Emma Cuadros Ortiz v. Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al.

D. Arizona

Emma Cuadros Ortiz v. Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al.

DecidedFebruary 9, 2026

Docket2:25-cv-02014

StatusUnknown

This text of Emma Cuadros Ortiz v. Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al. (Emma Cuadros Ortiz v. Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Emma Cuadros Ortiz v. Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al., (D. Ariz. 2026).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Emma Cuadros Ortiz, No. CV-25-02014-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation for entry of a protective order. 16 (Doc. 24). In the stipulation, the parties offer no cause for the need for a protective order. 17 (Id.). In the proposed protective order, they define what they will mark as confidential as: 18 “Confidential Material means non-public information, including but not limited to 19 personnel records, medical or psychiatric information, private customer data, proprietary 20 business information, trade secrets, or other information protected by statute or recognized 21 privacy interests, the disclosure of which would cause harm or invade legitimate privacy 22 interests.” (Doc 24-1 at 3). 23 Generally, global protective orders are not appropriate. See AGA Shareholders, LLC 24 v. CSK Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007). Federal Rule of Civil 25 Procedure 26(c) requires a party seeking a protective order to show good cause for issuance 26 of such an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule 26(c), ‘the 27 party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result 28 if no protective order is granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (quoting 1 Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002)). The party seeking 2 protection “must make a ‘particularized showing of good cause with respect to [each] 3 individual document.’” Id. (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 4 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). Thus, “[t]he burden is on the party requesting a 5 protective order to demonstrate that (1) the material in question is a trade secret or other 6 confidential information within the scope of Rule 26(c), and (2) disclosure would cause an 7 identifiable, significant harm.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 8 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). 9 A permissible subcategory of global protective orders is umbrella or blanket 10 protective orders. Blanket protective orders delay the requirement to show good cause with 11 respect to individual documents until the designation of that document as confidential is 12 challenged or when a party attempts to file it under seal. Rocky Mountain Bank v. Google, 13 Inc., 428 Fed. App’x 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (explaining that “where 14 [a] blanket protective order [is] issued, an actual showing of good cause must be made if 15 another seeks access to the document.”); Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 16 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006) (“we have held that … reliance on a blanket protective order is 17 unreasonable and is not a ‘compelling reason’ that rebuts the presumption of access” once 18 a document is filed in the record). 19 Here, the parties’ proposed protective order is so broad that it is an impermissible 20 global protective order. For example, it seeks to protect documents, “including but not 21 limited to”. This language does not advise the Court or the public of the scope of the 22 documents that will be marked as confidential. It further lists information that the Court 23 has no reason to believe will be at issue in this case like “private customer data” or 24 “personnel records” of third parties. Thus, the breadth of the proposed protective order 25 does not fall within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26’s limited protections and good 26 cause has not been shown to protect any categories of information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1), 27 (G) (the district court may, upon a showing of good cause, “issue an order to protect a party 28 or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” 1 || including by “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 2 || commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specific way.”). 3 As a result of the foregoing, 4 IT IS ORDERED that the stipulation for entry of a protective order (Doc. 24) is || denied without prejudice. 6 Dated this 9th day of February, 2026. 7 8 '

= James A. CO 10 Senior United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Emma Cuadros Ortiz, No. CV-25-02014-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation for entry of a protective order. 16 (Doc. 24). In the stipulation, the parties offer no cause for the need for a protective order. 17 (Id.). In the proposed protective order, they define what they will mark as confidential as: 18 “Confidential Material means non-public information, including but not limited to 19 personnel records, medical or psychiatric information, private customer data, proprietary 20 business information, trade secrets, or other information protected by statute or recognized 21 privacy interests, the disclosure of which would cause harm or invade legitimate privacy 22 interests.” (Doc 24-1 at 3). 23 Generally, global protective orders are not appropriate. See AGA Shareholders, LLC 24 v. CSK Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007). Federal Rule of Civil 25 Procedure 26(c) requires a party seeking a protective order to show good cause for issuance 26 of such an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule 26(c), ‘the 27 party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result 28 if no protective order is granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (quoting 1 Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002)). The party seeking 2 protection “must make a ‘particularized showing of good cause with respect to [each] 3 individual document.’” Id. (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 4 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). Thus, “[t]he burden is on the party requesting a 5 protective order to demonstrate that (1) the material in question is a trade secret or other 6 confidential information within the scope of Rule 26(c), and (2) disclosure would cause an 7 identifiable, significant harm.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 8 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). 9 A permissible subcategory of global protective orders is umbrella or blanket 10 protective orders. Blanket protective orders delay the requirement to show good cause with 11 respect to individual documents until the designation of that document as confidential is 12 challenged or when a party attempts to file it under seal. Rocky Mountain Bank v. Google, 13 Inc., 428 Fed. App’x 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (explaining that “where 14 [a] blanket protective order [is] issued, an actual showing of good cause must be made if 15 another seeks access to the document.”); Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 16 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006) (“we have held that … reliance on a blanket protective order is 17 unreasonable and is not a ‘compelling reason’ that rebuts the presumption of access” once 18 a document is filed in the record). 19 Here, the parties’ proposed protective order is so broad that it is an impermissible 20 global protective order. For example, it seeks to protect documents, “including but not 21 limited to”. This language does not advise the Court or the public of the scope of the 22 documents that will be marked as confidential. It further lists information that the Court 23 has no reason to believe will be at issue in this case like “private customer data” or 24 “personnel records” of third parties. Thus, the breadth of the proposed protective order 25 does not fall within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26’s limited protections and good 26 cause has not been shown to protect any categories of information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1), 27 (G) (the district court may, upon a showing of good cause, “issue an order to protect a party 28 or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” 1 || including by “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 2 || commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specific way.”). 3 As a result of the foregoing, 4 IT IS ORDERED that the stipulation for entry of a protective order (Doc. 24) is || denied without prejudice. 6 Dated this 9th day of February, 2026. 7 8 '

= James A. CO 10 Senior United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Debbie Foltz, Consumer Action United Policyholders Texas Watch, Intervenors, and Tierney Adamson Kevin Snead Daniel P. Johnson, Intervenors-Appellants. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation California Institute of Medical Research & Technology, Inc., a Foreign Corporation Dba Comprehensive Medical Review Ralph Householder Steven Becker v. April Jean Ho Jim Mathis, Plaintiffs-Intervenors. Debbie Foltz, and Tierney Adamson Kevin Snead Daniel P. Johnson, Intervenors-Appellants v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, and California Institute of Medical Research & Technology, Inc., a Foreign Corporation Dba Comprehensive Medical Review Ralph Householder Steven Becker v. April Jean Ho Jim Mathis, Plaintiffs-Intervenors. Debbie Foltz, April J. Ho Jim Mathis Tierney Adamson Kevin Snead Daniel P. Johnson, Intervenors, and Consumer Action United Policy-Holders Texas Watch, Intervenors-Appellants v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, and Steven Becker

331 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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