d) of the

Mechanic’s Lien Act. 770 ILCS 60/17(c), (d) (West 2024). Count II purports to make a claim for

slander of title in that Sakiri is alleged to have recorded the same allegedly inflated lien. The first

amended complaint attaches the same contract as that in the adjudicated chancery matter

between Amit as “owner” and Alba as “contractor.” Thus, Sakiri, although principal of Alba,

was not a lien claimant himself under the Act, and counts I and II fail to account for that

distinction.

¶ 23 In sum, the circuit court acted within its inherent authority to correct erroneous

interlocutory orders related to the case before it. Further, all elements of res judicata are satisfied.

Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s dismissal of this matter.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 26 Affirmed.