Emmanuel Paul v. CMC

Opinion

) EMMANUEL PAUL, ) Case No. CV 20-2403-VAP (JEM) ) Plaintiff, ) ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER v. ) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH ) LEAVE TO AMEND CMC, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) On March 4, 2020, Emmanuel Paul (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On March 11, 2020, the case was ordered transferred to this Court. SCREENING STANDARDS In accordance with the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court must screen the Complaint to determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). This screening is governed by the following standards: A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory; or (2) the plaintiff has 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive dismissal, a plaintiff must provide “more than mere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (rejecting the traditional “no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to rise above the “speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or the merely possible or conceivable. Id. at 557, 570. Simply put, the complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the complaint presents enough facts “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard is not a probability requirement, but “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint that pleads facts that are merely consistent with liability stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. In a pro se civil rights case, the complaint must be construed liberally to afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Unless it is clear that the deficiencies in a complaint cannot be cured, pro se litigants are generally entitled to a notice of a complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to the dismissal of an action. Id. at 623. Only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment should the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id.; Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). After careful review and consideration of the Complaint under the relevant standards and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the Complaint must be Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and California Men’s Colony (“CMC”) as Defendants. (Complaint at 1, 2.)1 It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to assert an Eighth Amendment claim based on the unavailability of a therapeutic diet and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on the confiscation of his property when he was transferred to CMC-West in or about May 2019. (Id. at 3, 5.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 3.) I. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH FED. R. CIV. P. 8 The Complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted). To comply with Rule 8, a plaintiff should set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). Conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”; a pleading that “offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff's Complaint does not comply with the standards of Rule 8. His factual recitation is unclear and confusing. He fails to identify any individual defendants or how they were involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Thus, no individual defendant would be able to ascertain the nature and basis of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s failure to plainly and succinctly provide any defendant with fair notice of the bases for his claims violates Rule 8. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011); see also American Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] pro se litigant is not excused from knowing the most basic pleading requirements.”). Thus, the Complaint should be dismissed with leave to amend for failure to comply with Rule 8. II. CLAIMS AGAINST CDCR AND CMC ARE BARRED BY THE ELEVENTH Plaintiff names CDCR and CMC as Defendants. (Complaint at 1, 2.) Plaintiff”s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a State and its instrumentalities, unless the State consents to waive its sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). To overcome this Eleventh Amendment bar, the State's consent or Congress' intent must be "unequivocally expressed." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. While California has consented to be sued in its own courts pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, such consent does not constitute consent to suit in federal court. See BV Engineering v. Univ. of California, 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (holding that Art. III, § 5 of the California Constitution does not constitute a waiver of California's Eleventh Amendment immunity). Finally, Congress has not repealed state sovereign immunity against suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CMC is a prison facility operated by CDCR. Because CDCR is a state agency, it is at 100 ("This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought."); see also Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (the Eleventh Amendment bars claim for injunctive relief against Alabama and its Board of Corrections). If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should not name CDCR or CMC as defendants. Rather, he should name as defendants those individuals who were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.2d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (must show defendant was personally involved in constitutional deprivation or there is a sufficient causal connection between defendant’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation). Plaintiff appears to allege that the confiscation of his property upon his transfer to CMC-West violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Complaint at 2-5.) A negligent or intentional unauthorized deprivation of property under color of state law does not violate due process if state law affords a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit has held that California law provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for property deprivations caused by public officials. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17; see also Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895. Whether Plaintiff succeeds in redressing his alleged loss through the available state remedies is immaterial; it is the existence of those alternative remedies that bars him from pursuing a § 1983 procedural due process claim. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544 ("Although the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all the relief which may have been available if he could have proceeded under § 1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process."); accord Dennison v. Ryan, 552 F. App’x 414, 418 (9th Cir. 2013). It does not appear, therefore, that Plaintiff’s due process claim can succeed. See, e.g., Arellano v. Self, No. 15-02300, 2016 WL 4430923, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that prison officials deprived him of due process by charging trust account for certain debts because California provides adequate postdeprivation remedy); Magallon v. Ventura Cty. Sheriff's Dept., No. 11-07053, 2011 WL 4481288, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that jail officials deprived him of due process by failing to return property that was confiscated during booking because California law provides adequate postdeprivation remedy); Bettis v. Blackstone, No. 08-01561, 2009 WL 2971364, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009) (finding that plaintiff could not state cognizable claim based on prison's alleged failure to deposit money into trust account because California law provides adequate postdeprivation remedy). If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should consider not including a due process claim based on the deprivation of his property because it appears such a claim fails as a matter of law. IV. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM Plaintiff appears to allege that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was denied “a therapeutic diet for his kidney” when he was transferred to CMC-West. (Complaint at 3.) The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty on prison officials to "provide humane conditions of confinement." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Although it appears that Plaintiff may have been a pretrial detainee, and not a prisoner, and his rights with respect to the conditions of his confinement come "under the Fourteenth Amendment" and not the Eighth Amendment, his rights "are comparable to prisoners' rights under the Eighth . . . [as courts] apply the same standards." Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.1998). Like prisoners, pretrial detainees are guaranteed to receive "adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, and medical care." Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Minimal deviations minimis injuries" and do not "constitute a constitutional violations." See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). "The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. To properly plead "cruel and unusual" punishment, a prisoner or pretrial detainee must allege facts which demonstrate that he was confined under conditions posing a risk of "objectively, sufficiently serious" harm and that prison officials had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, there is both an objective and subjective component to the inquiry. Hallett v. Morgan, 296, F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). More specifically, in order to state a viable conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff first must plead facts sufficient to show that he was subjected to an objectively serious deprivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. The "routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting" is inadequate to satisfy the objective prong of the inquiry. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1999). Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate the prison official's subjective "culpable state of mind" by showing the official acted with "deliberate indifference" to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This requires the prisoner to allege facts demonstrating that the official displayed a subjective indifference "to a substantial risk of serious harm." Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. "Deliberate indifference" is evidenced only when "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. If an official "should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not [violated a party's Constitutional rights], no matter how severe the risk." Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir.2002). Plaintiff alleges that he was deliberately transferred to CMC-West, even though unnamed officials knew that Plaintiff was “on a therapeutic diet for his kidney which [CMC- West] [did] not provide.” (Complaint at 3.) Plaintiff acknowledges that he was transferred to These allegations are insufficient to plead an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating an objectively serious deprivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" or that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 834. Plaintiff may amend his pleadings in order to allege sufficient facts to establish an Eighth Amendment violation under the standards set forth above. ************* For the reasons set forth herein, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO If Plaintiff desires to pursue this action, he is ORDERED to file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, which remedies the deficiencies discussed above. If Plaintiff chooses to file a First Amended Complaint, it should: (1) bear the docket number assigned in this case; (2) be labeled "First Amended Complaint"; (3) be filled out exactly in accordance with the directions on the form; and (4) be complete in and of itself without reference to the previous complaints or any other pleading, attachment, or document. The Clerk is directed to provide Plaintiff with a blank Central District of California civil rights complaint form, which Plaintiff must fill out completely and resubmit. Plaintiff is advised to follow the directives set forth above. The First Amended Complaint must name and clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. These allegations should be within the body of the First Amended Complaint. The Court is not required to review exhibits to determine what Plaintiff's charging allegations are as to each named defendant. Plaintiff is admonished that, if he fails to file a First Amended Complaint by the deadline set herein, the Court may recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a Court order. DATED: July 13, 2020 /s/ John E. McDermott JOHN E. MCDERMOTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE