Emilee Anne O'Brien v. James Joshua Young

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-0608
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0608 Filed December 17, 2025

EMILEE ANNE O’BRIEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMES JOSHUA YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,

Judge.

James Young appeals the district court’s issuance of a protective order

against him pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2024). APPEAL DISMISSED.

Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Pleasant Hill, for appellant.

Emilee O’Brien, self-represented appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Ahlers, J., and

Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

AHLERS, Judge.

Emilee O’Brien filed this action against James Young seeking a domestic

abuse protective order under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2024). Following a hearing,

the district court issued the requested protective order. Young appeals. He

contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s decision to issue the

order.

Before we can address the merits of Young’s contention, we must first

decide whether this appeal is moot due to expiration of the protective order. By its

terms, that order expired March 14, 2025. An issue becomes moot if it no longer

involves a controversy subject to judicial determination because “the issues

involved are academic or nonexistent.” Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d

686, 705 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). If our opinion would not “have any practical

legal effect upon an existing controversy,” the issue is moot. Grinnell Coll. v.

Osborn, 751 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa 2008) (citation omitted).

Due to the apparent expiration of the order being challenged, we asked the

parties for supplemental briefing on the question of mootness. Both parties filed

supplemental briefs. Young’s brief argued that two exceptions to the mootness

doctrine—the collateral-consequences exception and the public-importance

exception—should be applied to avoid dismissal on mootness grounds. We

address each in turn.

An exception to the mootness doctrine “provides that an appeal is not moot

if a judgment left standing will cause the appellant to suffer continuing adverse

collateral consequences.” In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 2013). Young

contends this exception applies because the expired order “will continue to affect 3

his personal and professional relationships and his mental and emotional health.”

He also points to the fact that he was assessed court costs as a collateral

consequence.

As to Young’s claim that his relationships and health are adversely affected,

he provides no specifics. And we will not speculate as to such consequences.

See State v. Johnson, No. 16-0976, 2017 WL 2684342, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App.

June 21, 2017) (declining to apply the collateral-consequences exception when

the claimed consequences are “pure conjecture” or “too attenuated and

speculative”).1 Vague claims of harm to relationships or health do not persuade

us to apply the exception. As to the claim of collateral consequences by being

assessed court costs, courts do not “render decisions merely for the purpose of

determining liability for costs.” State ex rel. Turner v. Buechele, 236 N.W.2d 322,

325 (Iowa 1975). So, we decline to apply the collateral-consequences exception

to the mootness doctrine here.

Young also seeks to invoke the public-importance exception to mootness.

Riley Drive Ent. I, Inc. v. Reynolds, 970 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 2022). We

consider four factors to determine whether to apply this exception: “(1) the private

or public nature of the issue; (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication to

guide public officials in their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the recurrence of

the issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will recur yet evade appellate review.”

1 We recognize that our supreme court has applied the collateral-consequences

exception by presuming adverse collateral consequences in an appeal from a mental-health commitment order. See B.B., 826 N.W.2d at 431. But neither the supreme court nor our court has presumed such adverse collateral consequences in the context of chapter 236 protective orders, so we do not make such a presumption here. 4

Id. (citation omitted). The dispute here is of a private nature and ruling on the

merits will provide little if any guidance to public officials, so the first two factors

weigh against applying the exception. Given the fact-specific nature of the

challenge here, there is little to no likelihood of recurrence of the issue, so the third

factor also weighs against applying the exception. As to the fourth factor, the

length of time to process an appeal poses a risk that appeals in this type of case

may evade review. But, as our court has recognized, this risk can be reduced or

avoided by requesting expedited briefing. T.F. v. C.G., No. 23-1761, 2025 WL

412059, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025). No such efforts to reduce or avoid this

risk were made here. After weighing the four factors, we decline to apply the

public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine.

As the order being challenged here has expired and no exceptions to the

mootness doctrine apply, we dismiss Young’s appeal as moot.

APPEAL DISMISSED.