Emily A. Emerson v. Jake W. Laffan
This text of 2021 ME 53 (Emily A. Emerson v. Jake W. Laffan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2021 ME 53 Docket: Pen-21-65 Submitted On Briefs: September 22, 2021 Decided: November 2, 2021
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CONNORS, JJ.
EMILY A. EMERSON
v.
JAKE W. LAFFAN
STANFILL, C.J.
[¶1] Jake W. Laffan appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Bangor, Campbell, J.) allocating parental rights and responsibilities concerning
the parties’ child, who is now three years old. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)
(2021). The child has resided with his mother, Emily A. Emerson, since birth
and has had limited contact with his father. The judgment awards the parties
shared parental rights and responsibilities and allocates primary residence to
Emerson. Laffan has rights of contact every other weekend, starting with four
hours of supervised visits and gradually increasing to the full weekend. The
trial court also ordered Laffan to pay child support pursuant to Maine’s child
support guidelines. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006 (2021). 2
[¶2] Laffan asserts three grounds for appeal. First, he challenges the
District Court’s requirement that he bear the full burden of transportation for
visits with the child until July 1, 2022. Second, he appeals the failure to deviate
from the child support guidelines given his transportation costs. See 19-A
M.R.S. § 2007(3)(P) (2021). Finally, he challenges the failure to allocate any
child contact to him on the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays each year.
Because there is no competent evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s finding that it is unreasonable for Emerson to drive or otherwise share
in the transportation of the child until July 1, 2022, we vacate the judgment in
part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] The following facts are recited in the trial court judgment and
supported by the evidence. The parties are from Taunton, Massachusetts,
where they were in a relationship for approximately one year. Both have a
history of using cocaine, with Laffan’s use being more recent. Upon learning
she was pregnant with the child, Emerson decided that she wanted to change
her lifestyle and moved to the Bangor area, where she gave birth. When Laffan
found out Emerson was in labor, he and his parents drove to the hospital to try
to see the baby but were unable to do so. Laffan filed his complaint to 3
determine parental rights a few weeks after the baby was born. Throughout
the pendency of the proceedings, Emerson limited Laffan’s contact with the
child to a few hours at a time in the Bangor area. Laffan remains in Taunton
with his family.
[¶4] The trial court imposed a phased schedule of visits between Laffan
and the child to occur every other week. The first phase included six short,
supervised visits “in the greater Bangor area.” Phase two consisted of four
supervised, overnight visits in Maine. The third phase permitted overnight
visits from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at 3:00 p.m. and could be outside
Maine, though under the supervision of at least one of Laffan’s parents. If
everything proceeded in accordance with that schedule, the third phase would
have commenced around the first week of June 2021. After that, the
supervision requirement could be eliminated if Laffan submitted negative
results from two hair follicle tests taken two months apart.
[¶5] At the time of trial, Emerson was married and pregnant with twins.
The twins were due July 3, 2021, and Emerson expected to be on bed rest
toward the end of the pregnancy, making travel difficult for her. The trial court
found as follows:
By the time that Jake completes the six supervised visits, Emily will not be capable of traveling for extended distances. Given that she 4
is expecting twins, in addition to [her child with Jake], it is unreasonable to expect that Emily will be capable of driving extended distances for a year after the twins are born. Therefore, until July 1, 2022, Jake shall be solely responsible for the transportation of the minor child[] for contact.
The trial court ordered all exchanges of the child to be in the greater Bangor
area until July 1, 2022, unless the parties agree otherwise. Laffan lives
approximately four and one-half hours away from the Bangor area. He also
works a full-time job, often six days a week.
[¶6] At the same time, the trial court found that Laffan had been
diagnosed with a progressive genetic condition that affects some motor
function and may affect his ability to drive. In light of his condition, the court
prohibited Laffan from personally driving with the child until Laffan provided
written medical documentation authorizing him to do so. The court also
required Laffan to annually provide Emerson with updated documentation of
his ability to safely drive. Thus, Laffan’s parents may be required to accompany
him on each trip to the Bangor area not only to supervise the visits but also to
provide transportation. 5
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] On appeal, Laffan argues that the order “requiring him to provide all
transportation borders on discriminatory, [and] is simply not reasonable.” We
agree.
[¶8] “In assessing a determination of parental rights and responsibilities,
we review factual findings for clear error and the ultimate conclusion
concerning the child’s best interest and rights of contact for an abuse of
discretion.” Young v. Young, 2015 ME 89, ¶ 5, 120 A.3d 106 (alterations and
quotation marks omitted). Clear error arises when there is “no competent
evidence in the record to support” a factual finding. Violette v. Violette, 2015
ME 97, ¶ 15, 120 A.3d 667 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶9] In this case, there is record evidence to support the finding that
Emerson would “not be capable of traveling for extended distances” until the
expected birth of the twins on July 3, 2021. However, there is no evidence in
the record from which to presume that “it is unreasonable to expect Emily will
be capable of driving extended distances for a year after the twins are born.”
The allocation of sole responsibility for transportation to Laffan for a year after
the twins’ birth is particularly hard to justify based on the other supported
findings of the court. The trial court expressed doubt as to Laffan’s ability to 6
safely drive with the child. The court also found that Laffan “works long hours,
often six days a week.” In contrast, the court found that Emerson “does not
expect to go back to work after the twins are born.” In addition, Emerson
resides with her husband, who could potentially provide some care for the
twins or assist in driving. Finally, the trip from Taunton to Bangor is
approximately four and one-half hours each way, making it impractical, if not
impossible, for Laffan to visit the child overnight anywhere but in a hotel in the
Bangor area if Laffan must provide all transportation without missing work.
[¶10] In short, it was clear error to find that Emerson could not be
expected to drive for a year after giving birth, and it was an abuse of discretion
to allocate sole responsibility for all transportation to Laffan from the birth of
Emerson’s twins until July 1, 2022, based on that unsupported finding.
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2021 ME 53, 263 A.3d 160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emily-a-emerson-v-jake-w-laffan-me-2021.