Emmett Lawrence v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 19, 2023
• Docket: 23A-CR-00006
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Jul 19 2023, 9:19 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Theodore E. Rokita Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General Nicole D. Wiggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Emmett Lawrence, July 19, 2023 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CR-6 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff Jose Salinas, Judge The Honorable John Christ, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D23-2110-CM-32404

Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judges Mathias and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-6 | July 19, 2023 Page 1 of 6 Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary [1] In 2021, Emmett Lawrence was charged with Class A misdemeanor carrying a

handgun without a license under Indiana Code section 35-47-2-1. On July 1,

2022, while Lawrence’s case was pending, the Indiana General Assembly

amended the statute to remove the license requirement. Lawrence was later

convicted. He now appeals, arguing the 2022 amendment to the statute is

remedial and therefore applies retroactively to him. We hold that the 2022

amendment to Section 35-47-2-1 is not remedial, as it did not cure a defect in

the statute but rather signaled a change in Indiana’s policy on carrying

handguns. Because the 2022 amendment to Section 35-47-2-1 is not remedial, it

does not apply retroactively to Lawrence. We therefore affirm his conviction.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On October 20, 2021, the police found a handgun in the console of Lawrence’s

car. Because Lawrence did not have a license to carry the gun, he was arrested

and charged with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license

under Section 35-47-2-1. At the time of Lawrence’s offense, the statute provided

that, subject to some exceptions, “a person shall not carry a handgun in any

vehicle or on or about the person’s body without being licensed under this

chapter to carry a handgun.” Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(a) (version effective until

June 30, 2022).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-6 | July 19, 2023 Page 2 of 6 [3] On July 1, 2022, while Lawrence’s case was pending, the General Assembly

amended Section 35-47-2-1 to remove the license requirement, effectively

eliminating the criminal offense of carrying a handgun without a license. See

P.L. 175-2002, § 8. The statute now contains permissive language and states

that “[a] person may carry a handgun without being licensed under this chapter

to carry a handgun . . . .” I.C. § 35-47-2-1(b) (emphasis added). The General

Assembly also added a new section, Indiana Code section 35-47-2-1.5, outlining

the new crime of “unlawful carrying of a handgun.” This statute makes it either

a Class A misdemeanor or a Level 5 felony for certain categories of people—

such as people convicted of a state or federal offense punishable by a term of

imprisonment exceeding one year, people convicted of domestic violence, and

juveniles—to knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun.

[4] A bench trial was held in December 2022, and the judge found Lawrence

guilty. The case immediately proceeded to sentencing. Defense counsel noted

that “the statute itself that [Lawrence] was just found guilty of is no longer law

in the State of Indiana” and asked the court to “take[] that into consideration”

when sentencing Lawrence. Tr. Vol. II p. 94. The judge sentenced Lawrence to

180 days, with 8 days executed (time served) and 172 days suspended to non-

reporting probation.

[5] Lawrence now appeals.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-6 | July 19, 2023 Page 3 of 6 Discussion and Decision [6] Lawrence admits that he carried a handgun without a license in October 2021

and that he would be guilty under the version of the statute in effect then. See

Appellant’s Br. p. 9. He argues, however, that the 2022 amendment to Section

35-47-2-1 applies retroactively to him and therefore we should reverse his

conviction. No appellate court has addressed whether the 2022 amendment

applies retroactively.

[7] Absent explicit language to the contrary, statutes generally do not apply

retroactively. N.G. v. State, 148 N.E.3d 971, 973 (Ind. 2020). But there is a well-

established exception for remedial statutes, that is, statutes intended to cure a

defect or mischief in a prior statute. Id.; State v. Pelley, 828 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ind.

2005). “Yet even when the legislature passes such a law, retroactivity is

permissive, not mandatory.” N.G., 148 N.E.3d at 973. We employ a two-step

analysis to determine whether an otherwise prospective statute applies

retroactively. “We first decide whether the relevant law is remedial. If so, we

then consider whether retroactive application would effectuate the statute’s

legislative purpose.” Id. at 974.

[8] Two cases from our Supreme Court help to illustrate when a statute is remedial.

In N.G., N.G. petitioned to expunge a felony conviction that had been reduced

to a misdemeanor. Id. at 972. The relevant statute required N.G. to wait five

years before seeking expungement. Id. However, the statute wasn’t clear on

when that waiting period began. Id. The trial court—believing the relevant five

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-6 | July 19, 2023 Page 4 of 6 years hadn’t elapsed—denied the petition. Id. While N.G.’s appeal was

pending, the legislature amended the statute “to alleviate the confusion and

made the change effective immediately.” Id. Under the updated version, N.G.’s

expungement petition would have been granted. Id. Our Supreme Court held

that the amendment was remedial because “it cured a mischief that existed in

the prior statute, namely, confusion on when the waiting period begins for

certain ex-offenders seeking expungement.” Id. at 975.

[9] In the second case, Martin v. State, the question was whether Martin could

receive credit for time served on home detention as a condition of his probation.

774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002). The relevant statutes were silent on the matter,

and there was a conflict of authority on the issue in this Court. Id. at 44-45.

While Martin’s appeal was pending, the legislature revised the statutes to

explicitly provide probationers with home-detention credit. Id. at 44. Our

Supreme Court held that the amendments were remedial:

In light of the General Assembly’s response, we conclude that the amendments are remedial in nature as they were intended to cure a defect that existed in prior statutes, namely: silence concerning whether a defendant was entitled to credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation.

Id. at 45.

[10] Here, Lawrence argues, without much analysis, that the 2022 amendment to

Section 35-47-2-1 is remedial. See Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We disagree. The

amendment was not intended to cure a defect in the statute. Before July 1,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-6 | July 19, 2023 Page 5 of 6 2022, Section 35-47-2-1 required a license to carry a handgun; the amendment

eliminated that requirement. Thus, the legislature reversed course on the license

requirement, signaling a major change in Indiana’s policy on handguns. The

amendment did not clear up any confusion in a statute, like in N.G., or address

silence in a statute, like in Martin. And Lawrence doesn’t cite a single case to

support his argument that the 2022 amendment is remedial. Because the 2022

amendment to Section 35-47-2-1 is not remedial, it does not apply retroactively

to Lawrence. We therefore affirm his conviction.

[11] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-6 | July 19, 2023 Page 6 of 6