Emelia Guijon Hernandez v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-2508
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 24-2508 _______________

EMELIA GUIJON HERNANDEZ, Petitioner v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A201-876-606) Immigration Judge: Joseph C. Scott _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on April 29, 2025

Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges (Filed: May 2, 2025) _______________

OPINION* _______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

Emelia Guijon Hernandez, a Mexican citizen, came to the United States illegally more

than a quarter century ago and stayed. She and her husband have two children, both United

States citizens: Cindi and Luis Lopez. Cindi is married and has a child, V, a daughter.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. Hernandez and Luis both help care for V because Cindi suffers from anxiety and depres-

sion. Luis has no mental health problems and graduated from high school with straight A’s.

Six years ago, immigration agents started removal proceedings against Hernandez. Dur-

ing those proceedings, Cindi was 24 and Luis was 18. Hernandez admitted that she was

removable but sought cancellation of removal, claiming that deporting her would cause

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to Luis, her qualifying U.S.-citizen relative.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); § 1101(b)(1) (qualifying children must be under 21). She argued

that, if she were removed, Luis would bear a heavier burden taking care of Cindi and V.

The immigration judge disagreed. As he explained, it was “objectively not reasonable

to infer an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship given the significant sources of

support present in their home, as well as additional familial support in the form of

aunts/family members who live in the same town.” AR 58. So he denied Hernandez’s appli-

cation and ordered her deported to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed

without opinion. This petition followed, challenging both the immigration judge’s factual

findings and how he applied the law to those facts.

We start with the factual challenges. Hernandez contests the immigration judge’s find-

ings that:

• Cindi’s husband could change his work schedule to provide additional care for

Cindi and V;

• Cindi’s condition was not “severe, or certainly [not] severe enough to merit her

need to have Luis provide for her or V,” AR 59 (cleaned up);

2 • Luis’s delay in attending college does not show that Cindi’s condition is severe

because he only recently graduated high school;

• V’s past developmental delays in walking do not suggest significant ongoing

medical needs; and

• Extended family members are available to provide support to Cindi and V.

We cannot reach the merits of any of these factual disputes. Because we lack jurisdic-

tion to review the immigration judge’s “underlying factual determination[s],” we must dis-

miss all these challenges. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

Hernandez’s one remaining challenge fails on the merits. She argues that “the Court

acknowledged … the testimony of Luis that he helped his sister with her schoolwork.…

However, the Court negates these facts from the totality of circumstances.” Pet’r’s Br. 24.

This seems to be an argument not about underlying factual findings but about how to weigh

them. We review the immigration judge’s application of the exceptional-or-extremely-un-

usual-hardship standard to “found facts” for substantial evidence. Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at

222; Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2025). Substantial evidence

means that we defer “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary.” Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

A reasonable adjudicator could, indeed would, weigh the facts and reach the same con-

clusion that the immigration judge did. Luis is self-sufficient. And the additional burden of

helping Cindi need not fall solely on him. Cindi is married, has a babysitter’s help, and is

3 herself competent enough to have finished high school and college. Losing Hernandez

would be a terrible sorrow to Luis but not an exceptional hardship.

We will thus dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.