Emi Ltd. v. Picker International, Inc.

565 F. Supp. 905, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 14, 1983
Docket83 Civ. 0759
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 565 F. Supp. 905 (Emi Ltd. v. Picker International, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Emi Ltd. v. Picker International, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 905, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

Opinion

*906 OPINION

EDWARD WEINFELD, District Judge.

This litigation involves a new kind of x-ray technology. It centers about patents for computerized or computer-aided tomographic scanning, a medical diagnostic device incorporating the technology generally known as “CT” or “CAT” scanners. Generally speaking, a CT scanner takes detailed cross-sectional pictures of a person’s anatomy, bones and tissue by making thousands of individual x-ray measurements that are electronically unscrambled into a single view. It is the latest modern x-ray technology for diagnostic purposes to locate cancers, to analyze various organs and to observe items of the human body never previously seen without exploratory surgery. The installed units cost approximately one million dollars each.

The plaintiff, EMI Limited (“EMI”), is the owner of five patents for CT scanners and their improvements by assignment from the inventors. The defendant, Picker International, Inc. (“Picker”) for many years has been a major manufacturer and distributor of x-ray machines. EMI commenced this action against Picker upon allegations that Picker’s sale and distribution of its models of CT scanners (“Picker scanners”) infringe upon claims in EMI’s patents. Essentially, Picker challenges the validity of the patents; denies infringement and asserts a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the patents are invalid and unenforceable.

Picker moves for an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 1404(a), transferring this action to the Northern District of Ohio, within which district, at Highland Heights, Ohio, it has since the late 1960’s maintained its corporate headquarters and manufacturing facilities. The plaintiff opposes the motion to transfer. Thus, the burden of proof is on Picker as the movant “to make a clear showing that the proposed transferee district is a more convenient one, and that the interests of justice would be better served by a trial there.” 1

Both parties have submitted extensive affidavits directed to the relevant criteria in passing upon a section 1404(a) motion as specified by this Court in Schneider v. Sears. 2 Upon analysis of their respective positions as to each of those items, the Court is persuaded that the disposition of this motion is narrowed to and in large measure turns upon the availability of process to compel attendance upon the trial of third-party unwilling witnesses whose testimony is material to prime issues and the interests of justice. As to the other criteria, neither litigant’s claims markedly preponderate in its favor against the other.

Defendant’s challenge to the validity of the patents, based upon the standards set forth in 35 U.S.C., sections 102,103 and 112 and in Graham v. John Deere, 3 gives direction to the nature of the principal issues to be determined by the fact finder, which, among others, as stated in Deere include:

the scope and content of the prior art ...; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue ...; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.... Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy. 4

The CT manufacturing industry is a decade old. EMI, a corporation organized under the laws of England, started production of the Ct scanners in the United States, in Chicago, Illinois, and made delivery of its *907 first orders in 1973. Several years ago it discontinued making the machines and closed its Chicago plant. It licenses others to manufacture under the patents; in all, there are approximately ten licensees in the United States, including General Electric Company, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer, Inc. The latter three, in contested litigation, challenged the validity of plaintiff’s patents; however, those separate litigations which extended over a two-year period were settled before trial in return for licenses issued by EMI to the contestants.

The parties appear to be in agreement that the instant litigation will turn on the testimony of witnesses’ knowledgeability of the scanner, its novelty, the prior art and other pertinent factors under Deere. Since such testimony is of critical importance, “[t]he demeanor of witnesses before the trier of the fact, with an opportunity to appraise credibility, may well make the difference between acceptance and rejection of crucial testimony.” 5

EMI claims that it is more important that the case be kept here than it is for Picker to have it transferred to Cleveland since it must rely to a much greater extent on material and unwilling third-party witnesses who are within the subpoena power of this Court but not of the Cleveland court; 6 that a transfer of the case means that the testimony of such witnesses can be presented only through deposition. This testimony, required for EMI’s case, relates to the nature of the patented technology, its scientific, medical and commercial significance, the alleged use made of this technology in Picker scanners, the use of the technology in the patented machines previously manufactured by EMI, and in the machines now manufactured by EMI’s licensees. Further, EMI asserts that in view of Picker’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity, its rebuttal case perforce will require testimony from persons who were in the relevant technology at the time the patented inventions were made as to the asserted prior art and skill, the commercial success of the patented technology, the long felt but unsolved need for the technology, past failures to satisfy the need, unusual surprising results from the patented machine, the recognition by the industry at large of the patents in suit.

As to some of the foregoing required trial evidence EMI encounters no problem. The two inventors of the scanners, who live in England, as well as other key witnesses, are in its employ. Also it concedes the availability of experts affiliated with academic institutions. These witnesses are at the call of EMI whether the case is transferred to Cleveland or remains in this district. However, the rub is as to the witnesses whose testimony also is essential on the foregoing issues. EMI swears that to sustain its claim and to resist the counterclaim, it must rely upon other witnesses not under its control, principally officials and employees of licensees in the industry.

Thus we turn to a consideration of the specific potential third-party witnesses of each side about whom this issue centers. Because of its withdrawal from the manufacture of CT scanners in the United States, EMI has reduced its relevant personnel in this country from several hundred to a limited few.

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Bluebook (online)
565 F. Supp. 905, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emi-ltd-v-picker-international-inc-nysd-1983.