Empress Sterling Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury

79 P.R. 405
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 19, 1956
DocketNo. 11373
StatusPublished

This text of 79 P.R. 405 (Empress Sterling Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Empress Sterling Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 79 P.R. 405 (prsupreme 1956).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Snyder

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1951 and 1952 Empress Sterling Co. paid excise taxes totalling $4,302.12 on certain tableware, the containers therefor, and chinaware. The Secretary of the Treasury denied a petition for refund and the taxpayer filed suit in the Superior Court against the Secretary for the said refund. After a trial on the merits, the Superior Court entered a judgment ordering a refund of the taxes on the tableware and the containers, but dismissing the claim for refund of the taxes on the chinaware. Both parties appealed from the judgment to the extent that it was adverse to each-of them.

I

The question presented by the appeal of the taxpayer is whether the chinaware involved herein was an “article of jewelry” as defined in § 8 of the Internal Revenue Law, as amended by Act No. Ill, Laws of Puerto Rico, 1949, 13 L.P.R.A. § 968, and therefore subject to a 20 per cent excise tax.1

The Secretary asserts and the trial court held that the chinaware herein was taxable under § 8 on the ground that it was an article “. . . made of, ornamented with, embedded, set, covered or mounted with, or attached to, precious metals . . . ”.2 These plates were not made in whole or [407]*407in part of any precious metal such as gold. But the theory of the trial court was that they were ornamented with gold and therefore taxable under the above-quoted portion of § 8.

The plates in question have no gold as such embedded in them. In concluding that they were taxable under § 8 as articles of jewelry, the trial court relied principally on the fact that they have a design 1 ~y2 inches wide and 4 1,000,000 of an inch thick affixed to their border. (See footnote.) It is evident — from an examination of the two specimen plates introduced in evidence — that the said design was placed on the surface of the plates by a decalcomania process. The material used in this decorative design was gold paint. The latter — as the taxpayer concedes — undoubtedly contained a very small, unspecified amount of [408]*408gold.3 But we cannot agree that a decoration consisting of an extremely thin veneer of gold paint — which is admit-4 tedly only 1,000,000 of an inch thick and is not even a part of the plate as such — is enough to make the plates taxable within the meaning of § 8.

It is true that no specific amount of a precious metal as such need be included in an article in order to make it subject to taxation under § 8 as an “article of jewelry”. But we do not believe the Legislative Assembly intended to tax as jewelry a common household necessity such as the ordinary chinaware involved herein which was to be sold [409]*409at comparatively modest prices4 merely because it was decorated by an inexpensive and superficial process with a. 4 l-% inch border of gold paint 1,000,000 of an inch thick. We agree that decorations on plates do not make the latter any more utilitarian. But practically all ehinaware — even the cheapest kind — has some decorative feature to make it more attractive to a prospective purchaser. And a decoration of the type involved herein does not convert a plate into an article of jewelry, if it would not otherwise be reasonably considered as such under § 8. Here the decoration — a decalcomania of an extremely thin gold paint, which is not a precious metal as such — does not have thé effect of making the plate an “article of jewelry”.5

[410]*410The Secretary and the trial court relied in part on Regulation No. 58, dated August 3, 1945. This Regulation contains an illustrative list of articles taxable under § 8, including “Sets of dishes made of or ornamented with precious metals or imitations.” However, for reasons already indicated, we cannot hold that the chinaware involved in this case was ornamented with a precious metal as such.

We do not hold that some other chinaware — with gold as such or some other precious metal truly a part thereof or affixed thereto — would not be taxable under § 8. We hold only that these particular plates do not come within the category of “articles of jewelry” contemplated by the Legislative Assembly in § 8. The contrary view would go beyond permitting the tail to wag the dog; it would be permitting an imaginary tail to wag a very real dog, see footnote 5.

II

The Secretary appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court insofar as it held that certain tableware and the containers therefor were not taxable under § 8. The trial court found that the tableware in question was not made of a precious metal or an imitation thereof, but rather was made of an inferior metal which was silverplated for the purposes of conservation and use. The testimony shows that this tableware had “a nickel base” and was “covered with a bath of silver”.

We agree with the trial court that under the foregoing circumstances the tableware in question was not taxable under § 8. Here again the question is whether the articles are made of or ornamented with a precious metal or an imitation thereof. The tableware was not made of silver. The problem remains whether it was taxable because its [411]*411“nickel base” “was bathed with silver”. But, as the trial court pointed out, this was done not to ornament the product, but rather to conserve it and to make it safe and healthful to use.6 Under those circumstances, as the Federal cases passing on a similar question hold, the luxury tax imposed on articles of jewelry does not apply since the “bath of silver” is utilitarian rather than decorative. Marshall Field & Co. v. United States, 47 F. 2d 401 (Ct. Claims, 1931) ; [412]*412Warrin in China & Glass Co. v. Pedrick, 88 F. Supp. 128 7 See S.T. 935, Internal Revenue Cumulative Bulletin 1948-2, p. 192. This is in accord with the definition in § 8 of “imitation precious metals” as including “the gilding, silver plating, or platinizing of inferior metals with precious metals” and the final Proviso of § 8 that such an article shall not be considered an article of jewelry “unless it is, in the judgment of the Treasurer of Puerto Rico, a piece of jewelry ... or article essentially ornamental.” (Italics ours) .8 In addition, as in Part I, the comparatively modest price of this ordinary tableware 9 aids us in concluding that the Legislative Assembly did not intend in § 8 to tax this particular tableware as an article of jewelry.

Regulation No. 58 includes “Sets of tableware made of or ornamented with precious metals or imitations” in its illustrative list of articles subject to taxation under § 8. The regulation also defines “ornamented with precious metals” as including “embedded with precious metals”, “set with precious metals”, “covered with precious metals”, “mounted with precious metals”, “attached to precious metals”. But these definitions are merely a restatement of .the pertinent language found in § 8. They do not help us In deciding the specific question before us. We agree that other tableware sets containing substantial ornamental features would be taxable under § 8 and Regulation 58. But, for the reasons stated, the tableware herein does not [413]*413fall in that category.10

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Related

Marshall Field & Co. v. United States
47 F.2d 401 (Court of Claims, 1931)
Warrin China & Glass Co. v. Pedrick
88 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. New York, 1949)

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Bluebook (online)
79 P.R. 405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/empress-sterling-co-v-secretary-of-the-treasury-prsupreme-1956.