Emmons v. Petry

498 S.W.2d 38, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2510
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 26, 1973
DocketNo. 7424
StatusPublished

This text of 498 S.W.2d 38 (Emmons v. Petry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Emmons v. Petry, 498 S.W.2d 38, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

STEPHENSON, Justice.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained based upon allegations of medical malpractice. Judgment was rendered for defendants upon the jury findings. The parties will be referred to here as they were in the trial court or by name.

Plaintiffs, Frank Emmons and wife, brought this suit against defendants, Dr. James L. Petry, Park Place Hospital, Inc., [39]*39and its employee, a male nurse named Gus Gonzales. Dr. Walter W. Glass, Jr. (not a party to this suit) performed back surgery upon plaintiff Franklin Emmons on October 20, 1966. Certain complications connected with the urinary system set in and Dr. Glass called in defendant Petry, a urologist. It was the post surgical care by defendant Petry while plaintiff was in the defendant hospital that resulted in this suit being filed. According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the injuries were caused by the negligence of these defendants and by their treatment in a manner contrary to accepted practices and standards of the medical profession in the community. The specific allegations surrounded the catheterization of Emmons on October 26, 1966, resulting in urethritis and an injury to the erectile tissue of the dorsal end of the penis. Plaintiffs alleged that such injuries resulted in the permanent prevention of sexual intercourse and the passage of urine by a small artificial opening at the base of the penis.

The law is clear in this state that in order to recover damages from a doctor in a malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove that the medical treatment complained of constitutes negligence, was a proximate cause of the injuries, and, further, that proof of both must be made by expert evidence. Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1966); Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).

Plaintiffs’ primary complaint is concerning the method of submission of the case to the jury. The court’s charge contained forty-four special issues. However, the last forty-two special issues were to be answered only if there was an affirmative answer to either Special Issue No. 1 or No. 2. Those two special issues read as follows:

“SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the stricture sustained by Franklin Emmons was proximately caused by an unusual injury to his urethra on October 26, 1966, by the attempts to insert the foley catheter by Gus Gonzales?
“Answer ‘we do’ or ‘we do not’.”
“You are instructed that by the term ‘unusual injury to his urethra’ is meant an injury greater than that which would reasonably be expected as a result of the catheterization under the circumstances then and there existing.
“SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on October 26, 1966, Franklin Emmons suffered an injury to the erectile tissue on the dorsal or upper side of the penis by the attempt to insert the foley catheter by Gus Gonzales ?
“Answer ‘we do’ or ‘we do not’.”
“By the term ‘injury’ as used in the foregoing Special Issue, is meant injury to the erectile tissue of the penis by tearing through the urethra and blood accumulating in the adjacent erectile tissue and forming scar tissue, and it does not refer to the development of Peyronie’s disease.
“You are instructed that if you have answered either Special Issue No. 1 or Special Issue No. 2 ‘we do’, then you should answer the following Special Issues

The jury answered both of these issues in the negative and none of the other special issues were answered.

Plaintiffs’ specific complaints are: (1) This method of submission informed the jury of the effect of their answers. (2) This was not an unconditional submission of their theories of recovery. (3) This method of submission amounts to a general charge or global submission.

No objection was made in the trial court specifically complaining about the use of [40]*40the word “unusual” before the word “injury”. All of the medical witnesses agreed that any time a catheter is inserted, there is a certain amount of urethral damage.

This case is controlled by Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Pierce, 153 Tex. 527, 271 S.W.2d 422 (1954). The first special issue asked whether plaintiff’s injuries were directly and proximately caused in a certain manner and all of the negligence and proximate cause issues were conditioned upon an affirmative answer to the first issue. The jury answered the first issue in the negative and on appeal plaintiff complained about the method of submission. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and made these statements after illustrating the usual manner of submitting a negligence case:

“In this case, however, plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and proximate cause were inextricably tied in with his allegations of the manner in which the injury occurred.
“His pleading and testimony was to the effect that he sustained his injury while sitting at a distance of four or five feet from the lamp for a period of about five minutes. The testimony of his expert witnesses was that he could and probably did sustain his injury from use of the lamp in that manner. He had no pleading or testimony that his injury resulted from use of the lamp in any other manner.
“The simple, direct and controlling manner of submitting this case was followed by the trial judge and we cannot conclude that in adopting that method of submission he committed reversible error. The issue was submitted in language almost identical with that used by the plaintiff in his pleading.” Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Pierce, supra, 271 S.W.2d at 425, 426

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Related

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Pierce
271 S.W.2d 422 (Texas Supreme Court, 1954)
C. & R. TRANSPORT, INC. v. Campbell
406 S.W.2d 191 (Texas Supreme Court, 1966)
Hart v. Van Zandt
399 S.W.2d 791 (Texas Supreme Court, 1965)
Bowles v. Bourdon
219 S.W.2d 779 (Texas Supreme Court, 1949)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
498 S.W.2d 38, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2510, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emmons-v-petry-texapp-1973.