Empire Standard Life Insurance v. Anderson

182 F. Supp. 246, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 858, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4988
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 8, 1960
DocketCiv. A. No. 2626
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 182 F. Supp. 246 (Empire Standard Life Insurance v. Anderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Empire Standard Life Insurance v. Anderson, 182 F. Supp. 246, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 858, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4988 (E.D. Tex. 1960).

Opinion

SHEEHY, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, an insurance company, instituted this suit in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas, sometime prior to February 28, 1958, naming all the present defendants except the United States of America as defendants seeking to recover from such defendants a substantial amount alleged to be owing by such defendants to the plaintiff and requesting the appointment of a receiver to take over the properties of the defendants in order that said properties might be held intact to satisfy any judgment that the plaintiff might obtain against the defendants, or any of them. On or about December 2, 1958, plaintiff filed its First Amended Original Petition in the State Court naming as an additional defendant the United States of America, and in said First Amended Original Petition alleged that it had a lien on the properties of the defendants, other than the United States of America, to satisfy any judgment it might obtain against the defendants, other than the United States of America, and further alleged that the United States of America was claiming a tax lien on the properties of the defendants because of certain income taxes due and owing the United States by the defendants, Arlin Anderson and Underwriters Fund, and prayed that the lien of the plaintiff on the properties of the defendants, other than the United States of America, be declared prior and superior to the alleged liens of the United States. On December 16, 1958, the United States of America duly removed this case from the State Court to this Court and thereafter filed herein its answer and counterclaim as to the plaintiff and its cross-claim against each of its co-defendants. In its counterclaim and cross-claim the United States alleges and claims that the defendant, Arlin Anderson, is indebted to it for income taxes; that it has perfected a lien on all of the properties of Arlin Anderson to secure the payment of the income taxes due it by Arlin Anderson; that the defendant, Underwriters Fund, is indebted to it for a substantial sum for income and other taxes; and that it has duly perfected a lien on all the properties of Underwriters Fund to secure the payment of said taxes. The United States prays for judgment against Arlin Anderson and Underwriters Fund for the amount of the taxes owed the United States by said parties, respectively, and for a foreclosure of its liens on the prop-erites of Arlin Anderson and Underwriters Fund, Inc., and in this connection the Government alleges and contends that its said liens on the properties of Arlin Anderson and Underwriters Fund, Inc. are prior and superior to any lien or [248]*248liens that the plaintiff may have on the properties of Arlin Anderson and Underwriters Fund, Inc., or either of them.

While this case was still pending in the State Court and prior to the United States being made a party defendant, the plaintiff brought on for hearing its application for the appointment of a receiver to take over the properties of the defendants, other than the United States. On February 28, 1958, during a hearing in the State Court on plaintiff’s said application for the appointment of a receiver all parties hereto, with the exception of the United States, entered into a stipulation in writing which was filed among the papers of this cause in the State Court. Under the terms of said stipulation the defendants, other than the United States, assigned, conveyed and transferred to one J. 0. Daughtry as Trustee for the uses and purposes therein stipulated all property, real, personal or mixed owned by, belonging to or claimed by the defendants joining in said stipulation which is not exempt to the defendant, Arlin Anderson, from forced sale under the laws of the State of Texas. The uses and purposes hereto pertinent for which said property was assigned to Daughtry as Trustee are shown in Paragraph (3) of the stipulation which provides as follows:

“Such Trustee shall take into possession and custody and safely keep, preserve, maintain all of such property as a reasonably prudent business man might or could do and apply the same to the liquidation pro tanto of any final judgment as may be rendered in this suit and said Defendants do severally hereby give and grant an express lien on all of their several properties hereby conveyed to such Trustee to secure and pay off any judgment as may be rendered against the Defendants herein,' or either of them, it being agreed for the purposes hereof only that each and all of said corporate Defendants are the alter ego of the Defendant, Arlin Anderson, and such agreement shall not be admissible on the trial of the merits of this case; or elsewhere, save in support of the express lien herein granted. In this connection, it is agreed that if judgment should be entered in favor of Plaintiff herein for particular property in the possession of said Trustee he shall deliver such property to the Plaintiff in accordance with said judgment and that as to that judgment, if any, as may be so rendered in favor of Plaintiff for an amount of money the Trustee shall sell all of said property held by him at private sale for cash as may be found necessary to satisfy such money judgment. Such sale or sales shall be subject to approval of this Court after five (5) days’ notice given by said Trustee to the attorneys last of record herein for the respective parties hereto.”

Within two or three days after February 28, 1958, the said J. 0. Daughtry took possession, constructive or otherwise, of all of the properties of the defendants, other than the United States, except such property of Arlin Anderson as is exempt from forced sale under the laws of the State of Texas, and has had possession of said properties since that time.

The plaintiff asserted several causes of action against the defendants, other than the United States, alternatively. One of these causes of actions was on a note dated December 31,1956, in the principal amount of $165,364 which plaintiff alleges the defendant, Underwriters Fund, duly executed and delivered to it. At the trial the plaintiff, in effect, abandoned its causes of actions asserted in its complaint, other than its cause of action based on said note, and in open court so advised the court. Although the defendants, other than the United States, admit that on December 31, 1956, Underwriters Fund, acting through its President, Arlin Anderson, executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note in the principal amount of $165,364 they allege and contend that said note was without consideration. In [249]*249this connection, I find that on December 31, 1956, Underwriters Fund duly executed and delivered to the plaintiff a promissory note bearing that date in the principal amount of $165,364, which note was to be due on December 31, 1957, and was not to bear interest but said note did provide that in the event default was made in the payment of same at maturity, and it is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, or suit is brought on the same, the maker of the note was to pay an additional amount of ten per cent on the principal and interest then due as collection or attorney’s fees. I further find that at the time of the execution and delivery of said note Underwriters Fund was indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $165,364 and that such note was given by Underwriters Fund to plaintiff because of such indebtedness and as evidence thereof. Under this finding it is concluded that said note is supported by an adequate consideration, and it is, therefore, a valid binding obligation of Underwriters Fund.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
182 F. Supp. 246, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 858, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4988, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/empire-standard-life-insurance-v-anderson-txed-1960.