Ely v. Webster

102 Mass. 304
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1869
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 102 Mass. 304 (Ely v. Webster) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ely v. Webster, 102 Mass. 304 (Mass. 1869).

Opinion

Colt, J.

The defendant’s acceptances were given for liquors sold to him by the plaintiffs in New York, at various times, in 1867, and are all dated in that year. Finch v. Mansfield, 97 Mass. 89.

At the time of these sales, § 61 of the Gen. Sts. c. 86, was in force, declaring that “ all payments or compensations for spirituous or intoxicating liquors sold in violation of law, whether in money, labor or personal property, shall be held to have been .eceived without consideration, and against law, equity and good [306]*306conscience,” and no action of any kind shall be had or main tained in any court for the price of any liquor sold in any other state for the purpose of being brought into this Commonwealth to be here kept or sold in violation of law, under such circumstances that the vendor would have reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser entertained such illegal purpose; and all bills of exchange, promissory notes, and other securities for and evidences of debt whatsoever, given in whole or in part for the price of liquor sold in violation of this chapter, shall be void against all persons holding the same with notice of such illegal consideration, either direct or implied by law.” •

Is a sale- made in the state of New York by a citizen of that state within the meaning of the statute ? The statutes of this Commonwealth can have no force beyond the limits of the state, to render invalid a contract for the sale of goods, lawful by the law of the place where made. They cannot reach with penalties the parties to such sale. At most, it can only be enacted, with reference to such, sales, that, when the contract is made with a view to a subsequent sale of the same goods in this state in violation of the law here, or under such circumstances that the vendor would have reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser entertained such illegal purpose, no action shall be maintained in the courts of this state for the price. This is all the statute attempts. It touches the remedy only. It speaks of two descriptions of sales, namely, sales in violation of law or of this chapter, and, as contradistinguished from them, sales made in any other states for the purpose of illegal sale here.

The phrase, sold in violation of this chapter,” therefore, as used in that part of the section which refers to the securities taken, means sold in this state in violation of it. Abberger v. Marrin, ante, 70. The plaintiffs’ acceptances were never void in his hands. If they had been under this law, it may be true that the repeal of it would not have given them validity.

It is further claimed that the evidence offered was admissible under that part of the statute, above stated, which denies to the vendor of liquors sold out of the state the right to maintain an action for the price. The repéal of this provision, before the [307]*307commencement of this suit, as it affects only the remedy, restores the plaintiffs’ rights, and the defence must rest solely on the principles of the common law as applied to illegal sales. By these rules, knowledge on the part of the seller that the goods are purchased to be used or sold by the buyer in violation of law is, at least, necessary to deprive him of his right to recover the price. Adams v. Coulliard, ante, 167.

The defendant only offered to prove that the plaintiffs had reasonable cause to believe that the liquors were purchased to b« sold by the defendant in violation of the laws of this state 1 his was not enough to show the participation of the plaintiffs in the illegal purpose. Even under the statute, the evidence offered would fall short of its requirements. It omitted that which is the foundation of the defence; namely, proof of the ilbgal purpose of the purchaser. It is not enough that the seller his reasonable cause to believe it; he may be mistaken in that b( lief, and the jury may find the buyer innocent of any illegal dt sign. Savage v. Mallory, 4 Allen, 492.

In any aspect the evidence as it was offered was immaterial.

Exceptions overruled.

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Bluebook (online)
102 Mass. 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ely-v-webster-mass-1869.