Employment Security Department v. Sahara Nevada Corp.

596 P.2d 504, 95 Nev. 505, 1979 Nev. LEXIS 484
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedJune 28, 1979
DocketNo. 10391; No. 10290
StatusPublished

This text of 596 P.2d 504 (Employment Security Department v. Sahara Nevada Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Employment Security Department v. Sahara Nevada Corp., 596 P.2d 504, 95 Nev. 505, 1979 Nev. LEXIS 484 (Neb. 1979).

Opinion

OPINION

Per Curiam:

Respondents commenced these consolidated actions on March 1, 1977 to recover excess unemployment compensation taxes assessed against them pursuant to Employment Security Regulation ESD-17 (Revised), which we declared invalid in Gibbens Co. v. Archie, 92 Nev. 234, 548 P.2d 1366 (1976). Although respondents were not parties to the prior action, the district court found their objections timely and entered judgment in their favor, against the Department. Before us, appellants contend that respondents’ failure to commence a district court action for judicial review within the prescription of NRS 233B.060(6)1 precludes respondents’ recovery. We disagree.

1. In Gibbens Co. v. Archie, supra, we held the Department’s admitted failure to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act in promulgating ESD-17 “renders the regulation invalid as to those employers who timely asserted their [507]*507objection.”- Id., at 236, 548 P.2d at 1367. Respondents satisfied the requirement of timely asserting their objections when they petitioned the Executive Director for a hearing and review of ESD-17. NRS 233B.060(6). When the hearing was denied, respondents paid the assessments under written protest.

Nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act requires that an objection take the form of a civil action. Compare, for example, Paul v. City of Manhattan, 511 P.2d 244 (Kan. 1973); State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Gober, 513 P.2d 391 (N.M. 1973). Had the legislature intended the imposition of a requirement that a civil action be brought within two years of the promulgation of the regulation in order to challenge its validity, it would have been a simple matter to use the term “action” in the statute rather than “objection.”

2. As respondents were employers who timely asserted their objections, the trial court properly held them entitled to a refund of the excess taxes collected. Peterson v. City of Reno, 84 Nev. 60, 436 P.2d 417 (1968); Lanigir v. Arden, 82 Nev. 28, 409 P.2d 891 (1966). Appellants do not attempt to reargue the validity of the regulation. Indeed, they concede its invalidity. Gibbens v. Archie, supra.

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lanigir v. Arden
409 P.2d 891 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1966)
Paul v. City of Manhattan
511 P.2d 244 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1973)
Peterson v. City of Reno
436 P.2d 417 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1968)
State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Gober
513 P.2d 391 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1973)
Gibbens Co., Inc. v. Archie
548 P.2d 1366 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
596 P.2d 504, 95 Nev. 505, 1979 Nev. LEXIS 484, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/employment-security-department-v-sahara-nevada-corp-nev-1979.