Elzie Hasket, Jr. v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 16, 2004
• Docket: 06-03-00120-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-03-00120-CR

ELZIE HASKETT, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 4th Judicial District Court

Rusk County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR98-188

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            The trial court adjudicated Elzie Haskett, Jr., guilty and sentenced him to eight years' confinement. Haskett appeals the trial court's sentence. He presents two issues to this Court: (1) the trial court erred by failing to conduct a separate punishment hearing, and (2) his eight-year sentence is excessive and disproportionate to the offense for which he was convicted. We overrule both points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

            On June 30, 1999, Haskett waived a jury trial and pled nolo contendere to possessing cocaine in an amount greater than one gram but less than four grams, as charged in the indictment. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(c) (Vernon 2003). The trial court found the evidence substantiated Haskett's guilt, but it deferred a finding of guilt and placed Haskett on community supervision for a period of four years.

            In 2000, the State moved to adjudicate Haskett's guilt. After hearing evidence and argument, the trial court found Haskett had committed a new criminal offense (driving while intoxicated) and had violated the terms of his community supervision in several other ways. Nonetheless, the trial court overruled the State's motion to adjudicate guilt and continued Haskett's community supervision.

            In January 2003, the State filed a second motion to adjudicate Haskett's guilt. The trial court heard evidence and arguments on the State's motion at a March 20 hearing, after which the trial court found Haskett had violated the terms of his deferred supervision, adjudicated his guilt, and sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment.

Separate Punishment Hearing

            In his first appellate issue, Haskett contends the trial court erred by failing to conduct a separate punishment hearing following its decision to adjudicate his guilt. An appellant has a statutory right to a separate punishment hearing, but that right may be waived. Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). An appellant's failure to object to the lack of a separate punishment hearing waives the error, if any, for review by the appellate court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 885–86.

            Haskett neither objected to the trial court's decision to proceed immediately with sentencing nor raised this issue in his motion for new trial. Error, if any, has not been preserved for this Court's review.

            Even if Haskett had not waived the right to a separate punishment hearing, we believe the trial court properly conducted such a hearing. The record shows that, when all evidence was concluded as to Haskett's guilt or innocence, the State and defense each announced the evidence was closed. The State waived closing argument concerning guilt or innocence. Haskett urged the court to leave Haskett on deferred adjudication community supervision. The court announced its determination of each of the alleged violations regarding Haskett's community supervision conditions and said, "I'll now call the case for punishment."

            The State announced that it had no more evidence, but asked the court to take judicial notice of prior hearings in that court concerning Haskett and any presentence investigation report. Haskett's counsel stated that he saw no reason for Haskett to testify again and urged the court to place Haskett on five years' community supervision. In response, the State requested the court to assess punishment of ten years' confinement.

            On completion of these statements, the trial court assessed an eight-year sentence in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and gave Haskett an opportunity to speak before sentencing. After Haskett's response, the court sentenced him.

            We believe the trial court properly conducted a separate punishment hearing. The fact that neither the State nor Haskett offered additional testimony does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trial court denied Haskett his right to a separate punishment hearing.

            We overrule Haskett's first point of error.

Disproportionate Sentence

            In his second point of error, Haskett contends the trial court's imposition of an eight-year sentence constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment. Illegal possession of cocaine in an amount greater than one gram but less than four grams is a third degree felony. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(c). The punishment range for a third degree felony is imprisonment for "not more than 10 years or less than 2 years." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.34(a) (Vernon 2003). Haskett's sentence of eight years falls within the statutory range provided by law.

            Traditionally, as long as the punishment assessed is within the range prescribed by the Texas Legislature in a valid statute, the punishment is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Samuel v. State, 477 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983), held the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed. The Solem Court provided a test which required a court's proportionality analysis to be guided by objective criteria, including (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. See id.

            The United States Supreme Court again addressed the proportionality analysis in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). As this Court noted in Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664–65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref'd), Harmelin modified the Solem test. Although five of the justices in Harmelin rejected the Solem test, seven still supported an Eighth Amendment prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences. Id. at 664.

            In Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.), we clarified Solem's proportionality analysis as modified by Harmelin. We recognized that, under the United States and Texas Constitutions, 1) a prohibition against "grossly disproportionate" sentences survives independently of legislative punishment ranges, and 2) a modified Solem analysis applies. Id. at 846. Under our decision in Jackson, we first make a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then consider whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Id.; see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Only if we find the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense should we then consider the remaining Solem factors and compare the sentence received to sentences for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction and to sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Jackson, 989 S.W.2d at 846; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; see also Alberto v. State, 100 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Fluellen v. State, 71 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd); Latham v. State, 20 S.W.3d 63, 69 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd).

            In the case now before us, we cannot say Haskett's eight-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense he admitted committing. Haskett received less than the State's requested maximum sentence of ten years. In 2001, the trial court had shown Haskett leniency by overruling the State's motion to adjudicate guilt even though it found he had committed the new criminal offense of driving while intoxicated. Given the record in this case, we cannot say the severity of the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record comparing the sentence with the sentences imposed against other defendants in this or other jurisdictions who committed a similar offense. See Fluellen, 71 S.W.3d at 873; Latham, 20 S.W.3d at 69; Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664–65.

            For the reasons stated, we overrule Haskett's second point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

                                                                        Jack Carter

                                                                        Justice

Date Submitted:          June 15, 2004

Date Decided:             June 16, 2004

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