Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed December 3, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-0480 Lower Tribunal No. 19-22194-FC-04 ________________
Emmanuel Pacin, Petitioner,
vs.
Nicole Granja, Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marcia Del Rey, Judge.
John F. Schutz, P.L., and John F. Schutz (Palm Beach Gardens), for petitioner.
Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Hollywood), for respondent.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Denied. FERNANDEZ, and LINDSEY, JJ., concur.
2 Pacin v. Granja Case No. 3D25-0480
MILLER, J., dissenting.
I am compelled to respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of law causing irreparable harm by
denying the father’s motion to dissolve a since-satisfied lien imposed in
conjunction with an indirect civil contempt judgment. The net effect of the
denial is that the father has been denied his right to purge the contempt, and
therefore his homestead property is slated for a forced sale without any
accompanying right of redemption. Such effect does not withstand legal
scrutiny.
I
The parties are the unmarried parents of a child with various
disabilities. The trial court entered a final judgment of paternity awarding the
mother full timesharing and ordering the father to pay retroactive child
support, along with monthly child support and private school tuition. The
father failed to comply with his obligations, and the mother subsequently filed
a motion for indirect civil contempt.
The trial court adjudged the father in contempt and ordered him to pay
$160,391.72, an amount reflecting the retroactive support, delinquent
3 monthly support and tuition payments, accounting fees, attorney’s fees, and
costs. The trial court also alluded to other potential arrearages but did not
set forth any amount.
Citing a lack of cooperation, coupled with the present ability to pay and
the child’s unique challenges, the court found the father’s conduct egregious.
Consequently, the trial court imposed an equitable lien on the father’s
homestead property and ordered a forced sale to be conducted by a court-
appointed realtor to satisfy the arrearages.1 Sale proceeds were to remain
in escrow pending a determination as to allocation.
The father subsequently satisfied the only liquidated sum set forth in
the contempt judgment. Arguing his contempt was purged, he then moved
to dissolve the lien, discharge the realtor, and void the requirement he
escrow the proceeds. He further filed a notice indicating he had exercised
his right of redemption. The trial court denied relief, and this petition
followed.
1 This court summarily affirmed the contempt order in a per curiam decision. See Pacin v. Granja, 383 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).
4 II
A
“The common law writ of certiorari is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Univ.
of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 251 (Fla. 2023). To establish
entitlement to relief, a movant must demonstrate that the subject order
constitutes “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2)
resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be
corrected on post-judgment appeal.” Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d
789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The last two elements are jurisdictional.
Walgreen Co. v. Rubin, 229 So. 3d 418, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
Acknowledging that homestead protection is of a constitutional dimension
and “all land is considered unique” under Florida law, the instant order is
properly reviewable in certiorari. See Bermont Lakes, LLC v. Rooney, 980
So. 2d 580, 585–86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
B
In my view, the disposition of this petition turns on two separate, yet
intertwined principles of law. The first principle is that a purged contemnor
is “automatically” relieved of a civil contempt finding. See Sosa v. Portilla,
306 So. 3d 979, 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“The purpose of civil contempt is
to obtain compliance with a court order. For this reason, civil contempt
5 requires a purge provision, whereby the sanction stops as soon as the party
purges itself of contempt by complying with the order.”). The second is that,
absent a specific showing of reprehensibility or fraud, a court is without
authority to override constitutional homestead protections for the purpose of
satisfying a spousal or child support judgment. See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v.
Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1029–30 (Fla. 2001).
C
It is axiomatic that “[t]he key safeguard in civil contempt proceedings
is the ability of the contemnor to purge the contempt.” Lanza v. Lanza, 804
So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing Parisi v. Broward Cty., 769 So.
2d 359, 365 (Fla. 2000)). Consistent with this fundamental tenet, “[i]n family
law civil contempt proceedings, where a party has refused to pay court-
ordered support, the court must set a purge amount, and the contemnor must
have the present ability to pay that amount to purge the contempt.” Elliot v.
Bradshaw, 59 So. 3d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The purge provision
may not be amorphous; it must be clear and definite. See Crutchfield v.
Crutchfield, 345 So. 2d 831, 832–33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). After the purge
provision has been satisfied, the contemnor is “automatically relieved of the
contempt finding.” See Douglas v. Douglas, 485 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA
1986).
6 D
In rare cases, homestead property may be encumbered and sold to
satisfy family support arrearages. But this court cautioned in Robles v.
Robles, 860 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), that this is the exception rather
than the rule. See id. at 1015–16. “It is a constitutional given that homestead
property may not ordinarily be subjected to the imposition of a lien of this
kind.” Id. at 1015. That is because homestead property is generally exempt
from forced sale or judgment liens. See Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. A narrow
anomaly exists where the obligor “is shown to have been guilty of affirmative
fraudulent or reprehensible conduct which improperly interfered with the . . .
ability to recover the award.” Robles, 860 So. 2d at 1015.
E
Here, the trial court found the father in contempt and ordered him to
pay $160,391.72 in retroactive and past due support, tuition, costs, and
accounting and attorney’s fees. The court simultaneously deemed the
father’s conduct egregious due to his failure to provide support, despite
having the ability to do so. The court therefore imposed an equitable lien
and ordered a forced sale of the homestead “to satisfy the [f]ather’s support
obligations and other obligations as [specified in the contempt order].”
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed December 3, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-0480 Lower Tribunal No. 19-22194-FC-04 ________________
Emmanuel Pacin, Petitioner,
vs.
Nicole Granja, Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marcia Del Rey, Judge.
John F. Schutz, P.L., and John F. Schutz (Palm Beach Gardens), for petitioner.
Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Hollywood), for respondent.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Denied. FERNANDEZ, and LINDSEY, JJ., concur.
2 Pacin v. Granja Case No. 3D25-0480
MILLER, J., dissenting.
I am compelled to respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of law causing irreparable harm by
denying the father’s motion to dissolve a since-satisfied lien imposed in
conjunction with an indirect civil contempt judgment. The net effect of the
denial is that the father has been denied his right to purge the contempt, and
therefore his homestead property is slated for a forced sale without any
accompanying right of redemption. Such effect does not withstand legal
scrutiny.
I
The parties are the unmarried parents of a child with various
disabilities. The trial court entered a final judgment of paternity awarding the
mother full timesharing and ordering the father to pay retroactive child
support, along with monthly child support and private school tuition. The
father failed to comply with his obligations, and the mother subsequently filed
a motion for indirect civil contempt.
The trial court adjudged the father in contempt and ordered him to pay
$160,391.72, an amount reflecting the retroactive support, delinquent
3 monthly support and tuition payments, accounting fees, attorney’s fees, and
costs. The trial court also alluded to other potential arrearages but did not
set forth any amount.
Citing a lack of cooperation, coupled with the present ability to pay and
the child’s unique challenges, the court found the father’s conduct egregious.
Consequently, the trial court imposed an equitable lien on the father’s
homestead property and ordered a forced sale to be conducted by a court-
appointed realtor to satisfy the arrearages.1 Sale proceeds were to remain
in escrow pending a determination as to allocation.
The father subsequently satisfied the only liquidated sum set forth in
the contempt judgment. Arguing his contempt was purged, he then moved
to dissolve the lien, discharge the realtor, and void the requirement he
escrow the proceeds. He further filed a notice indicating he had exercised
his right of redemption. The trial court denied relief, and this petition
followed.
1 This court summarily affirmed the contempt order in a per curiam decision. See Pacin v. Granja, 383 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).
4 II
A
“The common law writ of certiorari is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Univ.
of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 251 (Fla. 2023). To establish
entitlement to relief, a movant must demonstrate that the subject order
constitutes “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2)
resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be
corrected on post-judgment appeal.” Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d
789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The last two elements are jurisdictional.
Walgreen Co. v. Rubin, 229 So. 3d 418, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
Acknowledging that homestead protection is of a constitutional dimension
and “all land is considered unique” under Florida law, the instant order is
properly reviewable in certiorari. See Bermont Lakes, LLC v. Rooney, 980
So. 2d 580, 585–86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
B
In my view, the disposition of this petition turns on two separate, yet
intertwined principles of law. The first principle is that a purged contemnor
is “automatically” relieved of a civil contempt finding. See Sosa v. Portilla,
306 So. 3d 979, 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“The purpose of civil contempt is
to obtain compliance with a court order. For this reason, civil contempt
5 requires a purge provision, whereby the sanction stops as soon as the party
purges itself of contempt by complying with the order.”). The second is that,
absent a specific showing of reprehensibility or fraud, a court is without
authority to override constitutional homestead protections for the purpose of
satisfying a spousal or child support judgment. See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v.
Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1029–30 (Fla. 2001).
C
It is axiomatic that “[t]he key safeguard in civil contempt proceedings
is the ability of the contemnor to purge the contempt.” Lanza v. Lanza, 804
So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing Parisi v. Broward Cty., 769 So.
2d 359, 365 (Fla. 2000)). Consistent with this fundamental tenet, “[i]n family
law civil contempt proceedings, where a party has refused to pay court-
ordered support, the court must set a purge amount, and the contemnor must
have the present ability to pay that amount to purge the contempt.” Elliot v.
Bradshaw, 59 So. 3d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The purge provision
may not be amorphous; it must be clear and definite. See Crutchfield v.
Crutchfield, 345 So. 2d 831, 832–33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). After the purge
provision has been satisfied, the contemnor is “automatically relieved of the
contempt finding.” See Douglas v. Douglas, 485 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA
1986).
6 D
In rare cases, homestead property may be encumbered and sold to
satisfy family support arrearages. But this court cautioned in Robles v.
Robles, 860 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), that this is the exception rather
than the rule. See id. at 1015–16. “It is a constitutional given that homestead
property may not ordinarily be subjected to the imposition of a lien of this
kind.” Id. at 1015. That is because homestead property is generally exempt
from forced sale or judgment liens. See Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. A narrow
anomaly exists where the obligor “is shown to have been guilty of affirmative
fraudulent or reprehensible conduct which improperly interfered with the . . .
ability to recover the award.” Robles, 860 So. 2d at 1015.
E
Here, the trial court found the father in contempt and ordered him to
pay $160,391.72 in retroactive and past due support, tuition, costs, and
accounting and attorney’s fees. The court simultaneously deemed the
father’s conduct egregious due to his failure to provide support, despite
having the ability to do so. The court therefore imposed an equitable lien
and ordered a forced sale of the homestead “to satisfy the [f]ather’s support
obligations and other obligations as [specified in the contempt order].”
7 The parties do not dispute that the father subsequently satisfied the
liquidated sum set forth in the contempt judgment and contemporaneously
asserted he was exercising his right of redemption. This purge automatically
relieved him of the contempt finding. See Douglas, 485 So. 2d at 19.
Consequently, the lien and future sale were no longer justified “to satisfy the
[f]ather’s support obligations and other obligations as [specified in the
contempt order].”
Moreover, the trial court’s finding as to egregiousness was historical,
as it addressed only the father’s ability to the amount set forth in the purge
provision of the contempt order. Because he satisfied that amount, no legal
basis supported a foreclosure, let alone a continued override of his
constitutional homestead protections.
The mother’s arguments concerning law of the case and unliquidated
and subsequent delinquencies do not compel any different conclusion. “The
law of the case doctrine is ‘limited to rulings on questions of law actually
presented and considered on a former appeal,’” and the father did not raise
purge or right of redemption as a factor in his appeal of the contempt order.
See Pritz v. Sch. Bd. of Hernando Cnty., 260 So. 3d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2018) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 106
(Fla. 2001)). Nor could he, as he had not yet satisfied the judgment. Finally,
8 the trial court has not yet determined what arrearages, if any, remain to be
satisfied or assessed the father’s present ability to pay. As there is no
authority for allowing the lien to operate as a security instrument to compel
future compliance, I must respectfully dissent.