EMI Progressive Equities, Inc. v. Figueroa

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

EMI Progressive Equities, Inc. v. Figueroa

33 A.D.3d 397, 821 N.Y.S.2d 760

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 10, 2006

StatusPublished

This text of 33 A.D.3d 397 (EMI Progressive Equities, Inc. v. Figueroa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

EMI Progressive Equities, Inc. v. Figueroa, 33 A.D.3d 397, 821 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes, J.), entered July 11, 2005, which, in an action for specific performance, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

An issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff buyer could, after September 1, 2004, reasonably rely on the express authority to agree to a closing date conferred on defendant seller’s attorney in the contract of sale, or otherwise reasonably believe that the seller’s attorney continued to have such authority (see Ford v Unity Hosp., 32 NY2d 464, 472-473 [1973]). Such issue is raised by the seller’s letter dated September 1, 2004 addressed and hand-delivered to his attorney and, for present purposes, admittedly received by the buyer’s attorney on September 1. Concur—Andrias, J.E, Nardelli, Gonzalez, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes, J.), entered July 11, 2005, which, in an action for specific performance, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

An issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff buyer could, after September 1, 2004, reasonably rely on the express authority to agree to a closing date conferred on defendant seller’s attorney in the contract of sale, or otherwise reasonably believe that the seller’s attorney continued to have such authority (see Ford v Unity Hosp., 32 NY2d 464, 472-473 [1973]). Such issue is raised by the seller’s letter dated September 1, 2004 addressed and hand-delivered to his attorney and, for present purposes, admittedly received by the buyer’s attorney on September 1. Concur—Andrias, J.E, Nardelli, Gonzalez, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

33 A.D.3d 397, 821 N.Y.S.2d 760, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emi-progressive-equities-inc-v-figueroa-nyappdiv-2006.

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