Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C. v. LegitScript LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedApril 11, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-00514
StatusUnknown

This text of Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C. v. LegitScript LLC (Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C. v. LegitScript LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C. v. LegitScript LLC, (D. Or. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EMPOWER CLINIC SERVICES, L.L.C., Case No. 3:25-cv-00514-AB Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER v.

LEGITSCRIPT L.L.C.,

Defendant.

BAGGIO, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C.’s motion to seal the unredacted version of its Complaint (“Mot.”, ECF 3). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion in part and DENYS it in part with leave to renew. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C. is a compounding pharmacy that serves patients with specialized pharmaceutical needs. Compl. (ECF 1) ¶ 1. Defendant LegitScript, L.L.C. is a “for-profit, privately managed verification and monitoring service for online and other pharmacies.” Id. ¶ 18. Empower alleges that LegitScript’s network of certified pharmacies is anticompetitive in a variety of ways, including because it has caused customers to boycott Empower because it is not certified by LegitScript. Id. ¶ 6. Empower alleges that it sells glucagon- like peptide 1 receptor agonists (“GLP-1”) medications at a lower cost than the pharmacies in LegitScript’s network, so LegitScript’s actions not only harm competition but also cause customers to pay higher prices. On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a redacted Complaint (“Compl.”, ECF 1) and a motion to seal the unredacted Complaint (Mot., ECF 3). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to redact portions of paragraphs 95, 99, 101, 108-111, 113, 203–204, Exhibits 9–12 attached to the Complaint, and paragraph 13 of Arta Shaun Noorian’s Declaration in support of

the Motion to Seal (“Noorian Decl.”, ECF 4). Mot. (ECF 3) at 1. Defendant has not yet appeared in this case. II. LEGAL STANDARD There is a presumption of public access to judicial records to keep federal courts accountable and to support the public’s “‘confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 1995)). Typically, a party moving to seal a judicial record “bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the ‘compelling reasons’ standard.” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). There is an exception to the presumption in favor of public access: “sealed materials attached to a

discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. The record Plaintiff seeks to redact here—the complaint—does not qualify for this exception because it is the “foundation of a lawsuit.” See, e.g., Align Tech., Inc. v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, No. 23- cv-00023-EMC, 2023 WL 1931849, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2023) (collecting cases). A trial court can find compelling reasons to seal a court record that “might be used ‘as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1978)). The “release [of] trade secrets” can also be a compelling reason to seal court records. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. To conclude a document should be sealed, a court must articulate “the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096-97. A trade secret for purposes of a motion to seal “‘may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.’” Apple Inc. v.

Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, cmt b.) (recognizing that “the Ninth Circuit has adopted the Restatement’s Definition of ‘trade secret’”). III. DISCUSSION A. Complaint Paragraphs 95, 99, 101 Plaintiff seeks to redact portions of paragraphs in the Complaint that contain direct quotes from email communications with unnamed customers, along with the dates of those communications. Plaintiff seems to acknowledge that these quotes do not qualify as trade secrets, and instead argues that disclosure will violate Plaintiff’s internal communication policies, harm customer goodwill, and lead to loss of business. Mot. (ECF 3) at 7-8. Plaintiff argues that these

“competitive harms” justify sealing. Id. The Court disagrees and finds compelling reasons do not exist to redact Paragraphs 95, 99, and 101 for three primary reasons. First, Plaintiff’s argument that disclosure of these anonymous quotations will lead to competitive harm relies on “hypothesis or conjecture” and does not supply the Court with any factual basis to conclude that there are compelling reasons to redact them. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096-97. Second, Plaintiff’s cases do not help them. Plaintiff relies on the out-of-circuit district court case Hilb Grp. of Maryland, LLC v. Smith, No. 4:23-cv- 01978, 2024 WL 2216851 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2024) to argue that loss of business justifies sealing, but that case discussed business loss as irreparable harm in the entirely different context of a temporary injunction. Mot. (ECF 3) at 7-8. Plaintiff’s other case— Golden Eye Media USA, Inc. v. Trolley Bags UK Ltd., No. 3:18-cv-02109-BEN-LL, 2021 WL 1821376 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2021)—also establishes that non-trade secret business information that could harm a litigant’s competitive standing is limited to non-public financial or business strategy information. Id. at *2

(collecting cases). Third, Plaintiff chose to draft its allegations in a way that apparently violates its own internal communications policy. See Mot. (ECF 3) at 7-8. Plaintiff’s internal policies are not a factor for the Court to consider here. Plaintiff presumably could have described the communications instead of using direct quotations and dates. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to seal with respect to Paragraphs 95, 99, and 101 but grants Plaintiff leave to renew its motion related to these paragraphs or to file an amended complaint that does not quote the relevant emails. B. Complaint Paragraphs 108-111, 113, 203–204, Exhibit 9, and Paragraph 13 of the Noorian Declaration Plaintiff seeks to partially redact these portions of the Complaint and the Noorian Declaration because they contain customer names, customer emails, Plaintiff’s proprietary pricing strategy, and how Plaintiff’s pricing compares to its competitors. The Court agrees that compelling reasons exist to redact this information because it is “business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101. The disclosure of customer names and Plaintiff’s pricing strategy for the extremely popular GLP-1 drug could give Plaintiff’s competitors an advantage in contract negotiations and in turn disadvantage Plaintiff

relative to its current position in the market. See Apple Inc., 727 F.3d at 1225. The Court GRANTS the Motion to seal with respect to Complaint Paragraphs 108-111, 113, 203-204, Exhibit 9, and Paragraph 13 of the Noorian Declaration. C. Exhibits 10–12 Plaintiff argues the information in Exhibits 9–12 should be redacted because these exhibits “include email addresses, telephone numbers, and names of individuals, which could be used to identify or contact these individuals.” Mot. (ECF 3) at 10. As to Exhibit 9, the Court has already

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
United States v. Amodeo
71 F.3d 1044 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
727 F.3d 1214 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC
809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Empower Clinic Services, L.L.C. v. LegitScript LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/empower-clinic-services-llc-v-legitscript-llc-ord-2025.